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ABSTRACT  
 
In the period before their accession to the European Union (EU) the 
formerly communist countries of eastern Europe were expected to reform 
their economic and social policies to satisfy EU-wide requirements and to 
become competitive in a market-orientated system.  The countries were 
subject to pressure in the accession negotiations and eligible for aid to help 
them adapt.  This thesis examines the influences that the EU brought to 
bear in the field of vocational education and training (VET) and investigates 
why the EU made the requirements that it did.  
The thesis adopts a historical methodology, tracing the previous evolution 
of EU policy on VET on the one hand, and the state of VET under 
communism in eastern Europe on the other.  It then examines the factors 
impinging on VET caused by the pressures of economic transition and the 
accession process.  The treatment of VET during the accession 
negotiations and in the programme of aid are investigated in detail.  
Interviews with a number of key participants in the process shed light on 
the assumptions and reactions of the main stakeholders. 
The thesis shows how the EU’s interventions stemmed largely from its 
internal policies on VET rather than from a diagnosis of the problems of 
individual eastern countries.  The EU increasingly applied to the East the 
emphasis on lifelong learning and the methods of negotiated target-setting 
that it had evolved to make an impact with existing member states.  Various 
common European instruments for VET which emerged after 2002 also 
impinged on the East, though they had been presaged by a distinctive 
approach to curriculum design which featured in aid projects in the East. 
At the level of specific policy areas, the thesis findings tend to support a 
neo-functionalist interpretation of what drives integration within the EU. 
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CHAPTER ONE  
  
PERHAPS YOU CAN TELL ME HOW ALL THIS STARTED?  
Introduction, Questions, Scope and Structure 
 
I would like to be able to report that there had been snow on my boots as I 
entered the office of the Director of the National Centre for Technical and 
Vocational Education and Training Development in Bucharest in early 
January 2005.  But the big fall of snow that year came a couple of weeks 
later, making the city’s streets difficult to get round on foot and lengthening 
my thirty minute walk to and from the office where our project was located. 
The Centre’s office in Spiru Haret street, a couple of hundred yards from 
the Athena Palace hotel where spies had mingled in the cold war, had 
presented a forbidding aspect as I entered it with the leader of the project 
which I had joined the day before.  The cavernous entrance hall was mired 
in gloom, lit only by a single dim bulb.  I could vaguely make out the office 
of a concierge to one side, but we were not challenged as we passed 
through and up the broad, stone stairway to the first floor.  A little light 
penetrated here, sufficient to show the peeling walls of the corridor.  
Dinginess and shabbiness were the overriding impressions. 
However passing through a modest doorway into the wing occupied by the 
National Centre revealed a cheerier prospect.  There were carpets, light 
and warmth, and a distinct bustle.  Indeed the place was overflowing with 
paper; files had outgrown the filing cabinets and were stacked in every 
spare space in the offices as well as in the corridors.  
It became apparent that my introduction to the Director was neither a 
courtesy call, nor an occasion on which advice from me was expected.  
Rather I was clearly being examined to see whether I was likely to be 
suitable as the new ‘Key Expert in National Qualifications Frameworks’, as 
my job title was rather cumbersomely styled.  This was curious as I already 
had a contract to serve in this capacity, but it transpired that my 
predecessor had been found wanting in some mysterious respect and it 
was judged that it would be as well if I passed muster at the earliest 
possible occasion. 
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In fact I was not overly worried by the examination.  I had served in the 
British Civil Service for over 20 years and most of my career had been 
concerned with vocational education and training.  I had been on the team 
that developed National Vocational Qualifications in the 1980s, and five 
years before this interview I had been, for a number of years, the 
Department of Employment and Education’s lead policy person on 
vocational qualifications.  I was not sure whether the UK had invented the 
idea of a qualifications framework, but it was certainly one of the earliest 
proponents of the notion.  What is more, the examination in Spiru Haret 
was not a ‘make or break’ moment for me.  I had accepted the position 
offered to me by IMC, the consultancy firm which was engaged to run the 
project,* rather on the spur of the moment, as a chance to travel and to run 
alongside the other advisory activities that I had developed in the UK after 
leaving the Department three years earlier.  In short, if they didn’t want me I 
would not have worried too much about taking the next plane home. 
However, I was rather thrown when in the course of this first interview – 
when I was explaining my previous dealings with the English Qualifications 
and Curriculum Authority (QCA) – the Director asked me: “Do you know 
Mike Coles?”  As a matter of fact I did, and said that I had last seen him 
only a month before in a bar in Mexico.  This seemed a very satisfactory 
reply, and I was then treated to a rapid series of views on the papers Mike 
and his colleague Tim Oates (both QCA officials) had written exploring the 
possibility of a European Qualifications Framework (Coles and Oates, 
2005) – a treatise I must confess (but didn’t on this occasion) I had not read 
from cover to cover. 
At the end of the interview I remembered, just in time, the golden rule for 
any consultant; to establish what it is that the client wants.  Despite reams 
of material on the background to Romania’s vocational education and 
training system, the project, its tasks and the duties of its various members, 
it was not entirely clear to me just why they should want a national 
qualifications framework, let alone an English person to advise them on it.  
“What do you want in terms of qualifications?” was the best I could do at 
the time.  “We want European qualifications”  was the answer. 
                                                
* For the arrangements under which projects were run see page 175.  
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Over the next few days I pondered this response.  I read about, and talked 
to people about, the reforms that had been taking place in Romania’s VET 
system.  Modules, occupational standards, competencies, standard-setting 
industry bodies all – rather to my surprise – featured in the landscape.  This 
looked familiar to someone from the UK! 
I also learned about Romania’s educational institutions: the Bacalaureat 
examination at the end of secondary education, the various types of upper 
secondary Liceu, and the vocationally oriented Şcoala de Arte şi Meserii.  
The evocations of the French Baccalauréat, Lycées and Écoles d’Arts et 
Métiers were surely due to more than just the common Latin roots of the 
two languages. 
A number of questions formed in my mind.  Why did the Romanians want a 
national qualifications framework?  Why was the European Union (which 
was paying my wages) anxious to help them develop one?  Did Romania 
not already have a qualifications framework (there clearly were different 
grades and types of qualification, most of them of long standing)?  By 
‘European’, did they aspire to being like any particular European country – 
if so which one – or were they keen to adhere to some kind of common 
strand of ‘European-ness’ which it was my job to discern; or again was 
there an EU policy on vocational qualifications which it was my duty to 
promote?  If the latter, where did it come from, because in all my years in 
senior positions in VET in the UK, I had never heard of such a policy. 
It was these kinds of questions that led, some four years later and after 
further experience in Croatia and Serbia as well as on assignments with the 
OECD, that I decided to investigate the origins and nature of the European 
Union’s (EU) interventions on vocational education and training in eastern 
Europe, using the vehicle of a PhD to do so. 
 
Context 
Some background is needed to understand why I was asked to attend that 
meeting in Spiru Haret Street.  Like other eastern European countries 
Romania had, since soon after the second world war, been under 
communist government.   Most of these countries had also been under the 
sway of the Soviet Union, economically and militarily.  In 1989 and 1990, 
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through a dramatic series of popular revolutions, most of the countries* had 
replaced communism with other forms of, more or less, democratic 
government and progressively subscribed to a free-market economic 
system.  These moves were welcomed and materially supported by the EU.  
While these political and economic transitions were under way the 
countries made applications to join the Union, which most achieved in 
2004.   
The EU’s support programme covered a large range of topics, including 
education, training and employment.  Similarly the negotiations for 
accession to the EU involved steps to align each country’s internal policies 
and institutions with the practices laid down in the various treaties, 
directives and decisions of the EU, which also covered aspects of domestic 
education, training and employment policy. 
 
Previous studies in the f ield 
I do not believe that the topic of the EU’s policy on VET in eastern Europe 
has been thoroughly addressed before, at least in the English language.  
Having said that, there has been a considerable, and increasing, academic 
focus on issues which have a bearing on the matter. 
Since the late 1990s there has been a growth in a distinct school of 
academic commentary which has addressed the topic of ‘globalization’ in 
an education context, particularly with regard to the role of international 
organizations (including the EU) in stimulating convergent practice.  This 
school (which has a dedicated journal in Globalisation, Societies and 
Education) has two strands, which sometimes overlap, but which can be 
usefully distinguished.  The first focuses on new ‘spaces’ in education 
policy which it is claimed is no longer confined to national borders (Lawn 
and Grek, 2012; Lawn and Nóvoa, 2002; Robertson and Dale, 2008).  
There are also new forms of governance (Dale and Robertson, 2006), not 
only through the establishment of transnational expert groups (Normand, 
                                                
* The trajectory for the countries of the former Yugoslavia were somewhat different.  
By the late 1980s, after the death of Tito in 1980, the system could scarcely be 
called communist.  But from the early 1990s, a series of former republics of 
Yugoslavia split off from Serbia, the remaining Yugoslav republic, in most cases 
with concomitant wars, including the departure of Kosovo, a province of the 
Serbian Republic, to be administered by the UN. 
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2010; Robert, 2012), but importantly through the use of comparative data 
and peer review to stimulate convergence towards improved educational 
outcomes (Ozga et al., 2011).  This first strand can be seen to align with 
the view of Castells (2010) that the EU is the first ‘network state’, 
constituted out of a series of projects, policies, information flows and 
groupings of people, rather than an incipient ‘super-state’ which replicates 
the nation state on a larger or federated basis.*  While Castells considers 
that there is so far something of a void in terms of a distinct European 
identity shared by its citizens, other authors with an educational 
background claim to be able to spot an emerging one shaped by a stress 
on individual responsibility for lifelong learning and the development of 
personal capacities including the key process skills which lead to 
employability (Stoera and Magalhães, 2004). 
Rather than the formation of a new common educational policy, modes of 
governance and possibly joint identity, the second strand within this school 
considers that international organizations in general, and the EU in 
particular, have acted as vehicles for the transmission of ‘neo-liberal’ values 
stemming from Anglo-American political ideas of the 1980s.  This – 
allegedly – has led to the admirable humanistic sentiments of UNESCO’s 
concept of lifelong education (Faure, 1972) being corrupted into EU notions 
of lifelong learning which stress only instrumental employability (Borg and 
Mayo, 2005).  In the field of education and training there is a distinct 
"…coincidence of the Commission's agendas and the interests of 
international capital..." (Sultana, 2002, p.121).  The influence of global 
capital manifests itself not so much through direct representation, but 
through the emergence of a “dominant educational discourse” which links 
education to economic growth (Moutsios, 2010, p.121), or even through the 
increasing use of the English language itself (Brockmann, Clarke and 
Winch, 2011; Gough, 2014).  At the same time, a cult of ‘performativity’ 
through internationally comparable statistics “… constitute[s] an emergent 
                                                
* As Castells himself hints, the idea of units of governance which do not align with 
clear geographical and political boundaries, but rather with shared projects, beliefs 
and modes of action which are limited in scope and which allow participants to join 
other groupings, is hardly new in Europe.  The Holy Roman Empire, the Crusades, 
the Order of the Teutonic Knights, the Hanseatic League, the various churches and 
monastic orders, as well as modern examples such as Comecon/Warsaw Pact and 
NATO, all have these characteristics, though the EU could perhaps be represented 
as a particularly intense and institutionalized constellation of such arrangements. 
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global education policy field existing as an imaginary above nations” (Ozga 
and Lingard, 2007, p.77), and previously firmly public sector education 
services are subject to ‘managerialism’ and ‘marketization’ (Ball, 2007; 
Grek and Rinne, 2011).  Much of this literature is unashamedly polemical: 
for example, Taylor et al. start their work by “…making our own 
commitment to democracy and social justice explicit” (1997, p.viii), while 
Rizvi and Lingard conclude that “a new social imaginary is necessary to 
frame education policy in the wake of the egregious failures of 
neoliberalism” (2009, p.202).  Avis (2012) considers that VET policy 
“constitute[s] a site of struggle” against a “neoliberal hegemony” – an 
enterprise which “needs to be set within a rigorously anti-capitalist stance” 
(pp.8-9).* 
Despite the amount of literature from the ‘globalization’ school, and perhaps 
surprisingly in view of the apparent attractiveness of the interaction 
between the EU and the new East as a case study of the transmission of 
educational ideas through the agency of an international organization, there 
is little within this school about eastern Europe during the accession period.  
There are, of course, less theory-laden accounts of EU policy on education 
and training.  For example Ertl (2006) gives a readable overview of the 
evolution of this policy from the outset.  A very thorough, though wholly 
uncritical, account is contained in the EU’s official history of its education 
policy (European Commission, 2006b).  However neither work deals with 
the enlargement of the Community, still less with the EU’s promotion of 
VET through its aid programmes for eastern Europe. 
There have been a number of articles concerning VET in individual eastern 
European countries in the European Journal of Vocational Education and 
Training, published by CEDEFOP,† but these are in the main country-
specific and often concerned only with a particular aspect of VET.  They do 
not tell the story of the EU’s interventions as a whole.  While an edited 
collection by Strietska-Ilina (2007a) carries useful responses from writers in 
                                                
*This school has a very distinctive terminology – ‘hegemony’, ‘struggles’, the 
‘unmasking’ of deceptively attractive doctrines, problems frequently described as 
‘crises’, ‘imaginary’ (curiously used as a noun, connoting a commonly held societal 
concept), ‘emergent’ almost invariably used in favour of the much more common 
‘emerging’, ‘performativity’ etc.  For those that lay such stress on the role of 
discourse (another favourite) in framing thought, such idiosyncratic usages must be 
trying to say something. 
† European Centre for the Development of Vocational Training.  See Glossary. 
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the ‘new member states’ to various EU education and training policies, it 
does not describe or explain the genesis of those policies, let alone attempt 
to present them as a coherent whole. 
There is, of course, a considerable literature about the policy and process 
of EU enlargement, for example Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2005), 
but little on the specific case of education and training.  There is also a 
sizeable literature about the challenges of economic transition in the new 
member states, including some material on the specific challenges facing 
VET (for example, Mertaugh and Hanshek, 2005), these do not seek to 
describe or evaluate the role of the EU in helping candidates for accession 
to address these challenges. 
The European Training Foundation published a range of detailed studies of 
VET in the accession countries in the early 2000s. They do not, of 
themselves, give an account of the policies of the EU in relation to these 
countries, though in Chapter Eight I shall suggest that material from them 
can be used to identify what the main concerns of the EU were. 
The work which probably comes closest to the field addressed here, is 
Jean-Raymond Masson’s account of the support policies of the EU in VET 
in candidate countries (Masson, 2003).  The description of EU policies is 
very helpful and we shall make full use of it.  However it is confined to a 
single chapter, deals largely with the support instruments (rather than the 
accession negotiations) and comes to an end in 2002, before the rolling out 
of the EU’s Copenhagen process which I shall argue amounted to a new 
direction in influence. 
 
Research questions 
In framing research one needs to be rather more precise than the initial 
barrage of questions which assailed me in that first week in Bucharest.  For 
the purposes of my research I formulated the following: 
• In what ways did the EU intend to influence VET in eastern Europe? 
• Why did it select these particular items?   
• How did it pursue these aims?  
• What explains the approach that was taken by the EU? 
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• How influential was the EU in changing VET policies in the countries 
concerned? 
The last question needs a little qualification.  It would have been very 
attractive to be able to gauge the influence and effectiveness of the EU’s 
policies on the subsequent structures and performance of the VET systems 
in the eastern European countries.  However, this would have required a 
longer and wider perspective than I could achieve.  It is not so long since 
accession to took place, and any thorough examination of effects would 
have involved an in-depth country-by-country investigation.  However this 
study will record and discuss the more obvious and immediate forms of EU 
impact on the East. 
 
Scope 
Clearly we need to define what we mean by eastern Europe and what we 
mean by vocational education and training.  Both terms can be interpreted 
in different ways. 
Eastern Europe is a fluid geographical and political term.  Geographically 
eastern Europe stretches from the Urals in the east to somewhere around 
the Vistula in modern-day Poland and the eastern rim of the Carpathian 
mountains in the west; the Balkan peninsula is perhaps something rather 
separate.  The Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovenia and Croatia generally 
describe themselves as central, rather than eastern European.  Some 
Romanians would describe their country as belonging to the Balkans 
geographically.  Finland sees itself as firmly Nordic rather than eastern 
European.  Politically one tends to think of eastern Europe as the former 
European states of the Warsaw Pact other than the Soviet Union itself, 
though such a definition would rule out the Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia 
and Lithuania which were part of the Soviet Union proper until 1991, as 
were the Ukraine and Moldova which surely must be regarded as eastern 
European.  This definition would also rule out the states which were formed 
in the 1990s from the fragmentation of the former Yugoslavia which was not 
a member of the Warsaw Pact, though it had a communist government until 
the early 1980s.  In this study, however,  the definition of eastern Europe is 
pragmatic – it is concerned with those European states which in the 1970s 
fell under a communist form of government and which today have either 
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joined or have been accepted as potential candidates for entry to the 
European Union – excepting the former German Democratic Republic 
(which is a special case, having ceased to exist as a separate nation).  The 
study does not aim to cover the western Balkan states of Albania, Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Kosovo and the former Yugoslav Republic 
of Macedonia, all of which are decidedly Balkan, and none of which either 
fell under the Warsaw Pact or have yet joined the EU.   
So we are concerned with the following twelve countries: Estonia, Latvia 
and Lithuania (collectively known as the Baltic States), Poland, the Czech 
Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia, Romania and 
Bulgaria.   
Similarly vocational education and training (VET) is a wide concept, being 
used differently by different commentators (Bosch and Charest, 2010; 
Grubb and Ryan, 1999).  In its wider usages it covers any curriculum 
content in school which aims to prepare for the labour market, much of 
higher education, a great deal of formal education undertaken by adults 
together with training conducted within firms.  For the purposes of this study 
VET for young people (sometimes referred to as initial VET – IVET) is 
intended to connote programmes within secondary education which 
prepare for specific roles in the labour market as well as apprenticeships, 
and VET for adults (sometimes referred to as continuing VET – CVET) is 
intended to connote specific programmes and state-supported interventions 
for those over the age of 21 to train or retrain for labour market roles.  The 
study will not cover in any depth the important areas of VET within higher 
education, training within firms undertaken without state intervention, or 
wider aspects of lifelong learning except inasmuch as they impact on the 
more formal structures.  The reason for this focus on public, rather than 
private, provision of VET is simply that the EU, as a body which largely 
deals with and through national governments, is more concerned with 
public policies and processes than with attempting itself directly to influence 
the private sphere. 
In terms of period, the thesis is primarily concerned with the time from the 
fall of communism in 1989-91 and the accession of the last of the initial ten 
eastern candidates at the beginning of 2007, though some later material 
relevant to Croatia (which joined in 2013) and Serbia (which has yet to join) 
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is included, and a brief discussion of the post-accession effects is made in 
the final chapter. 
Though naturally the story of the interaction between the EU and eastern 
countries continued after accession, cutting off the story at this point is 
logical.  After accession the lever of conditionality (reform in exchange for 
membership) disappeared, as did the EU’s direction of the aid programmes 
for VET (the new member states instead had access to the EU’s normal 
structural funds on the same basis as existing members).  Though the EU 
continued to monitor, and no doubt influence, VET practices in the eastern 
countries after this point, it did so in the same way as for all member states.  
In short, after accession the countries no longer were in any way distinctive 
in official EU terms, and the nature of their story and that of the EU 
changes.  
 
Structure 
The next chapter concerns a rationale for the methodology chosen, and an 
introduction to the framework used for examining the driving forces behind 
the EU.  Thereafter the study is set out as follows: 
• Chapters Three and Four deal with separate starting points as they 
affect our story – the legacy of communism on the one hand and the 
genesis of VET policies within the EU on the other; 
• Chapters Five and Six deal with the implications for VET in the two 
main events that occurred after the EU and eastern Europe 
engaged with each other in the 1990s; the shock of economic 
transition, and – overlapping with this – the process of accession to 
the EU; 
• Chapter Seven summarizes the main ideas relevant to VET which 
arose from the historical legacy and the reactions to it; 
• Chapters Eight and Nine then deal in detail with the particular 
instruments used by the EU to influence VET in eastern Europe – 
the pressures brought to bear on VET in the negotiations for 
accession, and the EU-funded support programme which aimed to 
develop VET in the East; 
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• Chapter Ten presents perspectives of a range of people from 
various countries who participated in one way or another in the 
processes we have described.  
The final chapter presents the conclusions of the study, reflects on the 
methodology and outlines areas which might be of interest for further study. 
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CHAPTER TWO  
 
HOW CAN WE FIND OUT WHAT WAS GOING ON?  
Concepts, Methodology and Methods 
 
Introduction 
How do we investigate the EU’s approach to VET in the East?  We need 
some framework for interpreting what was taking place, an acceptable 
system of investigation, and particular means for extracting relevant 
information.  This chapter lays out the rationale, in turn, for the conceptual 
framework, methodology and methods used. 
 
A Conceptual Framework 
We are dealing here with the actions of a supranational organization (the 
EU) in supporting and eventually admitting to its membership a series of 
countries, and specifically in seeking to influence the arrangements for 
vocational education and training in those countries.  In this context a 
number of interpretative frameworks are possible.  
One could see this as an exercise in international relations – attempts by 
one country, or in this case a group of countries, to influence other 
countries such as to further the interests of the influencer(s).  That is 
patently something of what was going on, but such an interpretation would 
leave open the important issue of whether the EU can be seen as a 
‘country’ capable of taking international initiatives, or whether it should 
more correctly be seen as a collection of countries acting in their several 
interests and co-operating on a voluntary basis. 
Again, one could view the EU’s interest in promoting the development of 
VET in the East as an example of international aid.  Certainly aid for 
development was a feature, but this was only one strand – there was also 
the question of the conditions for accession and the progressive 
incorporation of personnel from the East into EU networks. 
Similarly ‘policy borrowing’ in the field of vocational education has for many 
years been the topic of research and comment (Finegold, McFarland and 
Richardson, 1993; Phillips and Ochs, 2003); there is no doubt, as we shall 
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discover, that a certain amount of borrowing went on, both deliberately and 
inadvertently.  However this was far from the whole story and if we are 
dealing – as we are – with the EU’s policy rather than the policies of the 
various eastern European countries, then borrowing by the EU from the 
existing member states was not a large feature; indeed it was in many ways 
notable by its absence. 
A further possibility would be interpret the interaction as one of the 
deployment of different types of influence.  Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 
(2005b) have researched the process of enlargement of the EU in different 
policy areas (though not in education or VET).  They see three different 
modes of influence: ‘conditionality’ (the need for new states to abide by 
existing EC law); lesson-drawing (the desire on the part of states to solve 
their problems by taking solutions from other countries), and ‘social 
learning’ (the desire to join in and co-operate with others). We shall re-visit 
this framework during the course of this thesis, but it is essentially an 
examination of process – what modes of influencing were used and were 
most effective – rather than seeking to explain why the policy took the form 
that it did.  
On reflection it seems reasonable to see the EU’s policies, both towards 
VET and towards the issue of the enlargement of the Community, in the 
light of a more general view of how EU policies and institutions develop.  A 
number of different interpretations, under the general description of 
‘European Integration Theory’, have been put forward over the years to 
explain the process of policy development at the EU level, treating the EU 
as a very particular case, without obvious parallels in other international 
organizations.  There are a large number of these theories – Wiener and 
Diez (2009) discuss eleven, ranging from federalism to feminism.  Not all of 
these theories purport to explain all dimensions of the EU’s development, 
and there is a certain amount of overlap between some of them. However, 
the following four would seem both to represent a useful contrast to each 
other and to have implications for the way policy on VET has been arrived 
at.  First we look briefly at each of the four, and then we consider what it 
might have to say about VET. 
‘Neo-functionalism’: early functionalist theories held that the post-war 
transnational organizations designed to deal with particular issues (eg. 
trade, international diplomacy, finance etc.) offered the prospect of 
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superseding the nation-state and heralded a more rational world order, as 
interest groups addressed themselves to the new institutions, rather than 
their national governments, according to the functions that they were 
interested in (Mitrany, 1944).  Building on this, academic theorists of the 
initial formation of the EU added elements explaining why such institutions 
appeared to take on a life of their own and grow in significance, as 
happened in the expansion of institutions in the 1950s from the European 
Coal and Steel Community to the European Economic Community (Haas, 
1968; Lindberg, 1963).  Though the stagnation of the development of the 
Community in the 1960s and 1970s led many (including Haas) to reject the 
notion of continuous and progressive integration which was implicit in the 
theory, it was revived in the 1990s when it became apparent that the EU 
was gaining new functions and new members (Stone Sweet and Sandholtz, 
1998).   
Neo-functionalism is based on the ideas of rational actors seeking to 
advance their interests through the new transnational institutions, the 
importance of interest groups and elites who progressively associate 
themselves on a transnational basis, and the reinforcing effects from within 
EU institutions (eg. the Commission) which develop a distinctive mission to 
enhance their own role, thus adding impetus to further integration.  The 
important neo-functionalist concept of ‘spillover’ accounts for a self-
reinforcing dynamic as integration in one field (eg. the mobility of labour) 
inevitably leads to pressure for integration in others (eg. common 
immigration and asylum policies, moves towards European citizenship).  
Neo-functionalism predicts gradualist, technocratic, path-dependent and 
perhaps accidental pathways to integration.  The founding father of the EU, 
Jean Monnet, was arguably in this camp, as he believed in progressive 
integration area by area: 
The new method of action developed in Europe replaces the 
efforts at domination of nation states by a constant process of 
collective adaptation to new conditions, a chain reaction, a 
ferment where one change induces another. (Monnet, 2003) 
‘Liberal inter-governmentalism’, in contrast to neo-functionalism, holds that 
the governments of member states (rather than EU officials, elites or 
interest groups) are the main actors, and that the process of European 
integration is entirely dependent on the extent to which powerful states are 
prepared to encourage or countenance it.  States form their preferences 
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through their own internal political processes, bargain with each other to 
reach a policy solution and, where it is in their interests to have a durable 
inter-governmental arrangement, erect supranational institutions to 
administer the mutually agreed solution and to enforce compliance with it.  
Thus the EU is no different in principle to other supranational organizations 
(such as the United Nations or trade bodies) erected through international 
agreement – the degree, direction and speed of integration is explicable by 
the sum of the preferences of its constituents factored by their relative 
bargaining power.* 
Though it is often contrasted with neo-functionalism, liberal inter-
governmentalism shares with it the belief that the various actors (in this 
case the member states) are acting rationally. Milward (1992) considered 
that European integration and the formation of supranational institutions 
were: 
… not the supersession of the nation-state by another form of 
governance ... but [the supranational institutions were] the 
creation of European nation-states themselves for their own 
purposes, an act of national will. (p.18) 
Though the Community was in fact the servant rather than the master of 
the various member states, it was sometimes convenient for a national 
government to blame the EU “for unpopular policies which were also those 
of the government itself, and, when it suited the mood, caricatured as a 
technocratic dictatorship trampling the rights of [national citizens] underfoot” 
(p.116).  Contra the neo-functionalists, there is nothing at all inevitable 
about ‘ever closer union’.   
Moravcsik (1998) analyzed major ‘turning points’ in the development of the 
EU (such as the creation of the Single Economic Area) and concluded in 
each case that the outcome was the rational outcome of a bargaining 
process undertaken by states with varying degrees of (primarily 
commercial) interest and negotiating power.  Liberal inter-governmentalism 
has been criticized for confining its explanations to a relatively limited 
number of (admittedly important) démarches, for discounting the steady 
incremental process of day-to-day decision-making, and for failing to 
recognize that EU institutions depart from their original, inter-
                                                
* This inter-governmental theory is labelled ‘liberal’ in contrast to ‘realist’ because it 
asserts that countries’ preferences are set through their internal political processes 
rather than purely by their geo-political position. 
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governmentally agreed, missions.  Its proponents, however, insist that such 
effects are relatively weak, and reversible by national governments acting 
in consort (Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig, 2009). 
Constructivists place less emphasis on purely rational behaviour – whether 
the interaction of groups acting in their own interests (central to the neo-
functionalist position), or the outcome of bargaining between nation-states 
committed to promoting their individual interests.   Constructivists hold that 
European institutions are not merely the reflection of the intentions of those 
that created them, or those that work in them, but themselves influence 
those actors in new ways.  A belief that people not only create, but also are 
shaped by the institutions that they take part – that social ways of behaving 
of themselves constitute the ideas of meaning held by individuals – stems 
from a wide range of disciplines, including the philosophy of Heidegger, the 
anthropological work of Lévi-Strauss and the sociology of Giddens (Crotty, 
1998).  Following  the import of these ideas into theories of international 
relations (Adler, 1997),  Checkel (1999) drew attention to the need to 
supplement concepts of rational actors developing (or hindering) European 
integration with “…a more sociological understanding of institutions that 
stresses their interest- and identity-forming roles” (p.545).  
Thus the social constructivist point of view asserts that the very creation of 
the EU – including its institutions, its conventions of how states should 
behave, its formal meetings of state representatives, recognized interests, 
experts, and informal groupings – has led all these actors to adopt new 
norms and attitudes and so influences their future actions.  By such a 
process a genuinely new and distinctively ‘European’ entity is constructed, 
culminating eventually in a widespread common sense of identity. 
We may therefore see in the constructivist camp that strand of commentary 
on education in the EU context described on page 10 which points to a new 
‘space’ in educational policy-making and practice created by, and as a 
result of the EU, with pan-European instruments such as qualification 
frameworks, common educational patterns such as Bologna in higher 
education, governance through benchmarking and peer pressure and the 
creation of networks of experts from different countries as well as the day-
to-day interchange of teachers and students, each contributing to a 
distinctively European style of education policy which cannot be accounted 
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for by either the competing interests of different states or the machinations 
of a central bureaucracy.  
Finally there are a range of interpretations which emphasise economic 
drivers for increased European integration.  These assert the essential 
economic nature of the EU and view it as an arrangement which promotes 
economic growth and/or industrial/commercial interests.  Of course each of 
the three theories outlined so far have their economic dimensions – neo-
functionalists would not deny that much of the impetus of interest groups is 
economic, Milward was an economic historian and Moravcsik, as we have 
seen, stressed commercial advantage as an important motivation for the 
bargaining between states which characterizes liberal inter-
governmentalism. And constructivists would concede that many of the 
ostensible motivations which bring European actors together can be 
interpreted as having economic or commercial origins.  However those 
claiming a primacy for economic factors see these as providing a 
continuous force for integration, with the instruments represented in the 
other theories merely as the means through which the economic imperative 
plays itself out.  An early proponent of this point of view was Bela Balassa 
(1961) who provided a theoretical economic explanation for increasing EU 
integration and why it made sense to extend ‘co-ordination’ across different 
sectors, including monetary and fiscal policy.  
While there are many strands within this grouping, we may highlight two 
contrasting ones.  First there is the concept that there are different ‘varieties 
of capitalism’ (Hall and Soskice, 2001) representing different settlements 
whereby arrangements are made in different societies to promote trade and 
to counter or balance the otherwise unacceptable effects of economic 
growth.  Fioretos (2001) uses this framework to explain how different 
nations (in this case Britain and Germany during the Maastricht 
negotiations) press for different balances between trade, corporate 
regulation and welfare at the European level.   
A more conspiratorial interpretation is given by Cafruny and Ryne (2009), 
who claim that EU institutions merely reflect power structures elsewhere: 
Supranational institutions and ideas have not been, in 
themselves, the most important factors driving European 
integration.  Rather they have played a decisive role only to 
the extent that they have successfully articulated the interests 
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and strategies of the dominant national, regional and 
transatlantic social forces. (p.237) 
This stance is taken further in the second strand of the ‘globalization’ 
school of writers on EU education matters mentioned on page 11.   
Drawing on elements of Gramscian Marxism, ‘critical’ theory from the 
Frankfurt school, and sociology they hold that far from opening up the 
interesting and possibly benevolent new ‘spaces’ identified by the social 
constructivists, the EU has become – whether wittingly or unwittingly – the 
agent of promoting a relentlessly ‘neo-liberal’ viewpoint stemming from the 
‘Washington Consensus’ of the early 1990s and, particularly, the politics of 
Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher (Klees, 2008).  This neo-liberal 
sentiment has become so pervasive (‘hegemonic’), that it has infected the 
very language (‘discourse’) and frame of thinking (‘imaginary’) of the EU – a 
syndrome to which, it is claimed, international organizations are particularly 
vulnerable.  These international organizations then use their influence (in 
the case of the EU, a very considerable influence) to promote this new 
orthodoxy amongst its member states, to the advantage of international 
capitalist interests and to the detriment of workers.  Because of the patent 
unacceptability of this neo-liberal doctrine to the ordinary populations of 
countries, the governing elites have disguised (‘masked’) it in a discourse of 
emancipation (eg. freedom of choice), while claiming at the same time that 
‘there is no alternative.’  These devices have been sufficiently effective to 
enable governments espousing these doctrines to be repeatedly elected in 
the various European countries and to continue to countenance the neo-
liberal agenda of the EU.  The task of academics of this school, who pursue 
‘social justice’, is to expose (‘unmask’) such deceptions. 
The principal hallmarks of this type of neo-liberalism* are a belief in the 
effectiveness of markets (rather than the state or corporatist arrangements) 
in the allocation of resources, whether private or public, the promotion of 
unfettered free trade, the elimination of regulation so far as possible 
consistent with orderly markets, the reduction of public expenditure to allow 
more resources in the private sector, a transfer of previously public 
functions to the private sector with a more active management, through 
                                                
* Both Klees (2008) and Ball (2008), as subscribers to this school, give concise 
descriptions of the main tenets of neoliberalism and their implications for education 
policies. 
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internal competition, contracts and explicit targets, of those functions which 
perforce need to remain within the public sector (‘new public 
management’). In the sphere of VET the educational commentators from 
this school associate the neo-liberal agenda with attempts to introduce a 
“truncated and instrumentalised notion of knowledge” which is “anti-
educative” (Avis, 2012, p.7), and pressures leading to  “…education being 
conceived of mainly in vocational terms” (Borg and Mayo, 2005, p.209). 
It is, of course, possible to combine elements of these theories of 
integration, which are not necessarily mutually exclusive.  For example 
Anderson (2009) offers something of a ‘mix and match’ combination seeing 
the EU at different times as: 
• a project favoured by elites (both nationally and within the EU 
institutions), who take care not to expose it to any popular mandate, 
but who do not have any very clear end-view beyond the shared 
view that integration is desirable.  One can see the commonality 
with neo-functionalism here; 
• a geo-political device conceived both as a way to prevent further 
war in Europe (particularly to contain a potentially resurgent 
Germany), and to counter the Soviet bloc during the cold war.  In 
these aims the EU was inextricably linked to (and supported by) the 
USA.  Here we see an inter-governmentalist interpretation, ‘realist’ 
perhaps rather than ‘liberal’; 
• the EU as a vehicle for promoting free-trade economic relations, 
with this economic stance being put beyond the democratic sphere 
of individual nation states.  According to Anderson this aspect has 
increased over time; originally the EU was conceived by Monnet as 
being “capable, not simply of freeing factors of production across 
unified markets, but [also] of macro-economic intervention and 
social redistribution” (p.540).  However, these latter roles have 
atrophied leaving the EU primarily as a free-trade zone wedded to 
the freedom of capital within it.  Here Anderson clearly views the EU 
as a particular type of political economy. 
One can agree or not with Anderson’s interpretations, but the idea that the 
EU owes its nature to a number of different drivers, and that the balance 
between them shifts over time, is worth bearing in mind. 
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What kinds of approach to VET in eastern Europe might be expected under 
each of these different conceptions?  If the neo-functionalist interpretation 
is correct, one would expect the EU to have been feeling its way gradually 
to a policy on VET, driven largely by the Commission and other EU 
agencies aiming to increase their sphere of influence.  VET policy would 
often be a ‘spillover’ from other policy areas more central to the EU’s 
interests, and the policy in the East would in turn be largely derived from 
VET policies adopted in respect of the established member states.  
Interventions would have a technocratic flavour, and there would be an 
attempt to replicate in the East the apolitical structures developed in the 
existing EU. 
On the other hand if liberal inter-governmentalism were the dominant mode 
of operation, one would expect the eastern countries to have actively 
bargained over the VET policies they were expected to adopt, and the EU 
interventions to be traceable to some jointly agreed consensus amongst the 
established member states, perhaps reflecting some acceptable mixture of 
national policies.  On the ground one might expect the western countries to 
be trying to influence the new members to adopt their particular VET 
models, through consultancy and marketing, with the central EU agencies 
holding the ring between them. 
A social constructivist model would predict that the primary effect of policy 
on VET in the East would be the transfer – through mutual exchanges and 
networks – of a distinctive ‘European’ approach to VET initially formed 
through some kind of synthesis of practices in the older member states.  
One might expect this to have emerged gradually through transnational co-
operation facilitated, but not controlled, by the central EU agencies.  The 
East would be keen to participate in networks and to subscribe to the new 
practices, with its influence on them growing. 
Finally an interpretation based on the primacy of economic factors as the 
motor for EU integration would lead one to expect enlargement to the East 
to be driven largely by economic interests – the prospects of new sources 
of labour and fruitful locations for investment, and new consumer markets.  
One would expect major firms to take an active interest in publicly funded 
efforts for workforce development.  On the ‘varieties of capitalism’ reading, 
one might expect some competition of models between the more liberal 
and the more corporatist approaches, with a distinctive accommodation 
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being developed reflecting the emerging balance of interests in the East.  
On the ‘neo-liberal globalization’ school’s thesis, the EU would stress the 
role of VET rather than general education, with an instrumental bias in 
favour of satisfying the immediate needs of footloose industry, rather than 
developing the longer term human resources of the countries in question.  
There would be an emphasis on the economic rationale for VET – for 
example for increased productivity, stress on vocationally-orientated 
lifelong learning, and labour mobility – albeit ‘masked’ by an appealing 
rhetoric.  One might also expect private sector forms of VET to be favoured, 
and/or for market mechanisms such as competitive tendering, comparable 
performance data, vouchers etc. to be introduced within the public 
education sector. 
At certain points in what follows we shall take stock of which – if any – of 
the interpretations outlined here are exemplified in the events described. 
 
Methodology 
Different approaches to investigation of the topic were clearly possible.  It 
would have been possible to approach it through an examination of current 
VET practices in eastern Europe and to attempt to establish the extent to 
which they derived from interventions by the EU.  A series of case studies 
could have been undertaken, focussing on developments which were 
sponsored by the EU (such as the Romanian project on which I was 
engaged);  one could have sought to exemplify and explain whether the 
selected initiatives had taken root and what the determinants of 
sustainability seemed to be.  Indeed a case study method appears to be 
favoured by theorists of European integration; it was used by both Milward 
and Anderson and in their compendium of approaches to integration theory 
Wiener and Diez (2009) invite the proponents of each alternative theory to 
address specific policy cases to test the extent to which their approach 
does, or does not, apply.  In the field of VET in eastern Europe, Baumgartl, 
Strietska-Ilina and Schaumberger (2004) use a case study methodology to 
describe a range of EU-sponsored interventions in certain countries. 
However this kind of approach has limitations.  First, it could not easily 
address a number of the research questions.  While, admittedly, a case 
study approach might be able to give some in-depth context to the 
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particular methods the EU used in individual countries, and – supposing 
sufficient time had elapsed – perhaps enable one to track some of the 
country-specific effects, it could not directly shed light on the underlying 
rationale for the EU’s interventions.  One would need to retrospectively 
impute, from case study observations, what the EU’s intentions were, and 
why the interventions took the form that they did.  So while case studies 
might be effective in terms of the third and fifth research questions (page 
13), they could only be an indirect source of information about the other 
three, which concern the motivations of the EU.  
Moreover a selection of case studies which reflect EU interventions would 
suffer from the drawback that developments in VET which took place as a 
result of forces other than specific EU initiatives would tend not to come 
under examination.  As we shall see the EU’s VET policy spanned a large 
number of fields (eg. initial VET, continuing VET, lifelong learning, ways of 
framing the vocational curriculum, the nature of qualifications, the 
promotion of social partnership, active labour market measures etc.), not all 
of which were reflected in specific development projects.  A focus on 
specific EU interventions might therefore run the risk both of associating too 
many VET developments with EU support, and of missing wider influences 
of the EU, outside particular projects. 
Furthermore, from the practical point of view, the limitations of time and 
resources for doctoral research meant only a limited number of highly 
selective case studies could have been undertaken;  as there are twelve 
countries in scope to this study, no reasonable attempt could be made to 
encompass the entire region of eastern Europe.  Therefore one would need 
to impute EU motivations, not only retrospectively, but also on the basis of 
two or three cases, which might have been atypical.  Further, in-depth 
examination of the circumstances in a particular country would not have 
been feasible without access to local documentation and individuals.  It 
would have been unrealistic and unrepresentative to have relied on those 
sources which were in the English language, and – for me – unaffordable to 
have arranged for translation and interpretation.  And finally, as we have 
noted, there are already a number of case studies;  I have drawn on them 
in the course of this thesis. 
Instead of attempting to trace eastern VET practices to the influence of the 
EU, this study adopts a methodology of historical investigation combined 
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with a perspective of policy analysis, in tracking the evolution of VET policy 
both in the ‘old’ EU itself and in the context of its dealings with the eastern 
countries. A historical approach allows a wide range of factors to be 
considered including politics, personalities, economic events and social 
change;  “…history is both a craft and an art, drawing on formal research 
conventions yet embracing all interpretative traditions” (McCulloch and 
Richardson, 2000, p.9). 
This approach enables us to trace the evolution of the EU’s VET policy for 
eastern Europe, examining how it related to – or diverged from – the policy 
it had with respect to the established member states.  It also allows us to 
chart the interaction of that policy with the changing circumstances of the 
countries, and the perceptions of them.  However, it must be admitted that 
the ambition – embraced here – to cover policy towards all of the countries, 
and over a fifteen year period, does mean that the peculiarities of individual 
countries, and the recognition by the EU of these (where this happened), 
can only be touched upon.  And, and has been mentioned, the limited 
amount of country-specific context, together with the fact that the study 
finishes at the point of accession for the majority of countries, does mean 
that evidence of the effects of the EU’s intervention is restricted;  although 
certain common effects are noted (in the final chapter), the impact of the 
EU’s interventions will have impacted differently in different countries and 
no doubt continue to reverberate until the present. 
 
History 
Mahoney and Rueschemeyer (2003) characterize what they term 
‘comparative historical enquiry’ as being “fundamentally concerned with the 
explanation and the identification of cause and configurations that produce 
major outcomes of interest” (p.11).  The contribution of a historical 
approach is that it allows for “the unfolding of processes over time. 
...Comparative historical analysts incorporate considerations of the 
temporal structural of events in their explanations” (p.12).   
With one important caveat, to which I shall return, this is the approach 
adopted here.  The thesis is structured to track the ‘unfolding’ of a number 
of processes – the development of EU VET policy in general, the effects of 
economic transition for the eastern countries, the pressures arising through 
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the negotiations on accession, and the impact of the EU’s aid programme 
for VET – and to identify the interactions that each had (or failed to have) 
with the other at different times. 
As Mahoney and Rueschemeyer commend, this thesis uses “diverse 
methodologies and analytic tools” (p.34).  Thus in Chapter Eight we depart 
from a chronological account and undertake “...systematic and 
contextualized comparisons of similar and contrasting cases” (p.13) in the 
form of the reports of the different eastern countries made by the EU and 
the European Training Foundation.  Chapter Ten consists of interview 
evidence from a range people who undertook different roles in the 
negotiations and in the aid programmes.  As will be explained in the next 
section, we shall also make use of a range of different concepts from within 
the discipline of political science. 
Therefore, broadly, the approach taken is that attributed by McCulloch and 
Richardson (2000) to the ‘moderate revisionist’ school of educational 
history, namely an emphasis on narrative flow and on political and social 
context in explaining change (p.43).  This appears uncontentious: a “flexible 
use of both analytical and narrative modes [of historical writing]: sometimes 
in alternating sections, sometimes more completely fused throughout the 
text” is characterised by Tosh as “the way in which most academic 
historical writing is carried out today” (2010, p.158). 
There are however, difficulties in evaluating just what history can tell us, 
over and above a simple chronicle of events. Mahoney and Rueschemeyer 
conceive comparative history as being within the sphere of the social 
sciences which aim to arrive at “universal generalisations and lawlike 
propositions” (p.22).  Taking this view, the endeavour would seem to be to 
identify ‘historical processes’ which underlie events and which cause (or 
partially cause) the phenonema we are interested in. 
The trouble arises from the multiplicity of ‘causes’, both in terms of the 
varieties of influence on a single event, and – more so – in terms of the 
‘chain of causation’.  Given that any identified cause is itself dependent on 
a whole range of antecedent events, what gives us any warrant to identify 
one, or a limited range, of ‘causes’ as being especially significant?  The 
picture becomes yet more clouded when we consider ‘path dependency’ – 
the idea that “at critical historical junctures, choices are made that put 
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history on a course from which it is difficult, even impossible, to return” 
(Katznelson, 2003, p.290).  How do we identify such junctures, other than 
through assertion, when – according to Katznelson – we know very little 
“about the range of possible trajectories or about mechanisms sustaining a 
path dependence” which can range from the choices of individuals to 
“socially shared norms and expectations, [and] to the working of 
institutional arrangements” (p.292)?  A further complexity arises in 
identifying causal factors in that the possible factors affect each other.  Hall 
(2003) notes that “political outcomes [are] a result of chains of choices that 
… actors make in response to each other through iterated rounds of 
interaction” (p.384). 
Given the increasingly muddied waters that causal accounts perforce 
encounter, Hall notes that “comparative politics has moved away from 
ontologies [theories of how the world works] that assume causal variables 
and strong, consistent, and independent effects across space and time 
towards ones that acknowledge more extensive endogeneity and the 
ubiquity of complex interaction effects” (p.387). 
To cope with the plethora of potential causes, Hall proposes a methodology 
which does not seek to isolate specific causes and to link them with 
observed effects (whether through chains of causation, logical comparisons 
of instances of constant conjunction or disjunction, or statistical methods), 
but rather through what he terms ‘systemic process analysis’.  It is worth 
quoting his recommendation at length, since this is the methodology 
adopted in this thesis: 
One begins such an enquiry by formulating a set of theories 
that identify the relevant causal factors and how they operate, 
along with the rationale for their operation generally couched 
as deductions from more general contentions about the world 
based both on previous observations and on axiomatic 
premises.  From each theory, the investigator then derives 
predictions about the patterns that will appear in observations 
of the world if the causal theory is valid and if it is false, with 
special attention to predictions that are consistent with one 
theory but inconsistent with its principal rivals so as to discern 
which amongst a set of competing theories is more likely to 
be valid. Relevant observations are then made of the world 
(past or present) … The patterns present in these 
observations are then inspected for consistency with the 
predictions of each of the relevant theories with a view to 
reaching a judgement about which causal theory is superior 
to the others. (pp.391-2) 
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The previous section set out a range of theories about the operation of the 
EU, together with what they might imply about its stance on VET in eastern 
Europe.  As we proceed through the various chapters we shall take stock, 
as Hall suggests, of the degree to which the events tend to support, or 
counter, the tenets of each theory.  In the final chapter we shall draw the 
strands together in order to reach conclusions about the strength or 
otherwise of the various theories in explaining the events that have been 
recounted.  In keeping with Hall’s method, I have not attempted to integrate 
the account of events with their implications for each theory, but rather left 
this interpretation to the end of each relevant chapter.  This, I think, is more 
likely to allow a balanced view, as well as avoiding the necessity for the 
reader to keep four separate theoretical strands in play throughout the 
piece. 
I gave notice earlier of a caveat to this ‘comparative historical’ approach.  
As we have seen with multi-causality, causal chains and path dependency, 
the notion of ‘cause’ has proved somewhat problematic.  Indeed 
Katznelson recognizes that, at a certain point, accounts of chains of 
causation culminating in full-blown path dependency amount to a  “… a 
haphazard mixture of chance and opportunism deeply at odds with the 
comparative historical tradition”, and have the effect of ruling out of bounds 
“systematic accounts of large-scale change central to the tradition of 
macrohistorical scholarship” (p. 292). 
There is of course a respectable philosophical tradition of questioning the 
idea of causation itself.  Famously David Hume (1967) sought, but failed, to 
identify the empirical source of the idea of ‘necessary connexion’ which 
characterizes our notion of cause and effect.  He concluded that there was 
no observable evidence beyond the ‘constant conjunction’ of certain events 
from which we could infer causation and held that cause and effect (as 
opposed to observations of simple constant conjunction) was a mental 
impression which we imposed on events which invariably occurred 
together. 
We do not necessarily have to go this far to recognized that causation is, in 
practice, a very problematic concept.  Consider the apparently 
straightforward example, drawn from the physical world, of a flagpole 
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casting a shadow of a certain length.*   What causes the shadow to take the 
form that it does?  The following answers could each be cited: 
- the height of the flagpole; 
- the time of day; 
- the latitude of the location; 
- the laws of trigonometry; 
- the fact that the sun has just emerged from behind a cloud; 
- the fact that the top 5 feet of the flagpole had been lost in a recent 
storm. 
It is not only the large number of possible ‘causes’ that gives us concern in 
this example, but also their very varied nature – particularly when one 
acknowledges that one could nominate many antecedent ‘causes’ of most 
items on the list (eg. the reason why the flagpole was placed in that 
particular location).  If all these things – and many more – can be legitimate 
causes of a simple phenomenon what exactly is one asserting when one 
claims to have identified a specific cause? 
The problem gets worse, however.  It is plain that, with one exception, none 
of the apparently perfectly valid list of ‘causes’ is a necessary condition of 
the flagpole’s shadow (ie. the shadow would only take on its form if this 
factor was present), and none is a sufficient condition (ie. it of itself can 
account for the form of the shadow).  Unfortunately the one exception – the 
laws of trigonometry as a necessary condition (if they were different the 
shadow would be different) – does not help us at all.  For of all the potential 
‘causes’ it is this which we are actually least likely to cite as a cause; 
indeed to say that the trigonometry causes the form of the shadow would 
be a very odd statement in common speech.  So we are left with a 
multitude of apparent causes none of which are necessary or sufficient 
conditions – with the only one that does seem to fulfil the aspiration of 
expressing one of Mahoney and Rueschemeyer’s “universal 
generalisations and lawlike propositions” not actually seeming to satisfy our 
notion of cause at all. 
What are we to make of all of this?  It seems that – on examination in an 
apparently simple case – the aspiration of identifying specific causes has 
dissolved.  At the most we could say either that the entirety of the factors, 
                                                
* Here I have used, and extended, the ‘flagpole’ case given in Okasha (2002). 
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taken together, is a cause (which is not terribly helpful), or that each of the 
factors ‘has something to do with’ the shadow – not a very ambitious claim. 
However if we abandon the idea of causation as the object of enquiry and 
analysis, and instead substitute the ambition of explaining the shadow, 
things become very much easier.  All of the factors can be explanations of 
why the shadow takes the form it does, but this multiplicity and variety of 
possible answers does not give us a problem. For while in claiming 
causation we need to satisfy the test that an identified cause is in some 
demonstrable way connected to the phenomenon, the test of an adequate 
explanation is a different one:  instead of claiming a mechanism in the real 
world, an explanation depends for its validity on whether it satisfies the 
enquirer.  And it will satisfy the enquirer to the extent that it overcomes 
whatever puzzle the enquirer had in raising the query.  So, in our example, 
“It’s 4pm…” may be a perfectly adequate explanation for someone who is 
puzzling why the shadow is different from what it was yesterday (when he 
observed it at 3pm), while “The top got blown off in a storm…” would be 
equally satisfactory to someone who was puzzling why the shadow was not 
as long as it had been on the same occasion last year. 
When we recast the ambition of history, not to identify causes, but rather to 
elicit explanations, a lot becomes clearer.  It is noticeable that Mahoney 
and Rueschemeyer, and other authors in their collection, often use ‘cause’ 
and ‘explanation’ interchangeably,* so if we see the tools they offer as ways 
of achieving plausible explanations, rather than isolating causes, then we 
may be treading on solider ground – albeit with less claim to being able 
either to predict the future (because we have isolated a cause which, if it is 
repeated, will lead to similar outcomes in the future) or to attribute blame 
(because we have isolated the cause of an unfavourable event).   
On this reading, therefore, history is about achieving understanding, for 
which a systematic account of the linkages between events will sometimes 
be necessary, but which can also be achieved through other means, such 
as the identification of key human motivations, critical events and 
underlying narratives.  An objection to this stance might be that 
understanding is a form of knowledge which can surely only be achieved 
                                                
* See, for example the extract at the beginning of this section (page 29). 
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through rational argument and demonstrable facts.  Not according 
Wittgenstein: 
Try not to think of understanding as a ‘mental process’ at 
all… but ask yourself: in what sort of case, in what 
circumstances, do we say, “Now I know how to go on.” 
(Wittgenstein, 1958, p.61) 
Wittgenstein is suggesting that understanding is the act of breakthrough, 
the solving of a puzzle to the satisfaction of the solver, the ability to achieve 
further knowledge by applying understanding to new instances.  
Explanation and accounts of causation can be viewed as aiding such 
breakthroughs, but to do so they need to identify what the problem is that is 
causing the bottleneck (lack of understanding) in the first place.  This will 
vary from case to case, depending not on the reality of the situation to be 
explained, but rather on the nature of our own puzzlement.  Explanations 
and accounts of causation may be more or less useful to the process of 
understanding and thus to the acquiring of future knowledge.  But they 
cannot be true or false and so they cannot constitute knowledge 
themselves, just as perception can lead to knowledge but is not itself 
knowledge. 
The stance here is very similar to the interpretative methodology advocated 
by Clifford Geertz: “You either grasp an interpretation or you do not, see the 
point of it or you do not, accept it or you do not" (1973, p.21).  The purpose 
is not trying to fit things within a governing law but  "... to place them within 
an intelligible frame” (p.26). 
This account of history as explanations aimed at producing understanding, 
rather than making stronger claims about identifying verifiable causes or 
generalizable processes which can be the subject of moralizing, was 
favoured by A.J.P. Taylor: 
I cannot understand how knowledge of the past provides us 
with morality, let alone with knowledge of the future... The 
task of the historian is to explain the past; neither to justify 
nor to condemn it.  Study of history enables us to understand 
the past; neither more nor less…(quoted in Wrigley, 2006, 
p.214) 
It follows from this that in seeking to establish a historical narrative and 
explanation of what ‘caused’ what, we should not be too worried if we are 
not comprehensive, if we are selective, or if there are plausible alternative 
explanations.  For, though the facts which we deploy ought to be true, and 
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should be capable of verification as true or false, the explanations of cause 
are satisfactory only inasmuch as they are illuminating.  And they will be 
illuminating if they manage to produce, in the reader, the breakthrough of 
which Wittgenstein spoke.  This I believe, is the ‘art’ of history which goes 
alongside its ‘scientific’ factual base.  It is what makes history a humanity, 
rather than a social science. 
So the answers that will be given to the research questions on page 13 
should be interpreted as giving explanations rather than claiming causal 
relationships.  Similarly when examining the cases for and against the 
various theories of European integration set out in the previous section, the 
aim is – using Hall’s method – to test which of the interpretations are the 
most plausible, rather than which are most likely to represent immutable 
‘historical processes’ to which the future either will conform or from which it 
will need a special impetus to escape. 
 
Policy Analysis 
As well as history, this study will make use of the discipline of policy 
analysis, because – after all – it is policy and its formation that we are 
interested in.  A good deal of recent educational policy analysis has a 
sociological flavour, with contributors either seeking to demonstrate the way 
in which educational policy reflects structural societal fundamentals (Taylor 
et al., 1997) or exploring the ‘policymaking community’ as a sociological 
phenomenon in itself (Ozga and Gewirtz, 1994; Raab, 1994).   
I find such approaches rather contrived, particularly in an EU setting where 
pan-European class-based ‘struggles’ seem notable by their absence, and 
the policymaking community is widely dispersed.  I propose rather to utilize 
a rather more eclectic range of concepts drawn from general policy 
analysis.  I have in mind, in particular, the notions of ‘lesson-drawing’ 
(Rose, 1991) which deals with the appropriateness or otherwise of 
transposing policy ideas from one setting to another (in particular in this 
case, across national borders).  The notion of ‘epistemic communities’ 
(Adler and Haas, 1992) – is relevant to the social-constructivist theory of 
EU integration which posits the growth of such communities at a pan-
European level.  The concept of ‘street-level bureaucracy’ (Lipsky, 1979) 
recognizes that front-line workers, for example in projects, will set their own 
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agendas.  The idea of ‘image-making’ (Stone, 1989), which describes how 
the diagnosis of problems and the construction of a narrative around them 
determines the subsequent policy response, informs Chapter Seven which 
deals with the concepts of the time. 
As to a central theory about how policies are made and which of them are 
selected for implementation, I am attracted by Kingdon’s (1985) conception 
of competing policies in a ‘primeval soup’ vying for relevant problems which 
they can answer and for the right political circumstances to allow them to 
get off the drawing board: 
Advocates of a new policy initiative not only take advantage 
of politically propitious moments but also claim that their 
proposal is a solution to a pressing problem ... At points along 
the way, there are partial couplings: solutions to problems, 
but without a receptive political climate: politics to proposals, 
but without a sense that a compelling problem is being 
solved; politics and problems both calling for action but 
without an available alternative to advocate.  But the 
complete joining of all three streams dramatically enhances 
the odds that a subject will become firmly fixed on a decision 
agenda. (201-2) 
A conception of this kind may help explain why some rather unlikely 
features (for example a national qualifications framework) became high 
priority for transition societies.  Though coming from a different school, 
Ball’s (1994) account of policy concerned with British education reform 
sounds rather similar to Kingdon’s:  
The [policy] texts are the product of compromises at various 
stages...They are typically the cannibalized products of 
multiple (but circumscribed) influences and agendas.  There 
is ad hocery, negotiation and serendipity within the state, 
within the policy formulation process. (p.16) 
The basic stance on the issue of policy development, therefore, is that a 
good deal is about the right ideas coming up at the right time and being 
supported by the right people with the right rationale.  A historical approach 
is capable of showing how this constellation of factors comes about. 
 
Methods 
Structure of the thesis 
In writing history, the structure of the narrative is itself part of the method; if 
analysis is also woven in, as Tosh suggests, one needs some kind of 
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schema other than simple chronology to allow significance to be extracted, 
and so for understanding to be gained. 
In their study of the modern evolution of education policy Taylor et al. 
(1997) point out that: 
There is always a prior history of significant events, a 
particular ideological and political climate, a social and 
economic context … which together influence the shape and 
timing of policies as well as their evolution and their 
outcomes. (p.16) 
We shall make use of the three elements they describe:  prior history, 
relevant contemporary events (context), and the prevailing ideas affecting 
VET in structuring this study.  The starting point for the interventions in VET 
in eastern Europe was in the years after the collapse of communism in 
1989.  Chapters Three and Four examine the position respectively of VET 
in the communist East , and of VET policy in the EU, in the years before 
that, using a largely narrative mode.  In terms of the context which brought 
about the need for the EU to have a policy on VET in eastern Europe, the 
most relevant events were the process of economic transition from planned 
to market economies and the process of enlargement culminating, in the 
mid-2000s, in accession of most of the eastern countries; Chapters Five 
and Six are devoted to each of these strands, with an emphasis in each 
case on the implications for VET.  Again a narrative mode is used with a 
separate chronology for each topic. 
We can conceive the ideas governing VET as a product of the prior history 
combined with the implications of the events as experienced by the actors 
of the time; however ideas, once formed, take on a life of their own and 
may themselves influence future events.  Chapter Seven draws together, in 
a partly speculative form, the ideas affecting VET that might be derived 
from the political ideas which were dominant in the region in the 1990s.  
The resulting framework of ideas is then tested in an explicitly analytical 
way in Chapter Eight by examining the various diagnoses made by the EU 
of the state of VET in the East – the framing of the problem in Kingdon’s 
terms.  This analysis is taken further in Chapter Nine in looking at the 
programmes for supporting VET development.  Thus, having noted the 
views a range of the actors in Chapter Ten, we shall arrive at conclusions 
which are based not only on an analysis of the evolution of policies through 
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historical methods, but also on an analysis of the policies in action, to test 
whether the rhetorical policies were actually given effect. 
 
Documentary sources 
A good deal of the study is based on secondary documentary sources, 
usually books or edited collections.  There are a number of ‘core’ accounts 
which I used to guide my further reading or to seek out primary sources.  
These core accounts were: 
• A survey of educational practice in each of the eastern European 
communist states (but not the Baltic states which were then part of 
the Soviet Union) in the mid-1960s by Nigel Grant (1969).  Though I 
have not relied explicitly on this account for a great deal of the 
material in Chapter Three on the communist legacy (it relates 
circumstances well before the revolutions of 1989-91) it did give me 
a basic understanding of the school system in most of the separate 
countries which allowed me to place references by subsequent 
authors in context. 
• Much of Chapter Four is informed by an official publication about 
the evolution of EU education policy, henceforth referred to as the 
‘Official History’ (European Commission, 2006b).  This was used as 
a guide to the official documents, resolutions, decisions, regulations 
etc., which are referred to in this thesis; it also is of interest in giving 
a perspective on the thinking of those who were involved, as staff, in 
the formulation of the Commission’s education policies.  The Official 
History treats the evolution of EU policy as a natural and inevitable 
tide of events, bringing ever deeper involvement of the central EU 
institutions, and ever broader scope of interests in the education 
and training field.  In this unrolling of events, the member states are 
portrayed as jealous of their policy territory, sometimes benighted 
and occasionally downright obstructive, while a rather ill-defined 
‘public’ is represented as pressing for Community leadership and 
keen to become involved in EU initiatives when their governments 
permit.  So an allowance has to be made for the interpretation of 
some of the actions recounted in the Official History, though there is 
no reason to suspect that the actions themselves are not properly 
described. 
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• Chapter Five, on economic transition and its effect on education, 
makes use a range of statistics from Eurostat.  The reader will note 
that the data sources will not always instance all of the countries, 
largely because the Eurostat series tend to start including a country 
after it is clear that it is on the road to accession and begins to 
produce statistics in line with Eurostat’s definitions;  this point 
occurred at different times for different countries.  In two cases (the 
charts on pages 98 and 99) I have ‘retrospectively’ calculated 
education participation rates using the methodology described in the 
footnote to page 97.  This chapter also uses a survey of education 
and labour markets of each country undertaken towards the end of 
period (Kogan, 2008), in some ways mirroring Grant’s study 40 
years earlier. 
• Chapter Nine is aided by Jean-Raymond Masson’s account (2003) 
of the shifting emphases of the EU’s Phare support programme, and 
in particular by Masson’s references to individual evaluation studies, 
a number of which are cited in this chapter. 
 
Numerical Analysis 
Chapter Eight is a largely numerical analysis based on a series of ‘regular 
reports’ made by the Commission on progress to accession by each 
country and a series of ‘Monographs’ drawn up by the European Training  
Foundation (ETF) between 2002 and 2004.  The comprehensive nature of 
the archive of regular reports* and their standardized format make it 
possible to analyze them methodically.  
The ‘regular reports’ cover the whole range of accession issues, from 
political governance to agricultural policies.  They change slightly in 
structure over the period, but in all cases there are two sections relevant to 
VET, one concerned with employment issues, and another specifically with 
education.  A further section on the mutual recognition of qualifications 
appears from 2000 onwards.   It is these passages which are analyzed in 
Chapter Eight.  Additionally there are other references to VET-related 
issues within the reports, particularly in connection with projects under 
                                                
* Available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/key_documents/reports_1998_en.htm#re
port. 
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Phare, overall economic competitiveness and the treatment of minorities.  
To reveal these additional references, a word-search of each document 
was made using the terms ‘vocational’, ‘education’, ‘training’ and ‘human 
resources’, discarding those results which transpired not to be relevant to 
the question of VET policy. 
The ETF reports are lengthier and more or less entirely focussed on VET.  
Except in the case of Slovenia, each has a substantial executive summary, 
comprising around one third of the whole document, and it is this that was 
used for analysis. 
Each document was categorized as to the country, year of reference and 
type (EU or ETF report). 
This process of identification of relevant passages resulted in a corpus of 
text for analysis consisting of extracts from 74 documents comprising some 
200,000 words.  Analysis was performed through Nvivo.  First a coding 
frame was set up using the categories set out in the previous Chapter 
Seven , namely: 
Decentralization 
Europeanization 
Modernization 
Lifelong Learning 
Transparency 
Further categories were added as it became clear that other topics were 
also the focus of attention.  A full list of codes used and the number of 
references noted under each is given in Annex A. 
 
Interviews 
Chapter Ten presents evidence from nine interviews conducted in order to 
provide context to the documentary evidence and to explore a few 
particular remaining issues.  The individuals were selected both to provide 
a perspective on policy (of the EU on the one hand and of the eastern 
countries on the other), and to reflect the different roles.  I also wanted to 
include a range of nationalities.  The interviewees were: 
a Romanian VET policymaker during the period before accession 
a Danish senior official at ETF who had previously worked in the 
Commission   
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a Dutch ETF official who had had responsibility for monitoring VET in a 
number of eastern countries before their accession 
a French senior official at ETF 
a Serbian project advisor who had previously been an official in the 
Ministry of Education 
a British team leader of EU-funded projects in Serbia and Romania  
a British consultant with experience of drawing up terms of reference 
for support projects 
a Hungarian consultant on projects, including in Croatia and Romania. 
a Bulgarian education practitioner who later became a consultant on 
projects, including Croatia, specializing in IT systems 
The interviews took place between October 2009 and December 2010.  
They lasted between 30 and 65 minutes.  A half-page brief of the kinds of 
questions I had was given to interviewees in advance and re-presented at 
the interview itself. An example is at Annex B.  Interviews were semi-
structured within this framework. 
The interviews were in English.  Extracts have been slightly amended to 
inject clarity (imputed words are in square brackets), and to make the 
English intelligible while retaining some of the idiosyncrasies of those who 
were speaking in a language which was foreign to them.   
In conducting the interviews I had regard to ethical guidelines (BERA, 
2011), and in particular to the principle of ‘voluntary informed consent’ (p.5).  
Participants were informed of the purpose of the interviews in the initial 
approach, when sent the interview brief, and at the beginning of the 
interview itself.  Each interviewee’s consent to the interview and to their 
remarks being transcribed and possibly published was explicitly recorded 
as having been given.  In general the subject matter of the interviews was 
not sensitive, and no interviewee asked for any remark to be treated as 
confidential.  The interviews were recorded under condition of anonymity as 
a number of participants who were expressing views about the conduct of 
EU projects were likely to apply for posts in such projects in the future.  
Some interviewees said that they did not mind being named, but I decided 
not to do so, since it might seem odd to name some, but not others.  
The interviews were conducted in the form of a conversation;  I had met all 
but two of the individuals before, and known most reasonably well.  All of 
them knew I had been a member of project teams and a former UK 
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policymaker.  I was therefore acting in the capacity of a ‘Researcher-
Practitioner’ (Robson, 1993).  In this I believe I enjoyed some of the 
advantages ascribed by Robson (p.447), including an acknowledged pre-
existing knowledge base, which reduced the time needed to establish a 
rapport and allowed the use of mutually recognizable jargon.  In practice, 
one of the disadvantages noted by Robson – that of difficulties in hierarchy 
getting in the way of frank exchanges between people in the same 
organization – were, I believe, avoided as the independent self-employed 
nature of consultants does not carry any very recognizable pecking order.  
On the other hand it may be that some tacit assumptions were shared, or 
were presumed to be shared, to the detriment of the objectivity that would 
have applied in the case of an ‘outsider’.  In reporting extracts from the 
interviews in Chapter Ten I have sometimes included my own contributions 
in order to give a feel for the nature of the interaction. 
Transcripts of the interviews were analyzed using Nvivo.  A coding frame 
was generated after reading the transcripts and in the light of the questions 
originally presented to the interviewees;  these questions (see Annex B) 
related to the procedures for designing, bidding for and running Phare 
projects, to the role and reception of the experts, both foreign and ‘local’ 
who worked in them, and to the pressures exerted on, and by, 
policymakers in the countries concerned.  This frame was added to in the 
course of coding, as new, noteworthy, topics came up.  Finally, after 
coding, the various codes were ‘re-grouped (using Nvivo’s ‘tree node’ 
facility) into what seemed a more coherent set of issues.  
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CHAPTER THREE  
 
Rude Health or an Underlying Malady?  
The Communist Heritage and the Reaction to it  
 
Introduction 
What does seem clear is that [the authorities] are trying to 
bring the disparate elements of education and training – 
general and special, academic and practical – into some kind 
of unity, to find a way of educating at the same time the 
worker, the citizen and the person. (Grant, 1969, pp.122-3) 
The "all-round development of the personality" was the stated 
goal, but education was only provided in accordance with 
what used to be termed "societal needs".  Its range, level and 
orientation were determined by political and ideological 
intentions and by bureaucratic and economic factors, all of 
which were at times arbitrary. (Svecová, 1994, p.94) 
These are two rather different conclusions, drawn at different times by 
people of different nationalities.  Grant, a British observer, was recording 
his impressions after a tour of eastern European education systems in the 
mid-1960s.   Svecová was writing about her own country of Czechoslovakia 
just after the collapse of the communist system.  Was Grant hoodwinked?  
Was Svecová misrepresenting the past?  Had the system changed in the 
interim?  Or are the two different points of view merely two sides of the 
same coin?   
In this chapter we briefly sketch what the eastern European VET system 
was like under communism and what the reaction was after its fall;  in the 
latter task we make use of a range of mainly domestic authors writing about 
the early transition years before the EU’s intervention got significantly under 
way.  
 
The historical and geographical context 
In the 19th century and up until the end of the first world war the area we are 
concerned with was largely subsumed in four empires.  Eight of our twelve 
countries lay wholly, or in part, within the Austro-Hungarian Empire.  The 
Baltic States lay within the Russian Empire,  Bulgaria lay for most of the 
19th century within the Ottoman Empire, from which Serbia and Romania 
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(though in both cases substantially smaller than today) had recently gained 
their independence.  Poland was divided between the Russian, Prussian 
and Austro-Hungarian Empires.   
After the first world war, which saw the demise of all of these empires, a 
range of independent states were created.  Hungary was separated from 
Austria; Poland was re-united, the three Baltic States, Czechoslovakia, and 
the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (later the Kingdom of 
Yugoslavia) were established. 
However all of this territory was occupied in the second world war.  Much of 
it suffered three occupations (by the Soviet Union, Germany and then the 
Soviet Union again), and much of it experienced devastation of its 
infrastructure and the deliberate extermination or forcible removal of large 
portions of its population. 
By 1950 each of our countries had a communist government.  The Baltic 
States had been absorbed into the Soviet Union, which had liberated and 
then dominated all of the territory we are interested in, with the exception of 
Yugoslavia which – under its leader, Tito – exercised an increasingly 
independent path after its split from the Soviet Union in 1948 (Glenny, 
1999). 
Much of the region was rural though industrialization had taken place in 
some of the larger centres in the 19th century, especially in Czechoslovakia.  
Complex ethnic, religious and language groupings characterized the area, 
particularly in the Balkan peninsula.  A large Roma community, which was 
spread over the centre and south of the region, remained largely outside 
mainstream civic society and therefore outside any formal educational 
provision. 
In terms of education the main legacy of the pre-Communist era was a 
fairly comprehensive provision of elementary education.  However, some 
parts of the extensive rural areas were poorly served and illiteracy amongst 
the adult rural population was common – 25-40 per cent in the Balkans and 
Poland (Grant, 1969).  There were a number of secondary schools in the 
urban areas, notably the pervasive Gimnasium (grammar school). 
Vocational education, however, seems not to have been widespread or 
organized on a mass basis, though there were some specialized facilities to 
produce engineers and institutes for the armed forces and in Prussia a 
46 
number of trade schools sprang up in the early nineteenth century (Green, 
1990).  Technical schools began to arise in some urban areas around the 
turn of the century, but inasmuch as vocational education was conducted at 
all over the large rural tracts of the eastern territories, one can presume that 
it was in some kind of apprenticeship mode – the long-standing German 
communities that could be found in towns as far away as eastern 
Transylvania often included guild-type arrangements.*  However outside 
Prussia and the territory of the current Czech Republic, there was little 
industrialization before the first world war, and therefore little need for 
formal training (Mitter, 1992). 
A further characteristic to note was the practice of centralized 
administration of education. For example, the elementary schools of the 
Austro-Hungarian empire had standardized curriculum and textbooks by 
the beginning of the nineteenth century (Parízek, 1992).   
 
Main features of the education system under communism 
We do not attempt here to describe all the features of the education system 
under communism, but rather to draw out those features that will be most 
significant – either in terms of their continuance and adaptation, or in terms 
of the later reactions to them – to the stories of transition and accession 
that follow.†  
Education was highly centralized, with the exception of Yugoslavia where 
some discretion was given to the constituent republics and to schools 
themselves – which were run, like the enterprises, on co-operative lines 
(OECD, 1981).  This was not just a matter of control by ministries, but, 
more significantly that of the Communist Party.  Szebenyi describes how, in 
Hungary, apparent control by local education authorities in fact meant that 
                                                
* For example, the Black Church in Brasov contains memorials to the German-
speaking guilds of that (now) Romanian town.  The Museum of Arts and Crafts in 
Zagreb in Croatia exhibits a range of the Meisterstück produced by those qualifying 
as master craftsmen. 
† This section draws on: Grant (1969) – all countries except Baltic States; Nagy 
(1994) and Halász (1998) – Hungary; Liivik et al. (2013)– Baltic States; Potkonjak 
(1986) –Yugoslavia; Sandi (1992) – Romania; and Holmberg and Wojtowicz (1990) 
– Poland. 
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“…they only implemented the orders of the central, county and district 
committees of the party” (1992, p.63). 
Although each of the countries had their own education ministries and Party 
apparatus, there was undoubtedly a commonality in their education 
policies.  This did not simply result from the following of a lead from the 
Soviet Union, though this was certainly a factor for most of our countries 
(Anweiler, 1992), but also resulted from an element of educational 
philosophy inherent in the communist creed.  This idea, generally referred 
to as ‘polytechnical education’, had its roots in Marxist theory which held 
that productive work should feature in the education of all age-groups, and 
that a proper schooling should achieve a balance between  "mental 
education, bodily education and technological training" (Castles and 
Wüstenberg, 1979, p.39).   
From this stemmed three characteristics which could be observed widely in 
all the countries.  The first was a focus on incorporating actual work as part 
of the curriculum.  How this was done varied from country to country and 
from time to time, but included – for example – the inclusion of handicrafts 
at primary school, attendance at work places for one day a week, and 
mandatory training in a specific occupation, even for young people pursuing 
general education tracks (Luburić, 1999; Rosenkrantz, Apel and Kehrer, 
1965; Svecová, 1994).  Also relevant to this strand were the youth 
organizations to which most youngsters belonged and which organized 
activities, including useful work and cultural visits, often sponsored by local 
enterprises (Castles and Wüstenberg, 1979; Grant, 1969). 
The second strand was an emphasis on applied science and technology, 
which featured prominently in the curriculum, often at the expense of the 
humanities (Kogan, 2008).  Linked to this was a third strand – the 
development of discrete technical colleges at the upper secondary level, 
separate from specifically vocational training arrangements.  Introduced in 
the 1960s, after the post-Stalin education reforms announced by Nikita 
Khrushchev in 1958 (Soltys, 1997), these schools focused on the education 
of future technicians and held out the prospect (unlike more traditional trade 
training) of students gaining a full secondary leaving certificate, rendering 
them eligible (though not entitled) to progress to higher education. 
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The technical schools were generally four years in duration, following on 
from eight years of ‘basic’ (elementary) schooling.  However in Poland 
these schools generally lasted for five years (Wulff, 1992), while in 
Czechoslovakia, after the introduction of a 10 year basic school, they only 
constituted a two-year upper secondary phase (Svecová, 1994).  Indeed a 
number of countries sought to extend the phase of general education, 
before division into tracks took place.  Firm plans were made to do so in 
Poland in the 1970s, though in the event they were aborted (Pachocinski, 
1994).  A similar development took place in the 1970s in Yugoslavia, 
whereby the first two years of the secondary four year schools were 
focused on general, rather than vocational, topics with a common 
curriculum across all types of school; this was both an attempt to increase 
the ‘knowledge’ element of education generally, and to lessen what was 
seen as the “undemocratic social selection” which had arisen between 
general, technical and strictly vocational tracks (Potkonjak, 1986, p.10). 
On either side of the technical schools were, on the one hand, the legacy of 
the old gimnasia, now reduced from former six or eight year schools to four 
years (or two in Czechoslovakia, and formally abolished in Yugoslavia as 
part of the reforms of the 1970s).  On the other side was vocational training 
which did not lead to a full secondary leaving certificate, and with it the 
possibility of higher education.* 
The vocational training track usually lasted between two and three years 
after basic school, depending on the occupation in question.  It constituted 
a mixture of necessary theoretical/technical elements; practice, in 
enterprises or in school workshops; and continuing general education.  
Though less intense and wide-ranging than that undertaken in the technical 
schools, the general education components could nevertheless be quite 
extensive.  In Milosević’s Serbia, for example, literature, a foreign language, 
civics, history, music, fine arts, sports, mathematics, ICT, physics, 
chemistry, and ecology all featured in the three-year vocational 
programmes (Expert Group for Vocational Education and Training, 2001). 
These vocational schools were often attached to – indeed part of – the 
large state enterprises which dominated towns and cities, and came under 
                                                
* Though countries had various supplementary and ‘bridging’ courses by which a 
graduate of vocational training could gain a full secondary certificate, for example 
through evening classes. 
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the control of the relevant ministry (eg. of Transport, Shipbuilding, 
Agriculture, etc.) rather than of Education (Viertel, 1994).*  In Yugoslavia, 
where the enterprises were run as co-operatives (‘organizations of 
associated labour’), these had to agree plans and financing with the 
schools (Potkonjak, 1986).  Plans for the numbers of students in each 
vocational specialism were agreed in some fine detail between schools and 
enterprises and constituted a “meticulously calculated manpower supply for 
the state planned economy” (Strietska-Ilina, 2007b, p.35). 
The division between the three secondary tracks, general (ex-gimnasia), 
technical, and strictly vocational was well understood, though – as we shall 
see – sometimes challenged.  The general track was usually the smallest; 
in Hungary in the 1980s, some 20 per cent took this, compared with nearly 
30 per cent going to technical schools and over 40 per cent on vocational 
tracks (Halász, Semjén and Setényi, 1993, p.28).  In Poland the proportions 
at the same time were very similar (Piwowarski, 1996, p.49).  Before the 
reforms of the 1970s and the (formal) abolition of the gimnasija track, the 
proportion in general education in Yugoslavia was a rather higher 30 per 
cent (Potkonjak, 1986, p.29).  And in the Soviet Republics of Estonia and 
Lithuania the general track was the largest of the three (Kogan, 2008). 
Though having expanded considerably since the war, by 1989 higher 
education was not extensive – around 10 per cent of a youth cohort in 
Hungary (Nagy, 1994) and 16 per cent in Czechoslovakia (Parízek, 1992).  
Again, universities tended to be dominated by technical and vocationally 
relevant courses (Kogan, 2008).  In addition there were tertiary non-
University vocational courses (ISCED 4) similar to German Fachschulen; 
these gave chances both for graduates of general secondary education not 
proceeding to full higher education to undertake vocational training (usually 
for 2-3 years), and for existing workers to upgrade their qualifications.  
Examples include the viša škola of Yugoslavia and the şcoala technica of 
Romania, but equivalents existed in most countries. 
                                                
* In a number of countries these schools, and their links with firms, were described 
as ‘apprenticeships’.  Though the occupationally specific training and in-firm 
practical elements mirrored aspects of pre-war apprenticeship, the dominance in 
an area of a single enterprise (or limited number of firms), plus the absence of 
competition between young people for the best employer and amongst employers 
for the best apprentices, made the communist arrangements very different from 
those that obtained before the war or in the apprenticeship countries of the West 
(Evans, Behrens and Kaluza, 2000). 
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Finally we should remark on education and training for adults.  Most such 
training was undertaken in firms, and depended on the need for new skills 
demanded by new processes and machinery.  But there were sizeable 
programmes for increasing the general level of education amongst the adult 
population, many of whom had grown up in pre-war or wartime conditions 
and had not benefitted from anything beyond elementary education.  There 
were large programmes to promote literacy, particularly in rural areas, 
which were largely completed by the end of the 1960s (Grant, 1969).  
However adult education was about much more than this; a striking 
example was in Yugoslavia where a pre-war movement of ‘people’s 
universities’ focusing largely on folk traditions was expanded under Tito to 
cover 2.5 million people, or over 10 per cent of the population (Krajnc and 
Mumale, 1978).  Part of this was ideological, involving the “…joint study of 
party documents and Marxist literature" (p.13), but it also involved socio-
economic understanding and the study of individual school subjects, as well 
as vocational topics.  And these non-formal and non-certificated 
‘universities’ stood outside other modes of adult education, such as the 
extra-mural departments of formal higher education institutions and evening 
classes in schools under which recognized certificates could be achieved. 
How strong was communist vocational education?  Certainly it had 
admirers, including Grant after his tour in the late 1960s.  The idea of 
polytechnical education attracted particular interest from visitors from the 
West such as Holmes (1961) who wondered whether it could be an answer 
to the fostering within education of the technological advancement which 
was seen as necessary for competitiveness.  And the communist emphasis 
on the preparation for responsible work roles was plainly copied by some 
western countries (Castles and Wüstenberg, 1979). 
Perhaps the most striking comparison with the West was the sheer scale of 
participation in secondary education that was achieved in the communist 
East.  Calculations by Kogan (2008, p.9) show that during the 1970s and 
1980s, when upper secondary completion rates in the EU averaged around 
45 per cent, all the eastern countries with the exception of Lithuania and 
Bulgaria* had upper secondary completion rates of over 60 per cent and in 
                                                
* Lithuania’s was around the EU average, and Bulgaria’s just under 60 per cent. 
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five (the Czech Republic, Poland, Romania and Slovakia) it stood at over 
70 per cent. 
This is not to say that the communist system did not display problems.  A 
number of aspects caused difficulties, which were recognized as such at 
the time.  Some examples will indicate their nature.  In the Baltic States the 
original aspiration of ‘secondary education for all’ which accompanied the 
introduction of four year technical schools had to be modified through 
reversion to lower level one or two year vocational programmes when it 
became clear that not all pupils could succeed at the higher level – Liivik et 
al. (2013) cite drop-out in the 1960s at 25-30 per cent (p.78).  In Hungary, 
Halász, Semjén and Setényi (1993) describe how – over the years – the 
technical strand varied in aim between providing, on the one hand, a fairly 
broad vocational preparation in applied subjects for all and, on the other, 
explicit training for technician jobs, and how it was deliberately reined back 
in the 1970s in favour of lower level trade training when demographic 
trends exposed a shortage of workers for existing factories. 
There was worry, too, about the tacit social selection that was occurring in 
the different secondary tracks – certainly something not countenanced in 
communist ideology.  A Polish study by Kluczyński and Sanyal (1985) 
showed that students from ‘white collar’ families were more than twice as 
likely as those from ‘blue collar’ backgrounds to take the (comparatively 
restricted) general education track at upper secondary level.  The white 
collar group would “…only settl[e] for the junior vocational or technical 
secondary school if for some reason they are forced to by social or 
economic difficulties" (p.55). 
As we have seen, it was this kind of effect which stimulated Yugoslavia to 
embark on reforms which aimed largely to obliterate the divisions between 
the tracks.  However this path, it transpired, was fraught with difficulties.  
There were pedagogical difficulties in “…operationalizing socio-political 
principles" (Potkonjak, 1986, p.11), such that  "contrary to expectations the 
new [untracked] secondary schools retained many traditional and 
conventional features and showed themselves to be rigid" (p.10).  And the 
‘undemocratic social selection’ seemed to re-assert itself in the new 
dispensation with a feeling that courses at the new polytechnic schools in 
"... non-productive [public sector] vocations are nothing other than the 
earlier stream in the high schools (for mathematics languages and 
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humanities etc.)" (p.11).  While recognizing that the polytechnic secondary 
might in due course be regarded as the “school of the 21st century” (p.11), 
Potkonjak acknowledged that at the time it was proving hard to satisfy all – 
or indeed perhaps any – of the various interests;  universities demanded 
more general education ("good old gymnasium") and enterprises wanted 
more practical and technical skills – “good old apprenticeship" (p.23).*  
More severe reservations were made by Castles and Wüstenberg – 
observers plainly sympathetic to the precepts of socialist education.  They 
concluded their 1979 review education in East Germany by deploring that 
the emancipatory aspirations of polytechnic education had turned into the 
“the process of training hard-working, conformist people” being “pumped 
full of knowledge.”  The Communist Party “has taken the marxist concept of 
polytechnic education and robbed it of its real content” (p.99). 
Perhaps predictably, post-revolutionary writers tend to be harsher still.  
Sandi (1992) claims that in Romania the practical elements of polytechnical 
education had turned into “…compulsory ‘voluntary work’ in rural areas 
pushed beyond any bearable limits” (p.87).  There were also complaints 
about the over-crowding of the curriculum, and a stress on encylopedic 
knowledge rather than problem-solving (Parízek, 1992; Szebenyi, 1992), 
though Janowski – an early post-communist education minister – 
considered that “the Polish school has managed to preserve the cult of 
solid education understood chiefly as a body of knowledge” (1992, p.46). 
More profound problems, perhaps, were due to the economic context.  
Failing economies led to restricted expenditure on education, dramatically 
so in Romania where education expenditure dropped to two per cent of 
GDP in 1988, and the pupil to teacher ratio was 43 – double that of 1975 
(Sandi, 1992).  Moreover, with guaranteed jobs, restricted higher education, 
and low wage differentials, Janowski points out that individuals were not 
greatly motivated to excel in education – “gaining knowledge was not a 
profitable investment” (1992, p.42). 
So the undoubtedly high participation may have been accompanied by 
some problems of social division, lack of motivation and dubious quality.  
                                                
* The travails in England of Curriculum 2000 (Hodgson and Spours, 2003) and 
GNVQs (Capey, 1995) spring to mind. 
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One might add that these aspects were hardly foreign to education in the 
West.  Can we reach any judgment about the effectiveness of vocational 
education under communism?  Two indicators might be achievement in 
internationally comparative tests, and labour productivity. 
The OECD’s International Adult Literacy Survey (OECD/Statistics Canada, 
2000) reported on prose, document and quantitative literacy amongst 
adults in a range of countries during the period 1994-8.  It gives scores for 
those aged 26-35, who, in the four eastern countries which participated, 
would have undertaken secondary education in the latter years of the 
communist regimes.  Table 1 shows the scores, together with the rank and 
interquartile intervals – a measure of the dispersal of student scores within 
a country – for all the (current) EU countries which participated: 
Table 1: Mean scores, country rank, and interquartile intervals of 26-
35 year olds participating in IALS 1994-8 
Prose	  Literacy	   Mean	   Rank	   Interquartile	  
Germany	   284	   4	   60	  
Ireland	   272	   8	   58	  
Netherlands	   295	   3	   46	  
Poland	   242	   11	   64	  
Sweden	   314	   1	   53	  
UK	   275	   7	   70	  
Czech	  Rep	   280	   6	   50	  
Denmark	   284	   5	   37	  
Finland	   307	   2	   49	  
Hungary	   251	   9	   51	  
Portugal	   232	   12	   101	  
Slovenia	   246	   10	   63	  
 
Document	  Literacy	   Mean	   Rank	   Interquartile	  
Germany	   294	   6	   58	  
Ireland	   267	   8	   66	  
Netherlands	   299	   4	   50	  
Poland	   237	   11	   80	  
Sweden	   319	   1	   59	  
UK	   278	   7	   82	  
Czech	  Rep	   295	   5	   62	  
Denmark	   308	   3	   44	  
Finland	   310	   2	   54	  
Hungary	   259	   9	   64	  
Portugal	   229	   12	   80	  
Slovenia	   251	   10	   69	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Table 1 (cont) 
Quantitative	  Literacy	   Mean	   Rank	   Interquartile	  
Germany	   300	   4	   55	  
Ireland	   271	   9	   72	  
Netherlands	   298	   6	   54	  
Poland	   246	   11	   79	  
Sweden	   317	   1	   62	  
UK	   277	   7	   83	  
Czech	  Rep	   309	   2	   63	  
Denmark	   307	   3	   44	  
Finland	   300	   4	   49	  
Hungary	   276	   8	   70	  
Portugal	   238	   12	   95	  
Slovenia	   260	   10	   74	  
Source: OECD/Statistics Canada (2000), Table 3.4 
The Czech Republic did moderately well in prose and document literacy 
and notably well in quantitative skills.  However the other three countries 
were towards the bottom of rankings in all three fields, though in each case 
performed better than Portugal, the only Mediterranean country to take 
part.  All the eastern countries had a relatively high dispersal of scores – 
again with the partial exception of the Czech Republic in the case of prose 
literacy – though none as high as the UK. 
These results would seem to show that in these basic, but important 
aspects, the eastern countries were almost on a par with northern 
European peers.  Given their relatively underdeveloped state before the 
war, and the devastation visited on them during it, this might be seen as 
something of an achievement.  On the other hand, the very high 
participation rates (and generous allocations of general education during 
vocational courses) that we have noted do not seem to have paid off in 
terms of clearly enhanced performance.  So this evidence may point to 
some issues concerning the quality of instruction and/or motivation of 
students. 
The productivity of labour is a trickier issue, since labour productivity 
measures not only the skills and motivation of workers, but also the 
efficiency of allocation of capital.  The European Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development (EBRD), which monitored productivity throughout the 
period of transition, reported a decline in the early years after the fall of 
communism, but its 1999 Transition Report (European Bank for 
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Reconstruction and Development, 1999) noted a distinct increase in 
productivity in some countries and considered that many eastern European 
countries “should be well placed for rapid growth because of their high level 
of acquired skills” (p.71).  It would seem therefore, that a good skills base 
was showing through in these countries. 
However, the following year – after a special survey of employers – the 
EBRD was much more downbeat.  The evidence now “qualifies the view 
that the region has abundant human capital resources, despite 
considerable achievements in formal education” (p.vi).  Employers investing 
in the East viewed skilled labour in central and eastern Europe as around 
75 per cent as productive as those in their home countries, and in the 
Balkan region at only 65 per cent as productive.  The survey indicated that  
“…a lack of general flexibility or adaptability is by far the greatest perceived 
deficiency across all educational categories” (p.117).  This lends some 
credence to the earlier critics who pointed to over-burdening with factual 
knowledge and the narrowness of occupational profiles. 
Altogether, therefore, we might characterize the state of VET in the East at 
the point of transition from communism as having scored some 
considerable achievements: it had made great inroads into a backlog of 
adult illiteracy in rural areas; it had achieved secondary participation rates 
far higher than most western countries and at a much earlier date; it had 
solidly established the equivalent of the technical schools promised in 
England’s 1944 Education Act, but which were never delivered, and it had 
introduced (though not always wholly successfully) an imaginative work-
related curriculum twenty years before, say, Britain’s Technical and 
Vocational Education Initiative of the 1980s (Dale et al., 1990).   
On the other hand, communist VET was clearly prone to many of the same 
problems as in the West.  Social divisions seemed hard to overcome, even 
in a nominally comprehensive system; rhetoric outran reality, particularly in 
the ill-defined area of polytechnic education; aspirations for high levels of 
education for all proved unrealistic when confronted with the abilities and 
aspirations of ‘real world’ students on the one hand, and the immediate 
needs of employers on the other.  Moreover the relatively static 
occupational structure of the communist world and the lack of investment 
and innovation in its later years seems to have inhibited workers from 
acquiring the resilience and adaptability that western employers expected. 
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Revolutionary reactions to education issues 
The immediate post-communist atmosphere was a heady, if chaotic, time 
with many countries having little coherent, let alone agreed, visions for the 
societies that were emerging.  The metaphor of being in the position of 
‘rebuilding the ship while at sea’ was a common one  (Elster, Offe and 
Preuss, 1998; Strietska-Ilina, 2007b).  And of course there was the initial 
business of forming political groupings and drawing up political 
programmes. 
Despite the reform agendas which had bubbled up in the 1980s, there was 
no cogent and coherent programme for educational change in any country.  
Reviewing the situation in Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary shortly 
after the changes Karsten and Majoor concluded: 
Old structures and old certainties are breaking up, but the 
contours of a new order are not yet clear. There are no 
parties or actors with a clear programmatic view. What strikes 
outsiders most is a lack of vision about the future of each of 
these societies and the role of education in that vision. (1994, 
p.157) 
moreover was not education best left to the professionals? 
Most of the parties held rather vague and general ideas about 
education, about which they did not differ much.  Educational 
debates were overwhelmingly determined by educational 
experts with modernizing and technocratic values. (Nagy, 
1994, p.60) 
In these circumstances the dominant theme in the immediate post-
revolution period seems to have been reaction to the past rather than a 
purposeful preparation for the future.  Thus there were early moves to undo 
the most manifest symbols of communist rule;  in all countries explicit 
ideological content was debarred from the curriculum, leading in some 
cases to the withdrawal of textbooks in history, the social sciences and 
civics, and the temporary suspension of examinations in affected subjects 
(Mitter, 1992; Polyzoi and Černá, 2003).   
In parallel the compulsory teaching of Russian was ended more or less 
immediately in all countries where this applied.  In its place other western 
European languages were promoted.  Sudden changes to the policies of 
language teaching involved a very considerable effort; Janowski describes 
the steps necessary to introduce universal provision of English in Poland, 
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with the expansion of teachers of English from 1,500 to 25,000, involving 
the establishment of 55 foreign language teacher-training colleges.  
University autonomy was commonly an immediate reform and private 
universities were permitted in many countries.  In most countries, too, there 
were early moves to allow, and to an extent encourage, the establishment 
of non-state schools particularly by religious denominations, voluntary 
groups and innovatory educators.  However the non-state sector did not 
become widespread except for Catholic schools in Poland where religious 
education had been a feature of the landscape even in Communist times; 
Janowski (1992) records the establishment of 200 non-state schools in the 
first two years after communism – most of them not-for-profit, though there 
were also a few for-profit institutions.  Such privatization of schools as did 
take place, however, seldom affected the initial vocational education sector, 
though the growth of the private sector in the adult sphere was significant, 
as we shall see. 
The common syllabus of the basic, comprehensive, school was heavily 
challenged in some places.  Mitter draws a distinction between a mild form 
of reform which allowed a degree of specialization in the second, lower 
secondary, cycle of basic school, and a more radical form which re-
introduced the institution of the pre-war eight year gimnasium.  As we have 
seen – under communism –  explicitly academic tracks had been largely 
restricted to a two year upper secondary cycle.  In Hungary and the Czech 
Republic, some six and eight year selective academic schools were 
revived.  However, according to Kogan (2008), this type of reform was far 
from universal, and even in the countries where it was most common it did 
not affect more than ten per cent of pupils. 
In some countries, such as Czechoslovakia, decentralization of 
responsibility of schools to local government took place at an early stage 
(Polyzoi and Černá, 2003), though often without much by the way of 
associated financing, at least in the first instance (Hinţea, Şandor and 
Junjan, 2004; Karsten and Majoor, 1994).  In tandem vocational schools, 
which had often operated under relevant industrial or agricultural ministries 
in communist times (Viertel, 1994) were in many cases moved within the 
ambit of ministries of education.  However in some countries this process 
took some time – in Latvia it did not occur until 2004 (Lanka and Mürnieks, 
2006). 
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Finally we should note the difficulty faced in a number of countries of 
purging the teaching force of (real or suspected) sympathizers of the old 
regime.  Though none of the eastern European countries seem to have had 
as an acute a problem as the former German Democratic Republic where 
there had been a considerable network of Stasi informers amongst the 
teaching profession (Phillips, 1992), Hungary and Poland, for example, 
required school Directors to be confirmed or selected by votes amongst 
their teaching staff (Janowski, 1992; Mitter, 1992). 
 
The situation in the early 1990s 
At around the end of 1992, these immediate reactions had worked their 
way through, and the new governments and education reform groups were 
left wondering about the next steps.  Some legislative consolidation of the 
early reforms had been made, but both the future direction of educational 
reform and the capacity to undertake it were considered problematic in 
many cases.  For example with respect to policy on pedagogy there was, 
as we have seen, much comment about the ‘didactic’ and ‘authoritarian’ 
styles of teaching necessitated by an ‘encyclopaedic’ curriculum.  But 
whether, and if so how, to change this was by no means clear, nor that it 
would be politically acceptable to do so.  Polyzoi and Černá (2003) refer to 
two systems existing side by side; the formal one notionally liberalized by 
new laws, but the actual one still uniform as a result of the training of 
teachers and continued acceptance of the ‘traditional’ curriculum. 
It was plain to many that help was needed: 
It is obvious that the complexity and difficulty of the tasks 
belonging to the current processes of educational change 
cannot be tackled without a continuous exchange of ideas 
and information, or without comparative studies. (Sandi, 
1992, p.93 - Romania) 
and particularly perhaps in vocational education: 
One of the most interesting areas of ‘learning from abroad’ is 
vocational education…The reason is simple: [the former 
communist countries] expect to find out which training system 
best fits for the transition from a planned economy to a 
market one… (Anweiler, 1992, p.38) 
However, there was an uneasy feeling that radical change might be 
uncomfortable within the large vocational education sector: 
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…the logical step of reducing the unjustified huge number of 
‘industrial lyceums’ (secondary vocational education) is 
encountering the harsh resistance of thousands of 
engineering teachers afraid of losing their easy, not too 
demanding jobs. (Sandi, p.90) 
Then again, a forward agenda was needed if advantage was to be taken of 
the aid from abroad that was now becoming available:  
In some spheres the possibility of help from the West 
appeared and we had to have ideas of how to use 
it.  (Janowski, p.50) 
On the other hand there was much else to attend to.  Educational reform 
seemed hardly a priority; education in general, and vocational education in 
particular, had by many accounts been one of the strengths of communist 
system (Barr, 2005).  There was no need to rush matters. 
But events would take a hand – both the forces of nature brought about by 
economic transition and the more deliberate pressures resulting from 
moves to join the European Union.  We deal with these in Chapters Five 
and Six.  But before we take up the story let us find out what had been 
going on in the West.  What kind of VET policy did the EU have to offer the 
new East as it sought to find its way in a much changed world? 
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CHAPTER FOUR  
 
A CONCOCTION IS PREPARED: 
The EU’s Policy on Vocational Education and Training 
 
Introduction 
In November 2002, less than two years before the first eastern countries 
were to join the Union, European ministers of vocational education and 
training met in Copenhagen and drew up a ‘declaration’ which announced 
their “aim to increase voluntary cooperation in vocational education and 
training, in order to promote mutual trust, transparency and recognition of 
competences and qualifications” (European Ministers of Vocational 
Education and Training and European Commission, 2002, p.2). 
The informed observer might have noticed two rather odd things about this 
declaration, which started a process which lasted for the next decade.  
First, one might ask why the ‘common vocational training policy’ promised 
in the 1957 Treaty of Rome had migrated to ‘voluntary co-operation’ for the 
purposes of ‘transparency’ and the ‘recognition of competences’.  And 
second one might have noted that of the 31 ministers gathered in 
Copenhagen over half were not from member states of the EU.  Indeed, 
although representatives from the Commission were present, the meeting 
was not an EU one at all, but included – as equal members – not only a 
range of ‘candidate countries’ but also three countries, Norway, Iceland and 
Liechtenstein, who had at the time no intention of joining the EU at all. 
How had this come about?  This chapter charts the state of EU policy on 
VET as it stood in the early 1990s, and as it developed up until around 
2005.  This is the period during which the eastern European countries 
came into the ambit of the EU and subsequently achieved membership.  
First we will sketch the main milestones in VET policy since the beginning 
of the Community and then look in more detail at the main strands of policy 
at the time of the engagement with the East.  The chapter ends with a 
discussion of the policy approaches and what the assessment of the 
evolution of policy on VET says about the different theories of EU 
integration set out in Chapter Two. 
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The main milestones in EU education and training policy 
The 1957 Treaty of Rome (European Economic Community, 1957) made 
no provision for education; it did, however, make an apparently strong 
provision for vocational training: 
The Council shall, acting on a proposal from the Commission 
and after consulting the Economic and Social Committee [of 
the social partners] lay down general principles for 
implementing a common vocational training policy capable of 
contributing to the harmonious development both of the 
national economies and of the common market. (Article 128, 
p 104) 
Also relevant were the general provisions for “freedom of movement for 
workers” (Article 48), the progressive abolition of all “qualifying periods and 
other restrictions… regarding the free choice of employment other than 
those imposed on workers of the State concerned.” (Article 49) and – very 
specifically – provision in Article 57 for the Council of Ministers (the 
supreme legislative body of the Community) to “issue directives for the 
mutual recognition of diplomas, certificates and other evidence of formal 
qualifications”. 
A number of years were to pass, however, before anything approaching a 
‘common vocational training policy’ was to emerge and this was in the form 
of ten ‘common principles’ (Council of the European Communities, 1963). 
These principles were broadly conceived, for example “To bring about 
conditions that will guarantee adequate vocational training for all”, and “To 
promote basic and advanced vocational training and, where appropriate, 
retraining, suitable for the various stages of working life” (objectives under 
Principle 2).  Worthy though these sentiments were, there was nothing very 
actionable at Community level since the main responsibility for 
implementation was deemed to rest with the member states: 
A common vocational training policy means a coherent and 
progressive common action which entails that each Member 
State shall draw up programmes and shall ensure that these 
are put into effect in accordance with the general principles 
contained in this Decision… (Article One) 
Little concrete action came from the common principles which “...were 
never enacted as legally binding regulation tools and never had a method 
of implementation attached to them" (Ertl, 2006, p.17).  However, the 
Commission had the duty to carry out relevant research, to “collect 
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distribute and exchange any useful information” (Principle 5), to “draw up a 
list of training facilities and compare them with existing requirements with a 
view to determining what actions to recommend to the Member States” 
(Principle 4), and to “encourage direct exchanges of experience” (Principle 
6).  The one point of direct intervention was ambitious, though.  This was 
for the Commission to: 
…draw up in respect of the various occupations which call for 
specific training a standardised description of the basic 
qualifications required at various levels of training…[in order 
that] harmonisation of the standards required for success in 
final examinations should be sought… (Principle 8). 
As we shall see, continuing efforts were made on this last point, but 
attempts by the Commission in the 1960s, to institute a community-funded 
transnational training programme for unemployed Italians seeking work in 
northern countries ran into severe opposition from a number of member 
states who considered this well outside the competence of the Commission 
and insisted that any such arrangements should be a matter of bilateral 
inter-governmental agreement.  According to Petrini  “This represented a 
complete failure of the Commission’s attempt to propose itself as motive 
force of a common vocational training policy” (2004, p.35);  attempts at 
Community-level action on vocational training appear to have lapsed for a 
period. 
The 1970s saw the first forays of the Community into the field of education 
(as opposed to vocational training).  Partly this seems to have been due to 
a realization that little was being achieved through the Council of Europe 
(which had originally been seen as the vehicle for educational cooperation).  
Partly too, according to the Official History (European Commission, 2006b), 
it was a result of a common desire to stress the social, rather than merely 
the economic, functions of the Community and a desire in the Commission 
to widen the basis of EEC policies generally so as to avoid “restrictions on 
the natural development of the dynamism of the European Community” 
(p.64). 
Given the lack of clear legal authority for any action by the EEC in this field, 
the mode selected was that of ‘co-operation’, and the first meetings of 
education ministers were styled, awkwardly, as ‘the Council and the 
ministers of education meeting within the Council’.  Thinking was done, 
both by the Commission and by education ministers, as to what the role of 
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the Community in education might be, and the first central mechanisms for 
co-operation took shape – for example Eurydice, a descriptive database of 
education systems started in 1980; Arion, a programme of study visits for 
education administrators (1978); and NARIC, centres advising on 
equivalences of diplomas and study periods within higher education (1984).  
Eurostat started to compile education statistics on a EEC-wide basis in 
1978. 
There was, however, little action in vocational training, except for the 
establishment of a small programme (PETRA) in the late 1970s which had 
the object of establishing pilot projects and networks of vocational training 
providers.  In addition the European Centre for the Development of 
Vocational Training (CEDEFOP) was established in 1975 as an agency for 
research and co-operation, but more specifically: 
to encourage and support any initiative likely to facilitate a 
concerted approach to vocational training problems. The 
centre's activity in this respect shall deal in particular with the 
problem of the approximation of standards of vocational 
training with a view to the mutual recognition of certificates 
and other documents attesting completion of vocational 
training. (Council of the European Communities, 1975, Article 
2.2) 
The early 1980s saw an attempt to widen the vision of the Community to 
embrace the so called ‘People’s Europe’ launched at the Fontainebleau 
Summit of 1984 (Council of the European Communities, 1984) which 
considered it: 
essential that the Community should respond to the 
expectations of the people of Europe by adopting measures 
to strengthen and promote its identity and its image both for 
its citizens and for the rest of the world. (p.11) 
The idea of a ‘People’s Europe’ encouraged the Commission to establish 
its new education and training programmes on a substantially larger scale – 
these, after all, would affect the people of Europe directly rather than 
relying on the intermediation of member states.  Not surprisingly there was 
opposition amongst the more ‘euro-sceptic’ member states (particularly 
Denmark), who challenged the legal basis for centrally run programmes in 
this field, given that the Treaty of Rome made no mention of education.  
The Commission, however, was relieved by the 1985 Gravier judgement of 
the European Court of Justice which held that vocational training (which, 
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unlike education more generally, was plainly included in the Treaty) 
included: 
Any form of education which prepares for a qualification for a 
particular profession, trade or employment or which provides 
the necessary skills for such a profession, trade or 
employment… (European Commission, 2006b, p.102) 
As a result of this, much of higher education, at least, was in scope to EU 
actions.  Various programmes were launched, including Erasmus in higher 
education and Leonardo in the vocational education area. These continue, 
though differently grouped, slightly amended and considerably expanded, 
to this day. 
The 1980s also saw developments in the field of the mutual recognition of 
diplomas and certificates, a field which was plainly in scope to the 
Community, and which was central to one of its main tenets – the freedom 
of movement of workers.  Two Directives were issued: one concerning 
Higher Education Diplomas (Council of the European Communities, 1989), 
shortly followed by a complementary version for occupations with lower and 
shorter duration training requirements (Council of the European 
Communities, 1992). 
The contested legal basis for Community action in education was resolved 
in the 1992 Treaty of Maastricht.  This introduced an Article (126) which 
clearly permitted joint action in the field of education “while fully respecting 
the responsibility of the Member States for the content of teaching and the 
organisation of education systems and cultural and linguistic diversity” 
(European Union, 1992).  A parallel article – replacing Article 128 of the 
Treaty of Rome – was introduced in respect of vocational training.  This 
required that  
The Community shall implement a vocational training policy 
which shall support and supplement the action of the Member 
States, while fully respecting the responsibility of the Member 
States for the content and organisation of vocational training. 
(Article 127) 
It can be seen that this was rather more narrowly based than the equivalent 
in the Treaty of Rome, including now the principle of ‘subsidiarity’ (whereby 
the Community only did things which could not be done at a lower level).  
The Article also stated the aims of any Community action:  to “facilitate 
adaptation to industrial changes,” to “improve initial and continuing 
training”; to “facilitate access…and encourage mobility of instructors and 
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trainees”; to “stimulate cooperation … between educational or training 
establishments and firms”; and to “develop exchanges of information and 
experience on issues common to the training systems of the Member 
States.”  Importantly, both Articles specified that action taken at Community 
level must exclude “any harmonisation of the laws and regulations of the 
Member States”. 
Thus, although the Maastricht Treaty marked a step forward for the 
Commission in the field of education, on paper at least it embodied a 
restriction of its powers in respect of VET.  To be fair, though, those wider 
powers had scarcely been used in the previous 35 years. 
A fresh urgency in both education and training was heralded by the 
Commission’s White Paper on Growth, Competitiveness and Employment 
(European Commission, 1993b) – the ‘Delors’ White Paper – which 
responded to rising concern about jobs and economic growth across the 
Union.  For the first time in Community policy the White Paper invoked the 
importance of education and training in securing economic growth; in 
particular it introduced the notion of lifelong learning (though this had been 
in currency in earlier OECD and UNESCO publications): 
All measures must … be based on the concept of developing, 
generalizing and systematizing lifelong learning and 
continuing training. This means that education and training 
systems must be reworked in order to take account of the 
need … for the permanent recomposition and redevelopment 
of knowledge and know-how. (p.120, italics as in original) 
The White Paper called for much action by member states.  At Community 
level it proposed that there should be action: 
to improve the quality of training and to foster innovation in 
education by increasing exchanges of experience and 
information on good practices and developing joint projects; 
to establish a genuine European area of - and market in - 
skills and training by increasing the transparency, and 
improving the mutual recognition, of qualifications and skills; 
to promote European-level mobility among teachers, students 
and other people undergoing training... to develop common 
databases and knowledge on skills needs; to conduct 
comparative research on methodologies used and policies 
implemented; to improve the interoperability of systems of 
distance learning and to increase the level of standardization 
of the new decentralized multi-media training tools, etc. 
(p.122) 
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Though lengthy, this was a fairly ‘technical’ list, confined in the main to 
things that the Community had done before and to items which member 
states could not readily undertake on their own.  However the Commission 
also proposed that: 
…the Community should set firmly and clearly the essential 
requirements and the long-term objectives for measures and 
policies in this area in order to make it easier to develop a 
new model for growth, competitiveness .and employment in 
which education and training play a key role… (p.122, italics 
as in original) 
The idea of having a collective forward agenda, tied to objectives, across of 
all of education and training, would prove to be significant. 
Some more specific ideas were proposed in a further White Paper on 
Teaching and Learning (European Commission, 1995).  Here we find 
proposals such as a European accreditation system for skills , including key 
skills and a template for personal skills cards (p.35) embodying “more 
flexible ways of acknowledging skills” (p.34).  A European Credit Transfer 
System (ECTS), already in embryo form in higher education, would be 
replicated in VET (p.35).  Mobility of apprentices between countries would 
be promoted, supported by a European apprentice/trainee charter (p.41).  A 
European Voluntary Service Scheme would be set up, support for a 
network of “second chance” schools would be given (p.44), and “quality 
guarantee systems” including a “European Quality Label” would be made 
available for the teaching of European languages (p.48).  This White Paper 
was heralded as breaking new ground (Hake, 1999).  In the sense that the 
Commission was now talking explicitly about education, this was indeed 
new.  But the proposals themselves in retrospect were a rather motley list.  
Hake is a little cruel in his verdict, but perhaps not too wide of the mark: 
The grand goal of a transparent and dynamic system of 
lifelong learning across the European Union disappears in a 
set of second-hand proposals based more upon a European 
initial education system of yesterday rather than contributing 
to a new Europe for the 21st century… (p.67) 
However if the education initiatives seemed modest and fragmented a 
much more robust  approach was taken in the field of employment.  The 
European Employment Strategy was launched in 1997;  as well as the 
usual fine words, the strategy contained a mode of working involving the 
setting of overall targets, the production of action plans by each member 
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state, the joint review of these, based on assessments by the Commission, 
and statistical monitoring of results.  Publication of material accompanied 
each stage (European Commission, 2006a).  VET was clearly relevant, but 
initially was largely confined to training for unemployed people as part of 
‘active labour market policies’. 
In 1998, quite outside the ambit of the Community and a surprise according 
to the Official History (p.197), the Sorbonne Declaration was made by the 
higher education Ministers of France, Germany, the UK and Italy.  These 
countries proposed “progressive harmonisation of the overall framework of 
[higher education] degrees and cycles”.   We may note that this went 
beyond the powers of the Community in the Maastricht Treaty, so when the 
declaration was refined in 1999 in Bologna “the word ‘harmonisation’ was 
not included” (p.197).  Though technically outside the Community ambit (30 
countries associated themselves with Bologna) the development was 
significant in showing what could be achieved: 
Bologna changed the paradigm: it was no longer simply a 
question of mobility and cooperation, but rather of 
convergence between systems.  In a way, Bologna 
anticipated the direction of the new economic and social 
strategy that the Heads of State or Government were to 
adopt in March 2000 in Lisbon. (European Commission, 
2006b, p.29) 
The Lisbon Summit of 2000 appeared to revive, endorse and give some 
operational effectiveness to the broad vision of the 1993 Delors White 
Paper.  It followed it too, in placing education (and, perhaps more naturally, 
vocational training) in the service of economic imperatives.  It set: 
a new strategic goal for the next decade: to become the most 
competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the 
world capable of sustainable economic growth with more and 
better jobs and greater social cohesion. (Lisbon European 
Council, 2000, p.2 italics as in original) 
According to the communiqué: 
Europe's education and training systems need to adapt both 
to the demands of the knowledge society and to the need for 
an improved level and quality of employment. They will have 
to offer learning and training opportunities tailored to target 
groups at different stages of their lives: young people, 
unemployed adults and those in employment who are at risk 
of seeing their skills overtaken by rapid change. (p.8) 
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This might seem familiar rhetoric, but then (p.9) we have more specific 
targets, not all of which are jobs to be done at the Community level, 
including “a substantial increase in per capita investment in human 
resources”, a halving, by 2010, of the number of 1824 year olds with only 
lower secondary education who are not in further education and training 
and “schools and training centres, all linked to the Internet, ... accessible to 
all…”  Reflection on further “concrete future objectives of education 
systems” was remitted to the Council of Education Ministers. 
The Lisbon Strategy ’was noteworthy in highlighting education for economic 
purposes.  But this was not new (cf. the earlier Delors White Paper).  It was 
noteworthy, too, for attempting to set an agenda, not just for the Community 
institutions, but for the several member states, though – as we have seen – 
many previous documents since the original Common Principles of 1963 
had indulged in similar rhetorical flourishes.  What was an innovation at EU 
level was the idea of setting specific (or fairly specific) targets and, even 
more significantly, to establish a procedure for following these up.  As we 
have noted this had applied in the Employment Strategy since 1997, but at 
Lisbon it was enshrined as the preferred working method.  This was the so-
called “open method of coordination as the means of spreading best 
practice and achieving greater convergence towards the main EU goals” 
which involved: 
−  fixing guidelines for the Union combined with specific 
timetables for achieving the goals which they set in the short, 
medium and long terms; 
−  establishing, where appropriate, quantitative and 
qualitative indicators and benchmarks against the best in the 
world and tailored to the needs of different member states 
and sectors as a means of comparing best practice; 
−  translating these European guidelines into national and 
regional policies by setting specific targets and adopting 
measures, taking into account national and regional 
differences; 
− periodic monitoring, evaluation and peer review organised 
as mutual learning processes. (Lisbon European Council, 
2000, p.12) 
By 2000, therefore, the member states appeared committed not only to 
achieving improvements, and ‘convergence’, in education and training, but 
also to the idea that their actions (or lack of them) would be followed up, 
compared with others and publicly reported on  – with a commentary by the 
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Commission which did not hesitate to point out where progress was not as 
anticipated. 
The Education Ministers duly reported back and further “concrete 
objectives” were adopted (Council of the European Communities, 2002).  
There were now 13 objectives for education and training, though in many 
cases indicators of success were yet to be developed. 
In parallel the Commission organized a consultation (which included the 
eastern European countries) on the concept of lifelong learning in its 
Memorandum on Lifelong Learning (European Commission, 2000), 
reporting back a year later (European Commission, 2001). This highlighted 
six priorities: mutual recognition of qualifications; information, guidance and 
counselling; access to education and training; more investment in lifelong 
learning; development of basic skills; and the development of new training 
methods.  It suggested that the “open method of coordination” be applied in 
these areas as well (p.25). 
Surprisingly soon after these two sets of proposals the Commission 
undertook a stock-take of the education and training situation, not only in 
member states, but also in the various countries which at the time were 
candidates for accession.  As a result it concluded that: 
efforts are being made in all the European countries to adapt 
the education and training systems to the knowledge-driven 
society and economy, but the reforms undertaken are not up 
to the challenges and their current pace will not enable the 
Union to attain the objectives set. (European Commission, 
2003, p.3) 
The Commission noted that “the date of 2010 is getting closer and closer” 
[p.4 sic] and called for national strategies and “coherent action plans”.  It 
declared: 
the urgent nature of the challenges to be faced means we 
have to use the open method of coordination to the full – 
while fully complying with the principle of subsidiarity (p.4) 
The threat of using the open method “to the full” was manifested in a 
requirement for annual reports on progress from each country (later 
amended to be biennial). 
A broader follow-up to Lisbon was made by a ‘High Level Group of Experts’ 
headed by Wim Kok, which reported in November 2004.  It too considered 
that progress was too slow, and asked for annual guidelines and reports on 
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economic growth and jobs, which of course included relevant education 
measures.  Interestingly, the findings about lack of commitment to the 
Lisbon goals were  “an assessment that seems to be more valid for 'core 
European countries' than for the accession states of central and Eastern 
Europe” (Ertl, 2006, p.22). 
In parallel (again) the model of Bologna for higher education was carried 
over to VET.  The Copenhagen Declaration (European Ministers of 
Vocational Education and Training and European Commission, 2002) 
called for more mobility and cooperation, the creation of a single framework 
for the various instruments which aided mobility within the EU, as well as 
pushing forward ideas for increasing ‘transparency’ of qualifications 
including the recognition of non-formal and informal learning, and “common 
criteria and principles for quality in vocational education and training” (p.3).   
The ensuing ‘Copenhagen Process’ continued through the rest of the 
decade, and involved the eastern European candidate countries from the 
start. 
 
The situation in the run-up to accession of the eastern 
countries 
It will be helpful briefly to pluck out from the historical narrative the various 
strands of Community VET policy in the period 1990-2005 when the 
eastern European countries were preparing for accession. 
 
Policy 
We can detect two strands of policy – first the business of establishing EU-
wide objectives, and second the creation of Community-wide mechanisms 
which would aid the achievement of those objectives.  This type of thinking, 
falling short of the banned ‘harmonization’ but going further than the vague 
‘co-operation’, was beginning to emerge at the beginning of our period as 
exemplified in suggested Guidelines for Community Action in the Field of 
Education and Training, presented by the Commission in May 1993, some 
six months before the Delors White Paper:   
...Community action is developing and should continue to 
develop at 3 levels: 
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-  the encouragement of well-structured cooperation between 
the education and training systems; 
-  the promotion of quality through innovation by exchanges 
of information and experience; and  
-  the launching of specific direct actions on a community-
wide basis, where there is a clear advantage over action only 
at a national level. 
...Community action should seek to give a strong multiplier 
effect to the promotion of innovations which aim to improve 
the quality of education and training and set higher standards 
or new targets.  These efforts should focus on problems of 
common concern identified in collaboration with Member 
States..." (European Commission, 1993a, pp.9-10) 
The Commission seemed clear about the overall aim: 
... the Community's vocational training policy should be 
designed to support and complement measures developed 
by and in the Member States, with a view to setting higher 
training standards and also creating a transparent European 
area so far as skills and qualifications are concerned....  The 
Community should design a coherent framework to help 
implement its vocational training policy and at the same time 
give a European dimension to the arrangements made by the 
Member States. (p.17, emphasis as in original) 
One can see, over the ensuing decade, a tightening up of the two strands 
of setting “higher standards or new targets” on the one hand, and of 
“creating a transparent European area” in the field of skills on the other.  
The first was to be secured through “well-structured cooperation” and the 
second aided by particular “specific direct actions on a community-wide 
basis”. 
In terms of the “higher standards and targets”, for which the Guidelines 
were searching, we can see a progression in the following decade: the 
Delors White Paper introduced the issue; a model for action was developed 
through the Employment Strategy; and the Lisbon Strategy broadened the 
framework to apply to the full field of VET, linking it with a whole range of 
other, mainly economic, objectives.  Jobs, economic growth, productivity 
and the role of lifelong learning became the guiding stars – forming the 
EU’s contribution to a “global discourse ...of human capital investment, 
skills formation and lifelong learning” which involved other supranational 
organizations such as UNESCO, the OECD and the World Bank (Taylor 
and Henry, 2007, p.112).  Thus policy on training, and education more 
broadly, was largely framed in terms of economic needs.  Social cohesion 
was avowed, throughout, as a parallel aim though commentators from both 
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eastern and western Europe seem clear that it was subordinate (Dehmel, 
2006; Kuhn and Sultana, 2006; Strietska-Ilina, 2007b).  Dale and 
Robertson (2006), however, make the point that under ‘third way’ thinking 
social cohesion is necessary for sustainable economic growth, and growth 
is necessary for a socially cohesive society. 
The “coherent framework” offered by the Lisbon Strategy went wider than 
the more traditional vision of ‘vocational training’ (to use the term of the 
Treaty of Rome) which was originally conceived primarily as a tool to 
facilitate the matching of workers to individual slots in the labour market 
and to allow them to adapt to re-structured industries.  The Strategy, 
instead, adopted the model of knowledge and skills, via increased 
productivity, as a key factor in enabling trading blocs to compete against 
each other.  Given this rationale, the case for investment spills over from 
‘vocational training’ to education as a whole, and here the concept of 
‘lifelong learning’ is helpful precisely because it shifts talk about education 
from the “...institutionalised and ordered sequences” rooted in national 
education systems “..to become a new fluid, flexible and cross-national 
phenomenon” (Lawn, Rinne and Grek, 2011, pp.15-16).  It also places the 
individual centre-stage in acquiring learning, to be encouraged and 
facilitated by employers and governments, but ultimately responsible for his 
or her own destiny (Kuhn and Sultana, 2006). 
In terms of the trajectory of “creating a transparent European area” of skills 
the 1990s were marked by a move from the rather woolly identifying of 
“problems of common concern” and “exchanges of information and 
experience” to more ‘concrete’ (to use a favourite Community term) 
“specific direct instruments on a community-wide basis” aimed at 
stimulating mobility across vocational education and training within Europe.  
The Copenhagen Declaration had the aim, not so much of increasing the 
volume and universality of VET (which was the thrust under the Lisbon 
Strategy), but rather to create a ‘space’ or ‘common area’ for VET in the 
same manner as was being undertaken for higher education under 
Bologna. Thus the Declaration referred to a “European education and 
training area” (European Ministers of Vocational Education and Training 
and European Commission, 2002, p.2) and aspired to promote “action 
similar to the Bologna-process, but adapted to the field of vocational 
education and training” (p.2). 
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Like Bologna, the Copenhagen Process gave rise to a work programme 
interspersed with regular summits.*  Again like Bologna, the ‘process’ 
included European countries which were not in the EU (by 2010 Croatia, 
the FYR of Macedonia, Iceland, Turkey, Liechtenstein, and Norway).  This 
work programme resulted in a series of EU-wide ‘instruments’, including, a 
revised Europass (a standard way of setting out vocational achievements) 
issued in 2005, a European Qualifications Framework in 2008, a template 
for a European Credit System for VET (ECVET) in 2008 and the European 
Quality Assurance Reference Framework for VET in 2009.  Work to 
develop these instruments was underway in the period immediately before 
the accession of the eastern European countries. 
 
The Mode of Cooperation 
The search for a “higher standards and new targets”  which all member 
states could sign up to was one thing.  To implement it was quite another.  
How could one prevent distractions appearing as had happened so 
frequently in the past where: 
...successive Presidencies … influenced the political agenda 
by adding their national priorities, which did not always make 
for continuity in the Community's work. (European 
Commission, 2006b, p.192) 
and above all how could one hold the various member states to acting on 
the commitments they had made, as the cooperation process: 
…depend[ed] largely on the willingness and commitment of 
the Member States to take account, at national level, of the 
common objectives that they had fixed for themselves at 
European level. (European Commission, 2006b, p.32) 
The answer, as we have seen, was the ‘open method of coordination’ first 
used in the Employment Strategy in the late 1990s, and enshrined as the 
preferred method for collective action at Lisbon.   
This method was familiar in some countries.  It was perhaps a transatlantic 
import (Grek and Rinne, 2011), derived from older ‘Management by 
Objectives’ traditions and applied more widely to government in the 
influential Reinventing Government (Osborne and Gaebler, 1993) which 
                                                
* A veritable tour of European cities – Maastricht, 2004; Helsinki, 2006; Bordeaux, 
2008; and  Bruges, 2010. 
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was popular with ‘third way’ thinkers in the Clinton and Blair 
administrations.  This approach seemed to accommodate the hitherto 
conflicting desires of achieving collective progress within a regime of 
‘subsidiarity’; to achieve ‘convergence’ without the banned ‘harmonization’; 
to respect ‘decentralization’ while achieving aims for the EU as whole. It 
was a mode of operation to which the eastern countries would be expected 
to conform – the idea of central targets would hardly be novel for them, but 
the concomitant open accounting for progress towards them would be 
something entirely new. 
 
The Programmes 
A brief mention has been made of the education and training programmes 
operated at Community level.  These were re-structured in the middle of 
our decade (1994/5).  Socrates dealt with schools and higher education, 
while Leonardo focussed on vocational education and training.   
Leonardo operated principally through three modes: supporting individual 
exchanges of students and teachers/trainers; supporting ‘innovative’ 
projects which involved partners in a number of different countries; and the 
establishment of networks to exchange information and practice.  A large 
number of activities were eligible; the original programme had a rather 
cumbersome 19 objectives including, for example, the promotion of equal 
opportunities, vocational guidance, and “to develop the European 
dimension in training” (European Commission, 2006b, p.172).  These were 
subsequently rationalized to three overarching objectives at the time of the 
renewal of the programme in 2000. 
In 1998, around the mid-point of our period, Leonardo was running at 
€140m per annum, and the education and training programmes collectively 
at around €400m (European Commission, 2006b, p.273).  In the scale of 
things this was not large, amounting to less than 0.5 per cent of the total 
EU budget and less than five per cent of the European Social Fund (p.182).  
Nonetheless the Commission had considerable trouble getting the budgets 
it wanted in the face of reluctance on the part of the member states.  The 
bulk of Leonardo money went on continuing vocational training and other 
lifelong learning projects, as opposed to initial vocational education; 75 per 
cent was spent on transnational projects, with less than 20 per cent on 
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individual exchanges and six per cent on related research (European 
Commission, 1997c). 
Though small, one should not dismiss these programmes as incidental.  
There were two important side effects – one personal and the other 
political.  At the personal level a considerable number of people were 
involved; according to the Official History (p.180), 77,000 ‘partners’ were 
involved in Leonardo transnational projects in the period 1995-9, and 
127,000 students and 11,000 trainers took part in exchanges or work 
placements in other countries.  Including Socrates, by 1992 some 6-7% of 
all EU students could expect to participate in exchanges at some point 
(Stein and Kurtz-Newell, (1995, p.148).  Though most of these were in 
higher education, and perhaps therefore targeted future elites rather than 
ordinary ‘citizens’ (Field and Murphy, 2006), the influence of this very 
personal experience of the ‘European Dimension’ should not be 
underestimated.  One might expect this to have been particularly well 
received by the formerly restricted eastern European countries, which were 
– through an enlightened decision – granted access to these programmes 
in 1997, well before their accession (European Commission, 1997c, p.56). 
At the political level the programmes were a way of allowing the 
Commission to interact directly with professionals in the various member 
states, rather than just policymakers. In the enthusiastic words of the 
Official History: 
[The programmes’] strength lay in the fact that they were 
implemented at the closest possible level to the education 
and training players on the ground and were effective 
catalysts and multipliers of the European dimension in 
education and training. Since they were hotbeds of 
transnational innovation and experimentation in Europe they 
were increasingly cited as an example of what the 
Community could best do for its citizens in response to their 
expectations of a Europe closer to their needs. (p.26) 
This effect on the ‘players’ is confirmed by Rasmussen (2006): 
In general Danish attitudes towards EU involvement in 
matters of education and culture are becoming more positive.  
This is partly because … many institutions and organisations 
have over the years been awarded grants from EU 
programmes or participated in EU-funded networks. (p.63) 
In short, the programmes may well have delivered a lot of ‘bang for their 
bucks’ in gaining the Commission allies amongst practitioners, stimulating 
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them to put ‘bottom-up’ pressure on their policymakers, thus adding to the 
top-down pressures of the ‘open method of coordination’. 
Finally a word should be said about the sizeable European Social Fund 
(ESF).  In the latter half of the 1990s, training amounted to nearly 75 per 
cent of ESF expenditure (European Commission, 1997c, p.115).  The fund 
requires that its expenditures should add to training spending in a member 
state rather than substitute for government resources.  It aims to direct this 
additional expenditure to regions and people who are disadvantaged or 
who are particularly prone to the effects of economic change.  However the 
nature and quality of the training interventions made are entirely the 
prerogative of the member states, and indeed it is likely that the shares of 
the ESF that accrue to each member state are largely determined by 
political considerations rather than objective criteria of need or the nature of 
training (Allen, 2005).   
It is perhaps debatable as to whether the ESF should be counted as part of 
the EU vocational education and training policy.  The Commission has little 
influence over the type of training it is spent on, or indeed on the degree to 
which it spent on training as opposed to other measures to achieve social 
integration – in the late 1990s the proportion spent on training ranged from 
93 per cent in Denmark and Sweden to only 36 per cent in France.  The 
fund is clearly not viewed by the central EU authorities as a tool for 
transmitting education policy but rather as an aspect of regional policy and 
support for disadvantaged people.  However, as we shall see, the ESF was 
an important factor for the eastern European countries; though they only 
gained access to it on accession, preparation for taking on the 
responsibility for administering the fund was an important part of their 
‘capacity building’ in the run-up to full membership. 
 
Mutual recognition of diplomas and certificates 
This is a rather specific policy topic concerning the recognition of diplomas 
for purposes of professional mobility, rather than (as is the case with 
measures such as ECTS and ECVET) recognition for purposes of 
continuing study or mobility between education and training institutions in 
different countries. 
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Unlike other areas of education and training this is one where ‘hard law’ 
can apply at the Community level, as it deals with mobility of labour on 
which the Treaty is unambiguous.  The ‘mutual recognition’ Directives apply 
in cases where a diploma or certificate is required in a certain country for 
the practice of a particular occupation or profession.  In such cases some 
mechanism is needed whereby someone who has trained to an equivalent 
level in another country may satisfy, or partially satisfy, the requirements 
applying in the country to which they are transferring.  Originally this was 
pursued on a profession-by-profession basis, with agreements across 
member states about what counted as equivalent qualifications.  This, 
however, was a tortuous business and became slower as the number of 
member states expanded.  The General Directives adopted in 1989 and 
1992 (page 64 above) resolved this problem by placing a duty on member 
states to adopt procedures in respect of each of their ‘regulated 
professions’ whereby either they recognized equivalent qualifications 
gained in other member states or laid down what supplementary training 
was required (Council of the European Communities, 1992, Article 7). 
Outside the regulated professions the original hope was that there might be 
‘harmonization’ of training – i.e. that training standards for any given 
occupation would be the same across the EU.  It was plain at an early 
stage that this was unrealistic and in the event appeared to be expressly 
forbidden by the Maastricht Treaty, so the search instead became one for 
‘equivalences’.  As we have seen (page 63) this was one of the tasks for 
which CEDEFOP was set up.  A large exercise was started in the 1980s to 
“undertake work… on the comparability of vocational training qualifications 
between the various Member States, in respect of specific occupations or 
groups of occupations” (Council of the European Communities, 1985, 
Article 2).  This work included, inter alia the “drawing up mutually agreed 
Community job descriptions” and “matching the vocational training 
qualifications recognized in the various Member States with the job 
descriptions” in order to draw up, for each occupation, a table showing the 
relevant vocational qualification in each member state (Article 3).  This 
proved a Sisyphean task on which the Official History gallantly reports: 
Under [CEDEFOP's] aegis, dozens of tripartite groups of 
experts met to try to draw up correspondence tables for 
skilled workers in the various occupations.  While questions 
did arise once the work had been completed as to the 
practical value of the tables so produced, Cedefop's work 
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contributed greatly to promoting a European approach in 
training. (European Commission, 2006b, pp.233-4) 
Nothing seems to remain of this task – the scale of which, with currently 28 
Members, constant updating of vocational qualifications, and flexibility of 
job descriptions, would surely now boggle the mind.  But the scarring 
experience on those involved no doubt encouraged the move away from 
the idea of ‘equivalences’ towards that of ‘transparency’, which is the flag 
under which the European Qualifications Framework flies; the idea is that, 
through the EQF, employers and individuals should more readily be able to 
estimate the nature and level of training for themselves rather than to rely 
on officially produced tables or ‘harmonized’ training standards. 
 
The search for a policy framework 
The preceding survey is bound to leave the reader a bit puzzled.  The 
Community’s policy has included everything from ringing statements that 
“every person should receive adequate training, with due regard for 
freedom of choice of occupation, place of training and place of work” 
(Council of the European Communities, 1963, Principle One) to proposals 
in the Teaching and Learning White Paper for “setting up a mechanism to 
enhance and brand educational software” (European Commission, 1995, 
p.36).  A cynic might say that policy has veered between initiatives that no-
one will do anything about and those which no-one wants in the first place. 
Underlying this volatility of scope has been an uncertainty, disagreement 
and manoeuvring about the very nature of what policy at the Community 
level should look like.  Should an EU policy attempt to summarize the 
aspirations of member states (as the Common Principles did, and many 
other utterances over the years have done)?  The issue here, of course, is 
how to close the loop between aspiration and fulfilment.  At national level 
the delivery of promises is – at least in part – safeguarded by elections, an 
active press and opposition parties.  At Community level, such mechanisms 
are largely absent and so such rhetoric comes very cheaply.  We can see 
the ‘open method of co-ordination’ as an attempt to inject a reality-check, 
demanding that aspirations are at least made concrete and monitored. 
On the other hand, perhaps the role of the Community is to attempt to 
search for and spread good practice in areas of common interest, using a 
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comparative approach.  This has been a strong feature of Community 
policy in the field of VET for many years, as evidenced by the continuing 
backing for CEDEFOP, and the support for ‘innovative projects’ under the 
Commission’s education and training programmes.  But there is no 
guarantee that – even if identified – good practice will actually be adopted. 
A further interpretation of the proper role of an EU-wide policy is that it 
should identify critical Community mechanisms which will foster a ‘single 
market’ in education and training, with the benefit – as in other market 
areas – of offering greater consumer choice and of fostering increased 
quality and efficiency in education and training services.  We can see this 
thinking operating in the encouragement of student mobility and fostering of 
credit transfer.  We might also detect it in the enthusiasm for distance 
learning (which has been a minor, but long-standing, feature of EU 
education policy), as this is obviously not dependent on national 
boundaries.  However,  mandating the use of such mechanisms would run 
up against the limits of the Treaties; they can only be instituted on a 
voluntary basis. 
Again, perhaps the main purpose of a policy at the EU level should be to 
introduce a ‘European Dimension’ into education and training.  This has 
been a feature in the field of education, rather than training, with early 
efforts, for example, to establish University chairs in European studies, or – 
more modestly – to produce common ‘European’ teaching materials.  The 
programmes of education and training exchanges can also be seen in this 
cultural light.  But there are clearly national sensitivities in this area, with 
many countries wary of attempts to develop European, rather than national, 
elements in the curriculum.  While the Lisbon Strategy attempted to create 
a sense of pan-European identity, this was not so much in the cultural 
sense, but rather that of a single economic trading bloc which needed to 
deal collectively with economic realities.   
One interpretation of the evolution of community VET policy is that it has 
swung between these various axes in an unpredictable manner, influenced 
by myriad forces as Field and Murphy (2006) describe: 
A variety of policy actors has been involved, each of which 
has sought to pursue its own interests while repositioning 
itself as a player on the European level …  with individual 
actors forming strategic and tactical alliances with others to 
promote their own preferred policy solutions… And the 
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difficulties of coordination, definition (scope) and agency 
mean that policy accomplishment is an extremely uncertain 
and complex process. (p.78) 
The similarity with Kingdon and Ball’s conception of the policy process as a 
primeval soup’ of competing policies (see page 37 above) is unmistakable. 
 
The nature of the European integration process in the case 
of VET 
What can be said about the degree and nature of European ‘integration’ in 
VET, and which of the models for achieving integration seem most readily 
to explain the process? 
It is plain that the economic rationale for broader and deeper EU integration 
has been significant in setting the context for VET.  The EU started 
explicitly as an ‘Economic Community’ and its further deepening as a 
‘Single Market’ has been driven by a clear economic rationale.  However 
despite the express inclusion of vocational training in the original treaty and 
its obvious relevance to issues of employment, productivity and labour 
mobility, concerted action on VET was at best sporadic in the first three 
decades of the Community’s existence.  The re-emphasis on economic co-
ordination in the 1990s gave a new impetus to Community actions on VET, 
but at a very general level, focussed more on the broadest interpretation of 
‘lifelong learning’ than on any development of a distinctive, integrated 
‘European’ model of VET.  
For those, like Anderson (2009), who would emphasize the growing pre-
eminence of capital over labour in the evolution of the Single Market, there 
must be a challenge to explain the complete absence of pressure from 
European multi-national employers towards the achievement of common 
standards (and levels of financing) of training, which must surely have been 
very much in their interests, but which – as we have seen – came to 
nothing despite some well-meaning official efforts. 
So, while undeniably forming the context of many EU VET actions, it seems 
unrealistic to claim that the Community’s VET policy was principally driven 
by economic interests and imperatives.  Indeed it would surely be fanciful to 
conceive that it has been “the interests and strategies of the dominant 
national, regional and transatlantic social forces” (Cafruny and Ryner, 2009, 
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p.237) which has resulted in the European Qualifications Framework or 
Europass – one would imagine that such forces, if they exist, would have 
rather more important business to be getting on with.* 
Much has been made by the ‘globalization’ school of the claim that the EU’s 
policy on lifelong learning, in particular, has been influenced by the 
burgeoning ‘neo-liberalism’ of the 1990s, and that a more educationally 
progressive UNESCO vision of the 1970s has been corrupted in favour of a 
narrower, vocationally-orientated alternative, which – however – retains the 
emancipatory rhetoric of the former.  For example, Borg and Mayo (2005) 
assert that: 
The EU Memorandum on lifelong learning [of 2000] and a 
number of projects it inspired indicate, in no uncertain terms, 
the extent of the distortion that has occurred with respect to 
the once humanistic concept of lifelong education...Some of 
the humanistic considerations ...were co-opted in the service 
of a document seeking to provide a humanistic facade to 
what is, in effect, a neo-liberal inspired set of guidelines. 
(p.218) 
They claim that this tendency was already apparent in the both the ‘Delors’ 
and the ‘Cresson’ White Papers of the 1990s.  It seems rather fanciful 
however to attribute this lurch to neo-liberalism as having taken place under 
the auspices of two leading figures of the French Socialist Party,† and one 
suspects – instead – that the emphasis on vocational matters rested on the 
fact that the EU always had a clearer mandate, both legally and politically, 
over the vocational and employment-related sphere, than it did over the 
‘humanistic’ territory of general education, which – as we have seen – was 
jealously guarded by member states.  Indeed, far from ‘masking’ the 
vocational content of the Memorandum with nods to the importance of 
education, other authors consider that “…the EU was unusual amongst 
international organisations in maintaining a clear non-economic stand in its 
approach” (Holford and Mleczko, 2013, p.38). 
The inter-governmental interpretation, holding that EU development is 
primarily a function of the interplay between the interests of independent 
                                                
*  Avis (2012) characterizes qualification frameworks as reflecting “…the impact of 
global conceptualisations rooted in neoliberalism” (p.7), though he gives no 
reasons as to why we should see them in this light.  Perhaps the very fact that they 
have been taken up in many different countries is proof enough that their origin 
must lie in the (allegedly) equally global ‘neo-liberalism’. 
† Unless, of course, they were early victims of the emergent social imaginary. 
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member states which can either prompt or prevent integration, evidently is 
powerful explanation of certain critical milestones in the Community’s VET 
policy, both negative and positive.  We can see it operating negatively in 
the restrictions on the Community’s education programmes in the 1980s, in 
limiting EU competence in the field of VET in the Maastricht Treaty and 
perhaps also in explaining the hesitant progress in the years after Lisbon.  
Certain positive impetuses have also resulted from inter-governmental 
initiatives, most notably the Sorbonne Declaration of 1998 which gave rise 
to the Bologna process for higher education and in the Copenhagen 
process of common instruments for VET.  Both were inter-governmental 
initiatives going wider than the EU. 
Though carefully orchestrated by the Commission, the Lisbon Summit 
seems also to have required a particular configuration of powerful 
governmental interests in order to give real effect to the Delors White Paper 
of seven years earlier.  Indeed, these examples would support Milward’s 
(1992) interpretation of governments using supranational institutions and 
programmes to pursue domestic goals which might be politically difficult to 
promote on a purely national basis:  Sorbonne was used by the original 
participating governments to “kick-start domestic reform agendas” in higher 
education (Knodel and Walkenhorst, 2010, p.138), and it seems likely that 
Lisbon’s instigation of the ‘open method of co-ordination’ was helpful to 
some governments in achieving labour market reform which they might 
have hesitated to pursue alone. 
However, while it might be useful in explaining the more dramatic blocks 
and breakthroughs, inter-governmentalism would not seem to be a powerful 
explanation for the more gradual developments – the slow elaboration of 
the different Community education programmes, the evolution of 
Copenhagen’s common instruments, or the decision to substitute general 
protocols for mutual recognition of diplomas for the more specific ones.  
True, governments had no very powerful objections to these evolutionary 
developments, but they do not seem to have played a significant part in 
proposing them. 
At the working level one can see distinct evidence for the constructivist 
interpretation.  The Commission’s education programmes gave material 
benefits, not only financial but also in terms of widening interests and 
career opportunities, to education and training practitioners and to relevant 
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researchers, as well as to the students who participated in them.  This had 
the effect of stimulating an interest in European policies and in the 
possibilities of acting on a transnational stage amongst specialists.  It may 
have begun to synthesize concepts and methodologies in a distinctively 
European way amongst technical circles resulting in something of an 
epistemic community (Adler and Haas, 1992).  The emergence of a 
professional consensus has become more marked – though far from 
universal – in the collaborative work undertaken to develop the common 
instruments under the Copenhagen process as well as amongst the data 
specialists who underpinned the Lisbon process (Lawn and Segerholm, 
2011).  
However the alignment of national policymakers at the official level with a 
pan-European VET technical community is a recent development which 
may well prove fragile, and does not seem to have stretched to the political 
class.  Anderson’s interpretation of colluding national elites, appears, in the 
field of VET at least to be more to do with consensus amongst working 
level experts than the higher echelons of policymakers.  There are signs, 
though, that this working level co-operation may be resulting in some 
distinctive ‘European’ features of VET systems, particularly in the field of 
qualifications and curriculum development.  And the open method of co-
ordination does seem to have introduced a new and acceptable ‘middle 
way’ of governance, somewhere between unpalatable central Directives 
and ineffective exhortations for co-operation, which promotes a 
convergence of goals while allowing a divergence of practice (Dale and 
Robertson, 2006).  On the face of it this kind of governance regime seems 
appropriate for EU, which is neither a government nor merely an 
association of countries, though whether its peculiar balance can be 
maintained in the starker environment of a single currency remains to be 
seen. 
Finally there is the neo-functionalist explanation.  Between the occasional 
inter-governmental démarches we have seen constant pressure from the 
Commission to establish a distinctive agenda in VET.  These initiatives 
have varied considerably – ideas for transnational training schemes in the 
1960s, programmes of financial grants in the 1980s, the discovery of the 
discourse of lifelong learning in the 1990s, and the attention to 
qualifications architecture from 2002.  What is notable is that when one 
84 
avenue is blocked, the Commission has been diligent in trying to open up 
another.  Although broadly from the constructivist camp, Dale and Derouet 
show how what could be construed as an exercise in mutual exploration 
might more realistically be seen as a process whereby the central 
institutions find a means of exerting influence and expanding their own 
roles.   
In terms of the Treaty, education remains a Member State 
responsibility, with the EC’s authority confined to vocational 
education. To get a foot in the door of education, it has had to 
follow a somewhat indirect route. It had first to construct a 
common goal – making Europe the leading knowledge 
economy in the world by 2010. Then, in pursuit of this 
objective, it laid out a common cognitive universe, based on 
common performance measures ... Then, once each 
society’s knowledge of its own system was shaped by these 
measures, the Open Method of Coordination was installed – 
with common benchmarks of goals to be reached. (2012, 
p.422) 
The neo-functionalist concept of ‘spillover’ is helpful as well. The Gravier 
judgement held that the competence of the Community in vocational 
training extended to higher education.  The European Employment 
Strategy’s open method of co-ordination ‘spilled over’ to VET and lifelong 
learning by the time of Lisbon.  Similarly the approach towards higher 
education qualifications developed through Bologna was transferred to VET 
in the form of the EQF and ECVET.  Within the Copenhagen instruments 
the concept of a European Qualifications Framework ‘spilt-over’ to the idea 
that, in order to engender ‘mutual trust’ in each other’s qualifications, 
countries also needed to sign up to common principles for quality 
assurance. 
 
Towards engagement with the East 
As we have seen, it was with a multi-dimensional, evolving and rather 
unsettled array of VET policies that the EU faced the newly attentive 
eastern European countries in the 1990s and early 2000s.  If they were to 
fall in with EU VET policies it would seem that they would need to set 
objectives for lifelong learning, undergo monitoring of their implementation 
of them, take part in transnational programmes, conform with the rules of 
the European Social Fund, and assist in the development of the 
Copenhagen instruments.   
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We shall see, in due course, what demands were actually made, but clearly 
it was going to be hard to grasp the totality of the various measures. Even 
the Official History struggles a bit, reporting that in 2002 the Council 
required that: 
...approaches and actions ... should form part of the 
'Education and training 2010' process which is built around 
lifelong learning.  Lifelong learning was also to be enhanced 
by the actions and policies developed within the European 
employment strategy, the action plan for skills and mobility ... 
the Socrates programme (in particular the Grundtvig action), 
the Community programmes Leonardo da Vinci and Youth, 
the eLearning initiative and the research and innovation 
actions." (European Commission, 2006b, p.229) 
Making sense of this, let alone implementing it, was surely a challenge, 
even for sophisticated bureaucrats from eastern Europe, accustomed to the 
niceties of multi-faceted Five Year Plans. 
On the other hand, the progressive rooting of EU VET (and indeed 
education) policy in an economic rationale presented a line of thinking 
which was far from alien to those formerly communist countries which had 
expanded education, and particularly vocational education, to help them 
attain technological prowess in the 1960s.  The concept of lifelong learning, 
though, was problematic; if such terms had to “bear the weight of 
incomprehension” in many western countries (Lawn, Rinne and Grek, 2011, 
p.11), the concepts were more difficult for societies where industrial 
displacement and job mobility had been practically unknown. 
However things were changing fast in the East and a reinforced case for 
change in VET was about to emerge.  If the West had looked to VET to 
help it to respond to the challenge of  “Growth, Competitiveness and 
Employment” (to use the title of the Delors White Paper of 1993), then the 
East would have every bit as much of an incentive to do the same. 
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CHAPTER FIVE  
 
A TURN FOR THE WORSE:  
Economic Transit ion 
 
Introduction 
The successes of communist education were well known, 
and the prevailing view in the early transition was that many 
aspects of education reform could wait.  That view was 
wrong. (Barr, 2005, p.10) 
When we left their story at the end of Chapter Three, the formerly 
communist countries of eastern Europe had emerged from the old regimes 
and were confronting their new world with a mixture of reaction to the past, 
optimism at new-found freedoms and hopes of prosperity.   Apart from 
some changes to the curriculum to reflect the departure of the old official 
ideology and a limited exploration of some new (or, rather, revived) school 
types, there was no firm direction in education as a whole and still less in 
vocational education.  Indeed there was a consensus that this area was not 
a priority, and could probably be left to the professionals. 
As Barr says, that view proved wrong.  Economic and social transition 
struck the countries in a way in which few anticipated and with ramifications 
for education that would present great challenges to what was seen as one 
of the few success stories of the communist era.  Standing, as it did, at the 
juncture between education and the labour market, VET was in the eye of 
the storm as the changes in the economy were read across to the world of 
education. 
Though the transition years are associated with the 1990s and early 2000s 
– the period between the fall of communism and the accession of ten 
eastern countries to the EU in 2004-7, these parameters inevitably simplify 
matters a bit. In the western Balkans it was warfare, ethnic divisions and 
the emergence of new nations, rather than economic transition, that 
characterized the period.*  And, as we saw in Chapter Three certain 
                                                
* With the exception of Slovenia, economic transition from communism in the area 
encompassed by the former Yugoslavia was a stuttering process at best, and for 
many of the countries that emerged the transition process only really started in 
around 2000. 
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transition features could be detected prior to 1989 in some countries (page 
56).  Nevertheless these reforms were relatively small and other countries 
had not experienced any discernible softening of the communist line.   
Furthermore, it is to an extent artificial to separate economic issues from 
those of accession (dealt with in the next chapter).  For example, 
candidature for the EU involved a formal commitment to a market economy, 
which in turn made much of the trajectory of economic transition inevitable 
– “the accession policies reinforced the transition process to a market 
economy and largely eliminated the remnants of socialism" (Gebel, 2008, 
p.21).  Maniokas (2004) goes further in believing that the EU’s stipulations 
about accession meant that  "... the governments of the candidate countries 
…lost control of their own agenda and priorities of action” (p.32).   
However, the two issues – of transition and accession – are conceptually 
different and involved different forces; in the case of transition the 
impersonal ones of economic and social change, and in the case of 
accession more deliberate political choices and bureaucratic process.  And 
while accession undoubtedly carried with it the need for economic 
transition, those forces would surely have affected the eastern countries 
whether or not they had joined the EU. 
In tracking the effects of transition we start with broad economic and 
administrative issues, then look at changes in the labour market which 
these gave rise to before focussing on their implications the education 
systems as whole and finally on VET in particular. 
 
Economic transit ion 
The main elements of economic transition need only to be sketched here. 
Though featuring at different times, at different speeds and sometimes in 
different orders, all the countries saw economic shocks comprising (Barr, 
2005; Havrylyshyn and Nsouli, 2001): 
• liberalization of prices (which were previously controlled), giving rise 
to a very different pattern of domestic demand; 
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• a gross change in international trading patterns, away from the 
‘Council for Mutual Economic Assistance’ (CMEA)* and towards the 
West, particularly the EU; 
• large changes in the official exchange rate resulting first in floating 
rates, and for most countries from around 2000, a formal or informal 
peg to the Euro.  In some countries this process was deliberately 
gradual, in others it was rapid.  This too altered patterns of 
international trade and domestic consumption; 
• the permitting, and (to varying extents) encouragement, of private 
enterprise including measures to disband collective farms and 
return lands to their original owners; 
• the introduction of defined budgets and market-style accounting for 
state enterprises which for the first time enabled policymakers to 
see whether they were operating at a profit or a loss, and to take 
relevant measures in response – closure, adjustment, privatization 
or continuation under state control. 
These policies were pursued both with different degrees of rigour and in 
rather different manners in the various countries.  The ‘starting point’ also 
varied – for example the peasantry in Poland had never been compelled to 
collectivize, and the former Yugoslavia was not part of the CMEA; Slovenia 
already had extensive trading links with the West. 
In terms of rigour, both Bulgaria and Romania were late starters and 
faltered in their dedication to full economic transition.  In the mid-90s 
Bulgaria reverted to policies of bailing out loss-making state enterprises.  It 
was never clear in Romania whether the fall of Ceaușescu had been the 
result of a popular revolution or of an internal coup, and the successor 
government of Iliescu was very equivocal about accepting foreign 
investment or restructuring industry; there was no internal consensus about 
reform until 1997 (Jeffries, 2002), and concerted action was delayed 
beyond that.  Following its ‘velvet divorce’ from the Czech Republic in 1992, 
Slovakia showed signs of reversing economic reforms under the Mečiar 
government until this was replaced in 1998, arguably as a result of 
pressure from the EU (Rybář and Malova, 2004). 
                                                
* Often styled as Comecon. 
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At the macro level one can contrast the differences between the ‘big bang’ 
policy of Poland, where reforms were introduced early and quickly, and the 
deliberately gradualist moves of Hungary which had a ‘crawling’ approach 
to realigning its exchange rate (Jeffries, 2002).  Views amongst 
commentators differ as to whether rapid or gradual change was preferable; 
more important according to Barr (2005) was that policy should be 
sustained and consistently supported by government. 
Dealing with the large state enterprises was a particularly fraught area, and 
one with significant labour market implications.  Approaches differed 
substantially between countries.  Jeffries (2002) contrasts the method of 
selling such concerns to foreign investors (the main course pursued in 
Hungary) with the alternative courses of distributing vouchers to the public 
at large (the Czech Republic) and encouraging management buy-outs or 
other forms of insider privatization such as in Bulgaria where ‘nomenklatura 
privatization’ gave rise to widespread corruption under a system for 
“nationalizing losses and privatizing profits” (Jeffries, 2002, p.29). 
Despite the variations, a good degree of commonality of outcome can be 
seen in the transition paths of the various countries.  In economic terms the 
first effect was a sizeable reduction in output due largely to the disruption of 
external trade but also to the realignment of consumer demand to different 
goods and services.  In all countries GDP fell sharply in the early years of 
the 1990s (EBRD, 2009), ranging from around 15-20 per cent in Poland, 
Slovenia and the Czech Republic to dramatic falls of 35-50 per cent in the 
Baltic states (which suffered most from the loss of trade within the former 
Soviet Union).  In the mid-1990s growth resumed in all countries though 
many, and in particular those which had not determinedly pursued 
structural reforms, suffered a repeated bout of GDP reductions following 
the Russian and Asian economic crisis of 1997-8.   
This setback meant that even after ten years not all countries could report 
that GDP had recovered to its 1989 levels.  While Poland and Slovenia had 
markedly higher levels by 2000,  Romania, Bulgaria and the Baltic States 
were still well under the levels they had achieved in socialist times.  
However the early years of the new century saw all countries making 
sustained gains in output. 
90 
Due to the ‘monetary overhang’ resulting from high nominal pay and low 
availability of consumer goods under communism, reinforced by the setting 
of pensions and out-of-work benefits on generous terms in the early days of 
the new era (Noelke, 2008), inflation became a problem in all countries with 
annual increases of over (and sometimes well over) 100 per cent 
everywhere except for Hungary at some point during the 1990s (Barr, 2005; 
EBRD, 2009). 
Despite the variable progress in different countries, the growth of the 
private sector during the 1990s was very considerable.  From typically only 
ten per cent of GDP in 1990 (though around a quarter in Hungary and 
Poland, due to private agriculture in the latter case), the private sector 
increased to account for over three-quarters of production by the end of the 
decade in most countries.  Apart from the laggards of Bulgaria and 
Romania, which were due in any case quickly to catch up in this respect, 
the eastern European countries were typically as much, if not more, private 
sector orientated than the established member states by the time of their 
accession (Jeffries, 2002).  
Public expenditure came under great pressure.  Quite early in the process 
(and with the exception of Hungary) public expenditure as a proportion of 
GDP fell to below the average levels of the EU15 (Ringold, 2005).*  When 
combined with the sizeable reductions in GDP that we have already noted, 
and the fact that under communism many individuals’ benefits and services 
derived from their (now defunct) employers, it is no surprise that a number 
of public services began to be run down, chiefly through allowing 
infrastructure to decay and reducing real wages for employees, and in 
some cases allowing their pay to fall drastically in arrears (Mertaugh and 
Hanshek, 2005).  With pressure from international donors for beneficiary 
countries to adopt prudent fiscal regimes, and later from the EU to adhere 
to the deficit limits of the Stability and Growth Pact†, the scope to increase 
                                                
* Eurostat publish a range of aggregations for the EU denoted by the numbers of 
countries the aggregated EU consists of.  In this case we have taken the ‘EU15’ as 
representing the established EU before the accession of 12 new countries in 2004-
7; the 10 eastern European joiners (often known at the time as CEECs) plus Malta 
and Cyprus.  Data series for the EU15 include figures for Austria, Finland and 
Sweden for periods before they actually joined the EU in 1995. 
† An agreement that countries would limit their budget deficits, particularly with a 
view to the introduction of the Euro, to which new entrants to the EU would – in 
principle at least – commit themselves to preparing to join. 
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public expenditure to allay the dire economic situation, to alleviate growing 
poverty, still less to renovate the infrastructure for the future, was extremely 
limited. 
A further by-product of economic transition was the growth of the ‘informal’ 
economy.  By its nature it is difficult to quantify, but the International 
Monetary Fund put typical eastern European levels at around 20 per cent of 
GDP at around the turn of the century (Camdessus, 2001).  The existence 
of the informal economy had many repercussions, including – for our 
purposes – a reduction in the tax base from which public services like 
education were funded, distortion of official statistics on employment and 
unemployment, through to difficulties for jobseekers and students in citing 
quite genuine, but undocumented, work experience for the purpose of 
gaining qualifications through the recognition of non-formal and informal 
learning. 
 
Public administration 
There were, of course, many changes and challenges in developing new 
administrative structures in the formerly socialist countries, not least of 
course in the very many territories which acquired national status for the 
first time or re-acquired it after a long interval.*  For our purposes two 
features need to be highlighted: the issue of administrative capacity and the 
trend towards decentralization.   
The enormity of the removal of the Communist Parties which had acted not 
only as the political leadership but also as the key element in administration 
at all levels is hard for us now to comprehend.  From there always being a 
plan, however deficient or unrealistic many might have thought it to be, now 
there was none, not even from the West, as the managing director of the 
International Monetary Fund later admitted: 
At the outset of transition, little was clear, except that there 
was no turning back.  There was no master plan and scarce 
relevant experience to guide action. (Camdessus, 2001, p.9) 
                                                
* The ‘new’ countries in question were the three Baltic States, which had existed in 
the inter-war years, Serbia, which had been independent before the first world war, 
and the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Croatia which had arguably never 
before existed as nation-states. 
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Inside the countries the removal (in most cases) of the communist 
leadership resulted in a serious problem of capability within the 
administration.  Commentators from the countries concerned tend to 
characterize the result as something of the worst of both the old and the 
new worlds, for example the combination of politicization with an inability to 
take decisions: 
..administrations were underpoliticized in terms of 
policymaking capacity - weak executives - but overpoliticized 
in terms of personnel policies - politicization of the civil 
service. (Dimitrova, 2005, p.82) 
and relics of the old system inappropriate for the new uncertainties: 
...[a] bureaucratic logic, assuming a clear distinction between 
the decision makers and the executors of decisions, strict 
respect towards procedures, lack of initiative of the executors 
and very strong separations (both on the horizontal and 
vertical levels) of administrative structures, is acutely present 
in administrative institutions. (Hinţea, Şandor and Junjan, 
2004, p.153) 
Far from attracting reformers into official positions, a number of the ‘old 
guard’ were left in post, with attendant problems: 
Perhaps the biggest problem in the new members' 
bureaucracies is a lack of well-trained, experienced and 
motivated staff.  Many of those with marketable skills ... have 
long since switched to better-paid jobs in the private sector.  
As a result, those stuck in underpaid civil service jobs are 
often poorly trained and motivated.  Many supplement their 
meagre salaries with bribes.  Petty corruption is still a serious 
problem in many of the CEECs. [Central and Eastern 
European Countries] (Grabbe, 2004, p.76) * 
Decentralization was a common feature of administrative change in eastern 
Europe.  All were agreed that one of the faults of the previous system had 
been excessive centralization.  A number of different things can be meant 
by this – the establishment of a new private sector taking some 
responsibilities from the state, greater autonomy for individual ministries, 
the establishment of quasi-autonomous governmental bodies (for example 
in order to delegate areas of decision-taking to ‘social partners’), or greater 
managerial autonomy for state enterprises and institutions such as schools.  
                                                
*  The difficulty of making progress when officials are nervous of their positions, 
expecting some form of ‘incentive’, resentful of others, or uncertain of their political 
direction is something I can personally attest to.  However this kind of behaviour is 
not unknown in western Europe too! 
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It was not always clear just what the many advocates of ‘decentralization’, 
both at home and abroad, were actually commending.   
Nevertheless, what did undoubtedly happen was a greater emphasis on 
local government, and the establishment of elections at this level.  The 
structure of local administrative units was not always new, but the idea that 
they were appointed independently of central government or the Party was.  
This tier of government was allocated new responsibilities – usually 
including at least some education functions and often also responsibility for 
employment offices. 
Local government was not always ready to discharge these new 
responsibilities and there could be confusion about just what decisions had 
been devolved and – in particular – about responsibility for funding: 
…the transfer of expenditure authority to local governments 
was often not matched by adequate local resources and led 
to gaps or lapses in service delivery.  In many cases, local 
governments lacked the mandate or capacity to raise 
revenues through taxation.  Even where local governments 
did have authority to tax, high levels of informal sector activity 
and tax avoidance limited actual revenues. (Ringold, 2005, 
p.42) 
Whether, in the case of education, decentralization was a necessary 
precursor to a healthier and more relevant system or an “ideologically 
motivated” distraction (Mertaugh and Hanshek, 2005, p.207) is a matter of 
some dispute.  Sandi in Romania considered at the time that the system 
was just not ready for local democratic involvement:  
… it is not possible to bring about the decentralisation of 
education and more democratic management procedures 
based on the participation of local people, since those 
principles are not working at the level of local administration. 
(1992, p.90) 
The result was that in many countries the national ministries of education 
retained a good deal of detailed control, with responsibility for the efficient 
operation of the system remaining unclear: 
Ministries of Education ... are responsible for curricula; 
recruitment, evaluation, training and promotion of school 
principals and teachers; and for the establishment of norms 
governing minimum and maximum class size and teaching 
hours.  These constraints make it impossible for local 
governments to carry out actions to improve efficiency ... 
unless the Ministry of Education agrees. (Mertaugh and 
Hanshek, 2005, p.231) 
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Labour markets 
In the transition period the labour market saw a massive reallocation of 
labour from sectors favoured by the central planners of the communist era 
to new areas favoured by domestic consumers and foreign markets.  Such 
a reallocation was wholly predictable, and – for most – a desirable 
phenomenon.  But it was the new market mechanisms that needed to be 
established, and the frictions that arose in the process, which gave rise to 
the problems on the labour market that occurred in the 1990s.  The fall in 
output that we have noted and the imposition of defined budgets on the 
large state enterprises gave rise to an immediate loss of jobs.  The 
question was how fast, and on what terms, this labour would be reallocated 
to the new sectors.   
The ensuing changes pulled in different directions.  In many countries 
comparatively generous redundancy and early retirement terms were 
granted to surplus workers in the state enterprises resulting, especially for 
older workers, in their withdrawal from the labour market entirely (Boeri, 
2000).  However workers taken on in the new sectors or retained in newly 
competitive industries were very much more productive than before; 
according to Rashid, Rutkowski and Fretwell, (2005, p.61) “... economic 
transition … was associated with a strong employment-productivity trade-
off that has been unambiguously resolved in favour of productivity.”  This 
meant that fewer workers were needed, but that – for those who worked – 
real wages rose. 
The result was rapidly growing inequality.  According to Havrylyshyn and 
Nsouli (2001) inequality as measured through the Gini co-efficient rose at 
twice the pace that it had done in the UK and the USA during the 1980s.  
Of course this was from a base of considerable equality of income under 
communism, so by around 2000 inequality was roughly on a par with the 
EU15 (Noelke, 2008).  However, given the previous comparatively low 
levels of wealth and consumption in some of the countries, this meant that 
the new ‘relative’ poor had very low absolute levels of income;  Noelke 
gives figures (p.74) showing that in 2002-3 between a quarter and a third of 
the populations of Estonia, Lithuania, Poland and Romania lived below the 
World Bank’s ‘vulnerability’ threshold of poverty ($4.30 a day), with over 
half the population in the case of Bulgaria. 
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There were dramatic sectoral shifts.  Figure 1 shows the very significant 
declines in the previously dominant industrial sector with large increases in 
the service sector, usually from a low base. 
Figure 1: Change in Sectoral Mix 1990*-2000 
 
We may note the substantial increase in agricultural employment in 
Romania and Bulgaria.  This was an odd feature of transition since in most 
cases of economic modernization there is a move away from the land 
rather than towards it.  According to Gebel (p 42) however, “…agricultural 
employment was a source of secondary income and an employment 
opportunity of last resort for many laid-off workers and pensioners”; in some 
countries redundant workers made their way back to their families’ newly 
recovered small holding and engaged with what was often close to 
subsistence farming.   
There were other ways in which labour markets responded to the fall in 
output and increase in productivity that exposure to open markets brought 
about.  There was a fall in the previously high activity rates (propensity of 
people of working age to hold employment or actively seek work).  Figures 
from the International Labour Organization  show that for the eastern 
European countries male activity rates fell by nine percentage points in the 
period 1990-2006 while female rates dropped by eight points (2008, p.44).  
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In the case of females this was quite against the wider EU trend, since 
rates amongst the established member states (EU15) rose during the same 
period.  In all the eastern countries female activity rates had originally been 
higher, and in some cases up to 20 percentage points higher, than in the 
EU15; however by 2006 they were lower than the EU15 in all cases except 
for Estonia, Slovenia and Lithuania.  In Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania 
they were barely over 50 percent compared with an average for the EU15 
of nearly 65 per cent.  Furthermore, even before accession, emigration of 
workers to other EU countries was also a response to the lack of jobs at 
home. 
The final symptom of labour market disruption was, of course, 
unemployment.  This had been practically unknown during communist 
times, and there was little infrastructure to deal with it in terms of labour 
exchanges or unemployment benefits (Noelke, 2008).  So even recording it 
was a problem during the early transition years. Table 2 gives 
unemployment averages for the five years from 1998, when the Labour 
Force Survey began to give reliable and comparable rates.  As can be 
seen, total unemployment varied considerably over this period.  High rates 
were entrenched in Bulgaria, the Baltic states, Poland and Slovakia, but in 
the Czech Republic, Hungary, Romania and Slovenia unemployment was 
below the level in the EU15. 
Table 2: Unemployment Rates 1998-2002 average* 
 Total % 
Aged less than 25 
years% 
Ratio youth/total 
unemployment 
EU15 8.1 15.6 1.94 
Bulgaria 18.0 36.5 2.02 
Czech Republic 7.8 16.5 2.12 
Estonia 11.2 20.4 1.82 
Latvia 13.4 23.3 1.74 
Lithuania 14.7 27.2 1.85 
Hungary 6.6 12.8 1.93 
Poland 15.6 33.9 2.18 
Romania 7.5 20.6 2.76 
Slovenia 6.8 17.2 2.54 
Slovakia 17.2 34.5 2.01 
*Bulgaria 2000-2002 
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The incidence of youth unemployment, on the other hand, was higher than 
the EU15  everywhere except for Hungary, with exceptionally high levels in 
Bulgaria, the Baltic states, Poland, Romania and Slovakia.  Young people 
in most cases were more than twice as likely to be unemployed as workers 
generally – something not unfamiliar to many established member states, 
but a source of great concern in the East, where this syndrome had been 
entirely unknown.  
 
Transit ion in education 
We saw in Chapter Three that there were early changes in education, but 
mostly of a limited nature: alterations to the general curriculum to expunge 
elements connected with communist ideology; the dropping of Russian for 
western European languages; some limited re-introduction of selective six 
to eight-year Gimnasia to include the lower secondary phase; and a 
loosening of restrictions on private and confessional education. 
However, in terms of social effects the most dramatic early educational 
change came in higher education.  In contrast to the position of upper 
secondary education where participation under communism had been high 
in comparison with western Europe, mass higher education had not been 
encouraged, but rather restricted to elites and to the known needs of the 
economy (Mertaugh and Hanshek, 2005).  In all countries higher education 
began to expand after 1989, revealing considerable pent up demand as 
illustrated in Figure 2.*   
  
                                                
* Due to difficulties in establishing figures on participation in various stages of 
education which are comparable both over time and between countries, Figure 2 
and Figure 3 use the highest levels of schooling reported by various age groups in 
the 2007 Labour Force Survey.  These age groups are then assigned the 
approximate year when they would typically have completed secondary education. 
Thus those who in 2007 were aged 55-64 had a median age of 60 which would 
have equated to 18 in 1965, which is one of the points shown in the figures. 
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Figure 2: Population of different generations having tertiary education 
Source: Eurostat (2009) 
As well as expanding, higher education diversified.  Not only did a 
significant private sector emerge in many countries, but also there was a 
growth of shorter vocationally-orientated courses within the tertiary sector 
(Kogan, 2008).  Within higher education the previous preponderance of 
technologically-orientated courses reduced and service-orientated courses 
such as business and law saw the greatest increases. 
Shortly after the beginning of transition the labour market began to reward 
those that held university-level qualifications with a considerable wage 
premium which Ringold (2005, p.47) reports as having doubled as early as 
1993; indeed this was one of the main causes of the increased inequality 
we have noted.  It is no surprise, therefore that the appetite for higher 
education continued to increase during the transition period, even though 
state-sponsored places were restricted for budgetary reasons, and despite 
concerns expressed by some commentators about the quality of often 
sparsely regulated new higher education institutions, for example in 
Romania: 
As a result of the huge educational demand, private, fee-
charging institutions have been organised, based on profit 
principles. Unfortunately, in most cases, their intention was 
not that of offering a better quality education, but of quickly 
earning large profits...” (Sandi, 1992, p.89) 
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Figure 3 shows the trajectory of high and improving upper secondary 
participation under communism through the 1970s and 1980s, with levels 
considerably higher than the EU15 at that time.  Transition, however, 
seems at least to have halted the rise in many countries (with the notable 
exception of Slovenia).  Indeed, the Baltic states, Romania and Bulgaria 
saw some decline during the transition years. 
Figure 3: Population of different generations having upper secondary 
education or more 
Source: Eurostat (2009) 
Despite the high participation rates under communism, there seems to be 
some doubt about the quality of school education inherited from the 
socialist era.  Mertaugh and Hanshek (2005) detail scores from PISA 2000 
which are generally lower than the OECD average and comment that these 
instruments test problem-solving (rather than memorized or mechanical 
learning) more than previous tests in which the ex-communist countries 
fared comparatively well.  Boeri reminds us that in some respects the 
previous upper secondary education was fairly meagre: 
The fact of having a relatively high number of workers with 
educational attainments above elementary schooling was 
mainly a by-product of the presence in these countries of 
'lower vocational' schools offering generally one or two years 
of training in narrowly defined occupations up to the 
completion of compulsory schooling ...(2000, p.57) 
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When one adds the considerations that, during transition, budgetary 
problems meant that teachers’ salaries were in many cases frozen, and the 
fabric of school buildings and equipment was allowed to deteriorate 
(Mertaugh and Hanshek, 2005), then questions about the underlying quality 
of education, let alone its appropriateness for the new circumstances, 
started coming to the fore. 
A further feature of transition with considerable implications for education 
was the fall in school-age population in some countries.  Figure 4 shows 
the trends in the population aged 15-20.  Though some countries 
experienced an increase in the early years of transition, and Poland had a 
large and sustained increase through the 1990s, all countries had 
experienced some decline by 2007 and Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, 
Slovenia and the Czech Republic had some 20-25 per cent fewer young 
people than in 1990.  This raised problems of viability for specialized 
options within many vocational schools, especially in the rural areas where 
these declines were most dramatic and numbers of students were in any 
case low. 
Figure 4: Population of upper secondary age (15-20) - 1990=100 
Source: Eurostat (2009) 
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Vocational education and training  
From the discussion so far, we can readily discern some of the transition 
pressures that began to affect VET, even it had been a source of pride 
during the communist era which invested considerably in bringing 
technological know-how to the masses and which set great store by a 
disciplined work-ethic. 
First, there was something of a threat to initial VET (IVET) in competition 
with general education.  Both because general upper secondary education 
had been suppressed in communist times and because upper secondary 
general education was the ‘royal road’ to the desirable and expanding 
university sector, there was now a tendency for general education to grow 
at the expense of vocational programmes.  
Though it is difficult to compare the figures from country to country, Table 3 
shows reported changes in the proportion of  upper secondary and 
equivalent education (ISCED 3) devoted to vocational, as opposed to 
general, education in 1993 and 2007.  Both Latvia and Poland saw a 
dramatic drop in the proportion of students taking vocational options (in the 
case of Poland this took place largely after 2001), and Lithuania and 
Slovenia saw substantial reductions too.  In other cases the reductions, 
though present, are relatively modest. 
Table 3: Students at ISCED Level 3 Vocational as Proportion of all 
Students at ISCED 3 
% 1993 2007 Change 
Bulgaria 59 53 - 6 
Czech Republic 82 75 -7 
Estonia 28 31 -3 
Lithuania 39 26 -12 
Latvia 60 34 -26 
Poland 71 44 -27 
Romania 69 65 -4 
Slovenia 78 65 -13 
Slovakia 81 73 -8 
Sources: Eurostat (2009), and ETF, 1999. Figures for Hungary have been excluded 
as they are clearly not comparable over the time period.  For Poland the figures in 
the first column refer to 1994. 
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However there were also marked shifts within initial vocational education.  
As well as, or instead of, a growing preference for general education tracks, 
there was in many countries a shift towards vocational options which 
involved ‘double qualifications’ – a professional qualification coupled with 
the Matura (full secondary-school qualification) or equivalent which gave 
access to higher education.  This shift was aided by the technical schools 
which we noted earlier had developed as a feature of communist education.  
Courses in these schools were longer in duration and broader in curriculum 
than the more strictly vocational options, and lent themselves to meshing in 
with higher education where they did not do so already: 
Technical education attracts more students, but has also 
become more general while ‘vocational’ education is 
shrinking and has a low status. In all countries the share of 
VET courses leading to achievement of higher level 
certificates is growing, and the courses with broader profiles 
are preferred. (Nielsen, 2004, p.43) 
In many countries these technical schools were considered to be on an 
“equal footing with general secondary schools” (Kogan, 2008, p.18), and in 
ordinary parlance were sometimes not referred to as vocational at all. 
As well as encountering competition from general education and appearing 
as a dead end in comparison with the technical route, traditional initial 
vocational education also suffered other problems caused by the transition 
process. 
The first, evidently, was a growing mismatch between the sectors in which 
programmes were offered, and the restructured economy.  Even if it had 
been apparent what the new industries were to be, it was not easy to 
undertake the considerable re-equipment and re-training or replacement of 
staff which would be needed to achieve a better match.  The fact that so 
many young people seemed to be unemployed, whatever vocational option 
they had taken, was demoralizing for any who wanted to bring about a 
significant shift in the sectoral mix within vocational schools. 
Moreover with the demise of the large state enterprises, the links between 
employer and vocational school had very frequently been broken: 
In the beginning of the privatisation and restructuring 
processes ...employers largely withdrew from the provision of 
training opportunities as they were not able to maintain the 
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training infrastructure or afford the financing of apprentices.*  
This led to general disarray in the education and training 
system, and the dismantling of well-established links between 
schools and enterprises. (Kogan, 2008, p.21) 
So there was a challenge for the lower-level vocational schools not only to 
find jobs for their students after they left, but also to provide them with 
anything approaching up-to-date and realistic work practice while on their 
programmes. 
As a result of these difficulties, commentators began to refer to initial 
vocational education as out-dated and as a reason for the high levels of 
youth unemployment that we have noted: 
... many young people are confronted with a lack of demand 
for their newly gained professional education as a 
consequence of unsatisfactory reforms to the national 
education systems, which lag considerably behind labour 
market needs and lead to skill mismatches and employers' 
complaints of low quality of education. (Cazes and Nesprova, 
2003, p.11) 
Boeri (2000) put together a raft of evidence, including declining job chances 
and low wage premiums for vocational students, coupled with the new-
found enthusiasm amongst the public for general education, to reach a 
verdict which challenged the entire structure of initial VET: 
The best indicator of the fact that the previous system had 
over-invested in [vocational] ... training comes ... from the 
changes which occurred in enrolment rates at secondary 
education institutes... Just as human capital theory would 
have predicted there has been a veritable boom of 
enrolments for general secondary and a strong decline of 
inflows into vocational education. (p.61) 
This challenge was reinforced by a World Bank study (2006) which argued 
against any specific vocational training during secondary education.  On the 
other hand, while not denying the problem of ‘mismatch’ and 
inappropriateness of much vocational education, Gebel (2008) points out 
that youth unemployment might be a symptom of a wider insider/outsider 
problem in the labour market, with established workers being retained in 
                                                
* The use of ‘apprentices’ here refers to the fact that under communism students 
spent considerable time doing practical work in large enterprises, rather than to any 
system of apprenticeship contracts with different employers.  In most central and 
eastern countries the previous system was more akin to French ‘alternance’ than to 
German apprenticeship. 
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jobs due to the high costs of making them redundant and employers 
preferring people with work records, while young people were left waiting in 
a queue for jobs regardless of any vocational training they had had. 
Careers information and guidance services, barely needed under 
communism, began to emerge, but they were sparse and focussed on a 
psychological model of counselling rather than on the provision of 
information and fostering of self-help which had become the preferred 
model in much of the West (Sultana, 2007). 
If IVET was in difficulty, continuing vocational education and training for 
adults (CVET) was simply at a very low level in most countries.  Though in 
socialist times enterprises had been responsible for training their workers, 
the slowness of technological change and the stability of product markets 
had meant that there was actually little need for workers to adapt their skills 
(Boeri, 2000).  The system of adult education or ‘people’s/workers 
universities’ (see page 50 above) seems to have fallen into disrepute 
towards the end of the communist era: 
... upgrading in the wage system was made dependent on 
achieving higher formal levels of education and training 
and/or the achievement of particular certificates. Participating 
in adult education became almost entirely focused on 
achieving (or buying) certificates rather than on improving 
knowledge and skills. (Nielsen, 2004, p.44) 
Little trace of the former adult education system seems to have survived 
the transition, and in-firm training, inasmuch as it existed, disappeared with 
the firms themselves.  While in some countries the new or re-structured 
firms had managed to (re)establish training by the time of Eurostat’s 1999 
Continuing Vocational Training Survey, in most of the region in-firm training 
was still at very low levels, as shown in Table 4. 
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Table 4: Proportion of firms undertaking any type of training: 1999 % 
Czech Republic 69 
Estonia 63 
Latvia 63 
Slovenia 48 
Lithuania 43 
Poland 39 
Hungary 37 
Bulgaria 28 
Romania 11 
EU 15 62 
Source: Eurostat (2009)  
Four years later, at the time of the Labour Force Survey’s special ‘ad-hoc 
module’ on lifelong learning, adults in most eastern European countries 
were still experiencing far lower levels of adult learning than their 
counterparts in the West: 
Table 5: Adults 25-64 reporting any learning activities, 2003 % 
Slovenia 82.1 
Slovakia 59.5 
Latvia 46.2 
Estonia 31.4 
Poland 30.0 
Czech Republic 28.7 
Lithuania 27.8 
Bulgaria 16.1 
Hungary 11.7 
Romania 10.0 
EU 15 43.9 
Source: Eurostat (2009) 
Increased levels of unemployment in a number of countries raised the 
question of re-training; something which the communist era had not had to 
deal with at all.  There was little or no infrastructure for providing this in 
terms of counselling, financing, training institutions dedicated to adults, or 
recognized programmes beyond the traditional vocational school courses 
which were theoretically open to, but hardly suitable for, displaced adults. 
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During the 1990s a considerable array of re-training courses grew up in 
response to this problem, but in the main they were not organized on a 
national basis.  In some cases vocational schools offered accelerated (but 
still quite lengthy) versions of the traditional programmes designed for 
young people, but more frequently the vacuum was filled by private and 
voluntary sector providers, financed on by fees or through donor aid 
programmes, forming a loose sector which was “highly fragmented” and 
including “institutions of highly variable quality” (ETF, 2003, p.124).  Figure 
5 shows the ratio of adult education and training taken through non- formal 
education providers compared with formal institutions.  It is apparent that in 
eastern Europe (with the exception of two countries) this non-formal sector 
became more important than is typically the case in the rest of the EU, in 
many cases very much more important. 
Figure 5: Adult Training Providers 
 
Source: Eurostat (2011) 
This was quite a remarkable outcome in these countries where this sector, 
let alone private operators within it, was previously unknown.  
Consolidating, financing and even recognizing this new sector would 
present a considerable challenge, as would defining its relationship with the 
traditional system of vocational education and vocational qualifications. 
Finally we should note that high and persistent levels of unemployment in a 
number of countries gave rise to the introduction of ‘active’ labour market 
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policies* often heavily influenced by western models.  Training featured as a 
possible route alongside alternatives such as intensive job-search and 
temporarily subsidized employment.  These training options frequently 
made use of organizations in the new adult training sector, as well as the 
conventional vocational schools, but, as they were often financed through 
the insurance funds which also had to pay the much increased burden of 
‘passive’ unemployment benefits, they were often crowded out in terms of 
resourcing (Rashid, Rutkowski and Fretwell, 2005).   
 
An agenda for VET reform 
By the end of the 1990s a distinct agenda was building up for improvement 
and change in VET.  Lower level IVET had come under considerable 
challenge, not only by commentators, researchers and international bodies, 
but also by local students and parents.  It needed to modernize in a number 
of different ways:  its match with the new sectoral make-up of the labour 
market, its breadth in terms of the ‘flexibility’ of occupational profiles, its 
progression routes within the education system – particularly to higher 
education – its quality in terms of teachers and equipment, and its links with 
firms.  On all these fronts it was now perceived as being weak.  And 
because of the traditional assumption that VET was an important 
contributor to economic success, weaknesses in vocational education were 
seen as a cause of economic and employment problems, rather than being 
a result of them. 
On the other hand, the communist strand of technological education 
seemed to be showing that it had a useful part to play in bridging the 
differences between old (technical) and new (flexible) skills, as well as 
providing a route to higher education which did not rely on classical notions 
of the Gimnasium or Lycée.  However whether it could prove both popular 
with the public and valued by the new employers remained to be seen. 
In many countries the whole field, and indeed culture, of continuing 
vocational training was to a large extent absent.  With the new emphasis on 
lifelong learning beginning to emanate from the EU and the patent problem 
                                                
* See Glossary. 
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of thousands of workers displaced from the old failed industries, the eastern 
European countries plainly had a lot to do on this front. 
At the same time as they were beginning to perceive that a new approach 
to VET was needed, the countries were also experiencing the legacy 
problems of a large and physically deteriorating estate of VET schools.  
Equipment, where it was not wholly inappropriate, was decaying.  The 
cadre of teachers in vocational schools was increasingly poorly paid and 
reflected the trades of the past rather than those of the future.  And, 
needless to say, even if the direction of reform had been clear, the 
restrictions on public financing made it most unlikely that resources could 
be found to renovate the existing VET structure, let alone to explore new 
avenues. 
Could answers (and indeed resources) be found abroad?  There was a 
sense, after all, that the problems of the eastern European systems, though 
more intense, were not wholly unlike those that, as we saw in the last 
chapter, were beginning to preoccupy the West and which the EU had itself 
had begun to address in the 1990s – youth unemployment, lifelong learning 
and the need for increased competitiveness – all of which posed challenges 
to traditional VET systems in the West.  And some responses by national 
education and training systems – expanding higher education, growing and 
highly diversified adult training sectors, and the advent of active labour 
market measures – which we have noted in the East, were also relatively 
new and converging trends amongst established member states (Green, 
Wolf and Leney, 1999).  As the prospect of accession grew, therefore, 
interest on the part of the eastern countries in the EU as a possible source 
of answers to the region’s VET problems grew also. 
 
Interpretations of integration 
Though we have scarcely touched upon the EU in this chapter, it is worth 
noting what these events have to say about the process of EU integration.  
Plainly there were strong economic forces at work and – as we have seen – 
these carried implications for VET.  It would be harder to claim that the 
economic forces pointed firmly towards convergence of VET in the East to 
EU norms.  If there was an integrating effect it seems to have come about 
less directly;  by virtue of their conversion to market-orientated economies 
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the eastern European countries were subjecting themselves to the same 
kinds of disciplines as the West, and therefore – inasmuch as economic 
conditions lead to a particular type of VET system – there was some 
convergence.  This can perhaps be most clearly seen in the emergence of 
an adult training sector outside firms, responding to displacement of 
workers from declining industries.  This sector had not existed before in the 
East, but was well developed in the West.  Its arrival in the East was – at 
root – due to the East now being subject to the same processes of 
unplanned industrial change that was familiar in the West.   
Some might point to the growth in private training organizations as 
evidence that ‘marketization’ had invaded a sector previously dominated by 
the public sector.  However, the growth of this sector was not at the 
expense of the public sector vocational schools, which had never 
undertaken much short-course provision for adults, and indeed seemed 
reluctant to make offerings in this new area.  Moreover many of the new 
providers in this sector were non-governmental organizations rather than 
‘for-profit’ companies.  Though some eastern countries did permit private 
sector schools, these did not establish much purchase outside the 
(expanding) higher education sector, and do not seem to have featured in 
the secondary vocational sector at all.  In short, the private sector in 
education seems to have been very largely confined to ‘growth’ areas (adult 
training, higher education) where its advances seem to have been more to 
do with lack of interest on the part of the public sector institutions than with 
any inevitable tendency, let alone deliberate policy, towards privatization in 
the educational sphere. 
It seems unlikely that the events described here would lead much credence 
to an inter-governmentalist interpretation, for the simple reason that in 
many countries for much of this period it was not plain that governments 
were capable of taking carefully considered decisions at all.  They were 
new, with inexperienced politicians and officials, or distrusted and alienated 
members of the ‘old guard, and the events they were buffeted by were quite 
unfamiliar.  Inter-governmentalism as a theory depends on there being 
governments to take well-balanced self-interested decisions.  Such a 
description just does not fit the general position in the East at this time, let 
alone any particular decisions about VET. 
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Because the EU itself has not appeared in this chapter, there is no direct 
evidence which might support the neo-functionalist interpretation which 
maintains that integration results from an essentially internal dynamic.  One 
might be tempted, too, to dismiss a social-constructivist interpretation, as 
the policymaking community of the eastern countries was unstable and had 
had little time to orient itself to the EU or – until the end of the period – to 
start to participate in EU activities.  On the other hand,  we have noted an 
appetite to find out about approaches taken in established market-
orientated countries, and it would appear that the population of the eastern 
countries were beginning to make the same kind of educational choices as 
their counterparts in the West – aspiring to higher education and taking 
general education in the upper secondary phase.  It may be fanciful to 
suppose that there was direct copying of tastes, rather than a reaction to 
converging social and economic realities, but there certainly was intense 
interest in the culture and practices of the western countries (Strietska-Ilina, 
2007b) and we must remember the increasing exposure of ordinary people 
through working abroad and renewed contact with relatives in the West. 
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CHAPTER SIX  
 
MAKING AN APPOINTMENT:  
Enlargement and Accession 
 
Introduction 
Recalling the heady street scenes that took place in Berlin, Prague and 
Warsaw through the autumn of 1989, it is easy to imagine that the dark-
suited Heads of Government* who met in Strasbourg that December would 
do little else but talk of these.  It is salutary to learn, then, that the press 
notice on their deliberations (European Council, 1989b) leads with the not 
insignificant matters of Economic and Monetary Union, the Social Charter 
and the Single Market, all of which were very much in the forefront of EU 
concerns at the time. 
However the Summit did deal with the East.  It is worth quoting at length 
from the “Declaration on Central and Eastern Europe” made by the Summit: 
Expressing the feelings of the people of the whole 
Community, we are deeply gladdened by the changes taking 
place… 
We seek the strengthening of the state of peace in Europe... 
in a context of dialogue and East-West cooperation. It also 
has to be placed in the perspective of European integration. 
...The changes and transitions which are necessary must not 
take place to the detriment of the stability of Europe but 
rather must contribute to strengthening it. 
The Community and its Member States are fully conscious of 
the common responsibility which devolves on them in this 
decisive phase in the history of Europe. They are prepared to 
develop… closer and more substantive relations based upon 
an intensification of political dialogue and increased 
cooperation in all areas… 
At this time of profound and rapid change, the Community is 
and must remain a point of reference and influence. It 
remains the cornerstone of a new European architecture and, 
in its will to openness, a mooring for a future European 
equilibrium… 
Construction of the Community must therefore go forward: 
the building of European union will permit the further 
development of a range of effective and harmonious relations 
with the other countries of Europe. (pp.14-15) 
                                                
* Not all were dark-suited.  François Mitterand wore a pale blue suit and Margaret 
Thatcher a rich red one. 
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These sentiments are worth a close reading for they display a number of 
different, and sometimes conflicting, motivations which were to repeat 
themselves in one form or another in the story of enlargement over the next 
15 years.   
One can readily detect a sense that developments were both uncertain and 
might be out of the control of the West.  Not only does the reference to the 
need for “stability” obviously point to the fear of turmoil in the East, but the 
Heads of Government seem to acknowledge that the “feelings of the people 
of the whole Community” represent expectations amongst their own various 
populations about developments in the East to which the EU leaders will 
need to respond in this “decisive phase in the history of Europe”. 
There is an aspiration, too, for the Community as an institution to perform a 
pivotal role, remaining (or perhaps more accurately becoming) “a point of 
reference and influence”.  The United States and NATO were of course 
also other potential ‘points of reference and influence’, together with 
associated institutions such as the International Monetary Fund and the 
World Bank, and it was perfectly possible that individual member states 
would go their own ways in responding to events in the East in terms of 
trade agreements, diplomatic responses, investment and aid. 
The last statement that “the construction of the Community must …go 
forward” reflects a concern that the events in the East might get in the way 
of the European project.  We have noted that the same Summit was also 
considering important internal matters.  While welcome in many respects, 
the events in the East brought evident dangers to the consolidation of the 
existing Community with, for example, the prospect of German re-
unification diverting attention in the EU’s major economy or, at the other 
end of the spectrum, those countries less keen on integration seeking a 
‘wider’ rather than a ‘deeper’ Union.  The statement should be read as a 
defence of integration already agreed, rather than as an ambition for a 
larger Union. 
Finally, one can see in the text an uncertainty about identity.  At various 
points the communiqué refers to the “Community”, to  the ‘European union”, 
to “Europe”, to the “Member States’” to “the other countries of Europe” and 
to “East-West cooperation”.  While no doubt the drafters were careful in 
their use of these different phrases, it would not have been clear to readers 
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just what entities were being referred to in these appellations.  The state of 
flux is virtually tangible.  It would be some time before it was clear whether 
the eastern European countries were on course to join the Community, to 
be associated in a co-operative structure yet to be devised, to take part in a 
‘Europe’ which was something different from the EU, or merely to 
participate in more constructive ‘East-West cooperation’. 
If there were the uncertainties on the part of the EU, then it hardly needs to 
be said that the eastern European countries were even less certain of the 
path they had set out upon.  Were they merely throwing off the Soviet yoke, 
transforming themselves into market economies to take their place in the 
wider constellation of ‘western-style’ economies, joining (or as some put it, 
‘returning to’) a historical ‘Europe’ which pre-dated the EU, or were they 
inevitably set on membership of an enlarged EU, in the same manner as 
other countries, notably Spain, Portugal and Greece, had recently done on 
their path from dictatorship to democracy? 
The answers to these questions are clearer now, but over the 1990s they 
were less than self-evident.  The story of that decade is the working out of 
what ‘integration’ and ‘cooperation’ would actually mean – both for East and 
West.  This is not just a matter of tracking the formal decisions about 
enlargement and accession, but also of recognizing that the entity that the 
‘new member states’ were joining was itself undergoing changes – the 
target was a moving one.  And the goals of “Europeanization”  
(Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2005b) went wider than simply 
membership of the Union;  there were presumptions about “European” 
ways of doing things which went beyond the formal requirements for 
membership, though they were not always clearly delineated from those 
requirements. 
This chapter therefore: 
• briefly charts the main milestones in decisions on, and conditions 
for, accession; 
• focuses on the formal requirements and processes for membership 
inasmuch as they affected vocational education and training; 
• charts the implications for eastern Europe of the new forms of  ‘co-
operation’ embodied in the ‘open method of co-ordination’ which 
became a feature of EU activity towards the end of the 1990s; 
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• reviews the resulting mix of means at the EU’s disposal for 
influencing VET in the East. 
The chapter concludes with a reflection on what the story of enlargement 
has to say about the various interpretations of the motive forces for EU 
integration. 
 
The pathway to accession 
There is no mention of possible accession of the eastern countries in the 
1989 Strasbourg communiqué.  Though there was a clear understanding 
on the part of the West and NATO that momentous events had occurred 
which merited a significant response, it was far from clear at this point that 
accession to the EU would be part of that response.  On the other hand it is 
evident that, even at this early stage, the Council wanted to emphasize the 
role of the EU (as distinct from its member states) in playing a key part in 
the unfolding developments.  At the practical level it sought a co-ordinating 
role with respect to aid, emphasizing: 
the key importance it attaches to the fact that aid and 
cooperation projects decided on by Western countries should 
be as complementary as possible … [ensuring] that the 
efforts undertaken to facilitate the transition taking ... are 
coordinated and effective. (p.13) 
Rather impressively when one bears in mind that it took place only weeks 
after the fall of Berlin Wall (and three weeks before the fall of Ceaușescu in 
Romania), the Summit decided on a series of positive responses over and 
above instituting an aid programme, including: confirming trade agreements 
with Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary, and decisions to participate in a 
“stabilization fund” for the latter two; setting up a European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development to “to assist the transition towards a more 
market-orientated economy and to speed up the necessary structural 
adjustments” (European Council, 1989b, p.13); and, in the field of 
education and training, “to allow nationals of the countries of Central and 
Eastern Europe to take part in a number of educational and training 
programs similar to Community programs”, and for “the setting-up of a 
European vocational training foundation” (p.13). 
However, before long the idea of accepting all or some of the countries as 
full members of the EU, rather than as ‘associates’ of some kind, began to 
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be actively considered.  If this took place it would be the fifth round of 
Community enlargement, and – to an extent – the procedures had already 
been established.  Indeed the fourth (‘EFTA’) round involving Austria, 
Finland, Sweden and (aborted) Norway was still under way in 1989 and did 
not complete until 1995.  But this fifth round, also referred to as ‘10+2’*, was 
different in both the number that needed to be handled, and the fact that 
their applications for accession came from a distinct, and reasonably 
common, political background.  There was also the fact that most were very 
poor in comparison with the existing members.  This feature, however, was 
not entirely novel; the earlier accession of Spain, Greece and (especially) 
Portugal had also highlighted issues of gross disparities of income. 
Under the Maastricht Treaty “Any European State may apply to become a 
member of the Union…”(European Communities, 1992 - Article O).  For 
many eastern European countries the idea of accession seemed an early 
and obvious step: 
After gaining independence [sic] in 1989-1990 following the 
collapse of communism, most CEECs were soon openly 
expressing the hope that, as they established liberal 
democratic and market-based systems, and as East-West 
relations were transformed, the way would be eased for their 
accession to the EU.  (Nugent, 2004b, p.34) 
There was, however, not a sharp distinction in the minds of many in the 
East, between the idea of ‘Europe’ in general and the EU as a particular 
institution with rules of membership.  The rallying cry of ‘back to Europe’  
(Anweiler, 1992; Hinţea, Şandor and Junjan, 2004) had a distinctly 
nostalgic and even romantic connotation: 
For them entrance to the EU is also going back to the Europe 
of the very brief inter-war period, to a democratic and 
independent past... For CEECs, Europe is not so much a 
project, but rather a sweet memory, a reality once lost and 
now regained. (Strietska-Ilina, 2007b, pp.52-3). 
General declarations of intent for membership were common (Sedelmeier, 
2005b), though in the early 1990s it was not at all clear whether 
applications would be seriously entertained, how they would be handled, or 
what the conditions would be. 
                                                
* This refers to 10 ex-communist states: Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Estonia, Hungary, Slovenia, Romania and Bulgaria.  The ‘2’ were Malta 
and Cyprus. 
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Following the Dublin Council of 1990 the eastern countries were offered, 
and accepted, ‘Europe Agreements’ which entailed free trade in 
manufactures, political dialogue on foreign policy and technical and 
financial aid (Sedelmeier, 2005b).  However these quickly became seen as 
a prevaricating device, and a central group of countries – Poland, Hungary 
and Czechoslovakia* – meeting at Visegrad, Hungary in 1991 determined to 
act in consort both to reinforce what they saw as European values and to 
press for “full involvement in the European political and economic system”.  
(Visegrad Group, 1991). 
The EU had not been prepared for numerous applications for accession.  
Staff were quickly drafted in to handle the aid and negotiations that would 
be involved whether or not actual enlargement happened.  These officials 
in the External Affairs Directorate had a “particularly strong” notion of EU 
identity and from the start “formed a group of principled policy advocates” in 
favour of incorporating the eastern European countries (Sedelmeier, 2005a, 
p.9). 
There were many questions to be answered in determining whether 
enlargement to the East should go ahead and on what terms.  Amongst 
them: 
• should there be any special conditions, beyond accepting the 
established body of EU law (the ‘acquis communautaire’), and 
would exceptions and/or transitional arrangements be allowed? 
• at what pace should accession take place? 
• should applications be undertaken in series, in parallel or in groups? 
• what would be the implications for EU budgets of a large group of 
poor, and in many cases agricultural, nations joining the Union?  
Would those existing members who were net contributors need to 
pay more; would those who were net beneficiaries get less? 
• what would be the implications for Community decision-making and 
institutions (such as the ‘rotating’ presidency, and veto rights) of 
nearly doubling the number of member states? 
Needless to say existing member states took different views on these 
various issues, and on the basic question of whether the Eastern countries 
                                                
* At that point in the ‘velvet divorce’ referred to as “The Czech and Slovak Federal 
Republic”. 
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should be admitted into the Community at all.  Though none openly 
opposed the prospective incorporation, undoubtedly some would have 
preferred a slower path, and considered that their own, hard-won, sectoral 
interests might be threatened and should be especially protected.   
Much has been written about the various interests and dynamics that led to 
a decision by the 15 in favour of enlargement.  Many commentators agree 
that it was not obviously in the economic interests of most existing member 
states to proceed with enlargement, or at least not in their interests as they 
conceived them at the time (Cafruny and Ryner, 2009).  However in geo-
political terms there were strong reasons for Germany to favour accession 
for Poland, for Sweden to favour the incorporation of the Baltic states, and 
for the UK to favour enlargement as an alternative to the ‘deepening’ of the 
existing EU which threatened to bring about the economic and political 
union which it feared.  The French and other more cautious countries may 
have been concerned that without an EU lead, the Germans would have 
developed relations with the Eastern countries on their own (Sedelmeier, 
2005b). 
Leadership from the Commission was particularly important.  The group of 
committed staff within the External Affairs Directorate, coupled with the 
determination of Leon Brittan who led it from 1995, overcame the caution of 
other Commission officials whose job it was to maintain previous sectoral 
agreements which would be threatened by the absorption of so many new 
members.  According to Sedelmeier  “The policy advocacy from inside the 
Commission was crucially important for policy to evolve, and for obtaining 
compromises on the many awkward questions that enlargement raised for 
the incumbents.” (p.426) 
There was also the power of ideas.  Western Europe had contrasted itself 
with the eastern bloc since the 1950s, both in terms of ideals of democracy 
and in terms of the effectiveness of its economic model.  After so much 
advocacy, was it viable for it now to turn previously communist countries 
away?  Even the “... less enthusiastic states become swept up in a 
rhetorical commitment, which led to a 'rhetorical entrapment' involving a 
process of virtual drift towards a policy commitment they did not at heart 
support..." (Nugent, 2004a, p.6). 
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By 1993 the EU had determined to show a more purposeful response to the 
aspirations of the eastern countries.  The price of not making a constructive 
response was by then being illustrated in the wars within the former 
Yugoslavia, where the EU was a hapless onlooker.  At the Copenhagen 
European Council of June 1993 it was “agreed that the associated 
countries in Central and Eastern Europe that so desire shall become 
members of the European Union” (European Council, 1993, p.13).  It went 
on to spell out, for the first time, the conditions of membership: 
…that the candidate country has achieved stability of 
institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human 
rights and respect for and protection of minorities; 
the existence of a functioning market economy as well as the 
capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces 
within the Union.  
…the candidate's ability to take on the obligations of 
membership including adherence to the aims of political, 
economic and monetary union.” 
These Copenhagen Criteria also specified that “the Union's capacity to 
absorb new members, while maintaining the momentum of European 
integration, is also an important consideration” (p.13) 
So, as well as complying with the inherited body of European law (the 
‘acquis’), the aspiring members would need to show that they had made an 
enduring transition to democracy in the western sense; similarly that their 
economies had changed to a market basis and that their industries could 
compete with those in the West.  Further than these, the countries should 
be on the path to economic and monetary union – a condition that did not 
apply at the time to some of the existing members.  These economic 
criteria had implications for education and VET which went beyond the 
strict contents of the acquis; at the time – as we have seen in Chapter Four 
– the EU was separately evolving the doctrine that education and training 
was an essential component for future competitiveness and that EU 
institutions had a role in promoting it.  Thus the combination of the inclusion 
of economic criteria at Copenhagen with the emerging emphasis on lifelong 
learning as a key economic factor would help establish a lively interest on 
the part of the Commission in the state of VET in eastern Europe. 
Two years later, at the Madrid meeting of the European Council, a further 
condition was introduced.  This was that the countries should not only 
accept the acquis and legislate in accordance with it, but that they should 
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demonstrably have the capacity and institutions to implement it.  This gave 
the Commission, which was responsible for negotiating and monitoring the 
accession process, the licence to evaluate the internal administration of 
aspiring members. 
During the course of 1995 and early 1996 all ten eastern countries formally 
applied for membership.  At the same time the Commission was 
considering in detail how to handle the negotiating process and what the 
implications would be for “absorption”, including the future division of the 
structural funds (Nugent, 2004b).  This resulted in a major piece of work, 
Agenda 2000 (European Commission, 1997b), which formed the basis for 
the opening of negotiations in 1998. 
By 2000 it was apparent that a ‘mass’ integration of eastern Europe might 
be possible.  In June 2001 the Gothenburg summit confirmed May 2004 as 
the target date for the accession of the majority of countries (including 
Malta and Cyprus), and 2007 for Romania and Bulgaria.  This timetable 
was adhered to, with referenda in the various countries confirming the 
matter. 
Beyond the enlargement to ‘27’, certain countries in the western Balkans 
subsequently entered the application process.  Following the completion of 
negotiations, and the necessary domestic referendum Croatia joined in July 
2013, and Serbia is a recognized ‘candidate country’ along with FYR 
Macedonia and Montenegro (European Commission, 2013). 
 
The accession process and requirements with respect to 
VET 
Agenda 2000 was a major development.  It considered the implications for 
Community policies in areas such as agriculture, employment and external 
affairs in the light of enlargement.  It made an assessment of the 
challenges that each of the candidate countries would face in order to meet 
the Copenhagen Criteria.  It recommended a format and style for 
negotiations.  And it assessed the impact on EU budgets, recommending a 
new financing framework which took account of the demands of the likely 
new members.   
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The strategy for handling the accession negotiations was based on four 
principles (European Commission, 1997b, p.52): 
• new members would take on the full rights and obligations of 
members on accession – there would be no ‘second-class’ or 
‘transitional’ status; 
• they would be expected to apply and enforce the acquis from the 
start of their membership – so domestic laws incorporating the 
acquis would need to be passed before accession; 
• it would be possible to agree particular and time-limited ‘transition 
measures’ which fell short of the full rights and obligations of 
members on a case-by-case basis where these were justified; 
• progress in adopting the acquis and in conforming with the other 
criteria would be regularly reported on by the Commission. 
The acquis was a very substantial body of law amounting to 80,000 pages 
in all (Nugent, 2004b, p.47).  To make matters manageable in negotiations 
it was divided into a series of 29 ‘Chapters’.  Chapters were ‘opened’ for 
negotiation at certain points in the overall process and ‘closed’ when the 
Commission considered that a satisfactory outcome had been reached.  
Chapter 13 covered Social Policy and Employment and Chapter 18 
concerned Education and Training.  Their contents are outlined later. 
As well as setting out the recommended process of negotiation, Agenda 
2000 contained an ‘impact assessment’ of eastern enlargement on existing 
Community policy areas.  Certain passages are worth quoting, as they give 
a sense of the Commission’s agenda with respect to VET: 
Important investment in human resources will be necessary 
and Community social policy and its funding will be burdened 
accordingly.  Adaptation of acceding countries to the 
Community social acquis and the European Social Model 
could be adversely affected by the large number of citizens 
having a standard of living far below the EU average, by 
insufficiently developed vocational training networks, by 
systems of industrial relations still in transition and in need of 
improvement, and by inefficient public administrations… 
(p.99)  
Here the Commission recognizes the risk that – unless the social 
infrastructure of the eastern countries is improved – there could be 
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something of a two-tier Europe, such that both the body of existing agreed 
practice (the acquis) and the ‘European Social Model’* could be threatened. 
No substantial problems are expected from the participation 
of acceding countries in Community cultural, educational and 
training activities, but new members are likely to draw 
important amounts from Community programmes and 
structural funds. Sustained co-operation in the run-up period 
to accession will contribute to improve the viability and 
efficiency of these sectors in candidate countries in view of 
facilitating their integration into the European framework. 
(p.100) 
The assessment here was that there would be no difficulty in the countries 
participating in the education programmes organized by the Commission – 
indeed as we have seen the participation of the eastern countries in these 
was called for as early as the Strasbourg Summit – but administrative 
capacity in operating these, and the much larger European Social Fund, 
were considered likely to be an issue. 
A substantial West-East wage differential serves as a strong 
incentive to East-West migration despite high unemployment 
in Western Europe. On the one hand, this may accelerate the 
drive towards more flexible labour markets…. On the other 
hand, labour market imbalances might increase, as there will 
be little employment opportunities for those parts of the 
Western labour force which will be crowded out… The need 
to build up an adequate publicly and privately financed 
infrastructure, and to invest in human resources, ... will 
require substantial financial resources, which will only partly 
come from domestic savings. With respect to public 
infrastructure in particular, transfers from western countries, 
and especially from the Community, are of considerable 
importance. (p.107) 
Here the Commission makes a case for the West to invest in infrastructure, 
and “human resources” in the East, in order to promote growth there and to 
avoid the large migration of unskilled labour which might threaten 
employment levels in the West. 
Enlargement carries a risk that support for a broad social 
policy would become weaker in the Union as a whole, 
especially if adaptation of acceding countries to the acquis 
were inadequate. Further development of Community policies 
(equal opportunities for women, labour law, co-ordination of 
social security schemes) could be hampered… Achievement 
                                                
* See Glossary.  Essentially a balance between goals of collective welfare and 
competitive markets mediated through ‘social dialogue’ between organized 
employers and trade unions. 
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of the aims of recommendations for social protection could be 
retarded. (p.121) 
Again there is concern that an underdeveloped East might act as a drag on 
the adoption of more progressive social policies in the West.  This 
acknowledged the fears that existing members that new populations from 
the East would undercut them within the Single Market. 
In general, education and in particular higher education, 
attains a relatively high level in the candidate countries, 
though prolonged budgetary constraints have had important 
negative effects. Vocational training and youth policies face 
important needs of modernisation and adaptation in order to 
be able to cope with the requirements of democratic market 
societies. (p.124) 
Here we see that  the Commission recognized the basic strengths of 
education in the East, but called for its “modernization”.  In all, as well as an 
insistence on the acquis in the field of employment, a substantial injection 
of resources to adapt and reform VET would be necessary. 
Agenda 2000 went on to propose ‘Accession Partnerships’ whereby issues 
for attention identified in negotiations would be formulated in terms of 
“precise commitments on the part of each applicant country”  which would 
be supported, where possible, by “mobilisation of all the resources 
available to the Community for preparing the applicant countries for 
accession” (Section IV.1).  Thus the aid programme which had been 
instigated after the Strasbourg Summit would be specifically geared 
towards those issues arising from accession negotiations. 
Finally Agenda 2000 presented a brief assessment (European 
Commission, 1997a) of the preparedness of all ten eastern European 
applicants using the Copenhagen Criteria.  Where matters relevant to VET 
were concerned each of the assessments noted that there were “no” or “no 
significant” difficulties foreseen in implementing the education and training 
components of the acquis.  There were more concerns on those aspects of 
the acquis which concerned employment and social protection, though the 
majority of these were to do with health and safety, the codification of 
labour law and the presence of an independent labour inspectorate. 
Under Copenhagen’s ‘economic’ criterion, to which VET might be relevant, 
there were far more frequent reservations.  While by 1997 a number of 
countries were reported to be well on the road to market reform and able to 
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withstand the competitive pressures of the Single Market, the Commission 
considered that Bulgaria would “not be able to cope” with these pressures, 
and that Latvia, Lithuania and Romania would face “serious difficulties”.  
The main concern on this score was lack of restructuring of industry, but in 
this high-level analysis the Commission particularly pointed to “low 
levels…of skills among the workforce” in the case of Romania and “low 
productivity” in the case of Slovenia. 
The extra criterion added at the Madrid summit concerning administrative 
capacity proved a substantial concern. Only Hungary and Poland scored 
well for efforts already made – all other countries needed “significant and 
sustained effort of reform” (the Czech Republic) or some minor variant of 
this formulation. 
Nevertheless the Commission viewed the situation promising enough to 
recommend opening negotiations with a number of countries.  The first 
round involving the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland and 
Slovenia started in March 1998.  The opening of negotiations with the other 
countries was subject to conditions of progress on various fronts, but got 
started in early 2000 following a further summit in Helsinki.  Nugent (2004b) 
takes the view that the supportive stance of Romania and Bulgaria during 
the Kosovo war was rewarded by the opening of negotiations with them, 
which might otherwise have been further delayed. 
There is no doubt that the negotiations for accession were extremely high 
stakes for the countries concerned and very directive on the part of the EU, 
as Nugent (2004b) comments: 
"Whether the ... process really merits the description of 
'negotiations' is perhaps open to question. …  The fact is that 
the 'negotiating process' largely consisted of the applicant 
states trying to satisfy the EU that they had both incorporated 
the acquis into national law as required and had suitable 
administrative structures and arrangements in place to be 
able to fully apply the acquis." (pp.52-3) 
The negotiations proceeded chapter by chapter and a huge number of 
issues were addressed.  Here we need only focus on the two relevant 
chapters concerning employment and social policies (Chapter 13) and 
education and training (Chapter 18). 
Chapter 13 was substantial, incorporating a large span of accumulated 
Treaty obligations and specific Directives on such matters as collective 
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redundancies, equal treatment of the sexes, health and safety, and social 
protection for unemployed and sick workers.  Interestingly, and significantly, 
it not only included such specific requirements, but also required 
participation in the Employment Strategy which – as we have seen in 
Chapter Four – had started in 1997 using the ‘open method of co-
ordination’: 
The candidate countries shall work in co-operation with the 
EU on the follow up of the Employment Policy Review. The 
candidate countries are invited to address the following 
issues: (i) whether the functioning of the labour market is 
improving so as to ensure that labour supply can be 
effectively matched with demand for labour on the domestic 
market and what policy measures are being developed to 
support this process; (ii) whether policy reforms and labour 
market transformations are progressing sufficiently rapidly 
and deeply to permit a full participation in the Single Market; 
(iii) the policies and measures ... being pursued to prepare 
the large share of the working age population which is 
unskilled or inappropriately skilled for a market economy; (iv) 
the degree of readiness of the employment policy structures 
and the employment policy delivery systems to implement the 
Employment Strategy. (DG Enlargement, 2004, p.46) 
A similar injunction concerned ‘social dialogue’: 
The Treaty requires that social dialogue be promoted and 
gives additional powers to the social partners. The candidate 
countries are, therefore, invited to confirm that social dialogue 
is accorded the importance required and that the social 
partners are sufficiently developed in order to discharge their 
responsibilities at EU and national level, … the development 
not only of tripartite structures but also of autonomous, 
representative bipartite social dialogue is an important aspect 
... (p.46) 
Arguably these stipulations went rather further than the obligations of 
existing member states, strictly interpreted. 
This chapter also covered the institutional arrangements that would be 
needed to take part in the mechanisms of the European Social Fund, which 
of course involved the disbursement of monies for education and training. 
Chapter 18, dealing with education and training, was far less burdensome.  
As the Guide to Negotiations noted “Education, training and youth is 
primarily the competence of the Member States” (DG Enlargement, 2004, 
p.60).  There was only one relevant Directive (dealing with free education 
for the children of workers from other member states).  The other 
requirement was that countries should be in a position to participate in the 
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education and training programmes run by the Commission.  Given that 
they were already doing this (as a feature of the earlier ‘Europe 
Agreements’), there were few problems. 
Given the unproblematic nature of Chapter 18, it is not surprising that 
negotiations were marked as ‘provisionally closed’ a few months after they 
were formally opened (by October 1998 in the case of the first batch of 
applicants, and by May 2000 for the second batch).  Chapter 13, though, 
took longer, with negotiations typically lasting a year to eighteen months 
before ‘provisional’ closure, though less than six months in the cases of 
Romania and Slovakia (DG Enlargement, 2004, p.48). 
Formal agreement was one thing;  the Commission however continued to 
monitor compliance through a series of annual progress reports on each 
country.  These will be analyzed in detail in Chapter Eight. 
 
The ‘open method’ is applied 
Chapter Four noted the development of the ‘open method of coordination’. 
This was first used in the European Employment Strategy (EES), which 
started in 1997.  Here the process is described as being : 
based on the key principles of subsidiarity (balance between 
European Union level and the Member States), convergence 
(concerted action), mutual learning (exchanging of good 
practice), integrated approach (structural reforms also extend 
to social, educational, tax, enterprise and regional policies) 
and management by objectives. Concerning this last 
principle, the strategy uses quantified measurements, targets 
and benchmarks, to allow for a proper monitoring and 
evaluation of progress. (European Commission, 2006a, p.3) 
From the start the “adaptability of individuals” was one of the policy 
dimensions of the “highly choreographed and stylized” EES (Dinan, 2005, 
p.460).  This gave scope for the ‘open method’ to evaluate education and 
training, to prompt states to make commitments for targets in the field of 
VET, and to subject progress against those targets to scrutiny. 
As we have seen, the candidate countries were effectively required to 
participate in this ‘voluntary’ process.  Keep considers that in general the 
process was weak: 
The problem is that the EU ... can only engage in weak forms 
of co-ordination in the area of education, training and LLL 
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[lifelong learning ].  The [national action plans] provide a 
common reporting mechanism, not a real means of policy co-
ordination.  Individual states have their own goals, targets 
and visions of what LLL policies might deliver, and tend to 
prioritise these over the goals of the Commission.   (Keep, 
2006, pp.162-3) 
However there is reason to believe that, in the case of the candidate 
countries, the process was considerably more powerful.  As a result of  
their backgrounds, of course, the whole business of planning targets and 
reporting against them had a certain resonance which went wider than 
voluntary participation in a climate of “mutual learning.”  Moreover, the EES 
process was clearly and explicitly bound up in the assessments that were 
being made of their preparedness for accession.  Last, with a free and, in 
most cases vibrant, press operating in a climate where entry to the EU was 
at or near the top of the political agenda, the countries were very aware that 
their efforts in the ‘transparent’ EES process were going to be highly visible 
to their publics.  
The mechanism for entry to the EES was the preparation of a Joint 
Assessment Paper (JAP) agreed with the Commission.  This gave a 
diagnosis of what the employment situation was, what the reasons for any 
underperforming aspect were, and what should be done about it.   
Though education and training had been a theme in the EES, after 2000 
Lisbon gave them a space of their own with associated targets and 
monitoring mechanisms.  As we saw in Chapter Four, an audit was carried 
out by the Commission in 2003 of progress on the lifelong learning front, 
following a large-scale consultation and the setting of ‘concrete objectives’ 
in this area in 2002.  This audit was in two parts – the first dealing with the 
existing member states and the second, authored by the European Training 
Foundation (ETF), concerning the situation in the “Acceding and Candidate 
Countries” (DG Education and Culture, 2003). 
The audit was based on reports from the individual countries, made in 
response to a Commission questionnaire.  These were complemented by a 
series of ‘monographs’ undertaken by the ETF which assessed the 
situation in each country with respect to its Joint Assessment Paper under 
the EES; these are analyzed in depth in Chapter Eight.  Though the ETF’s 
summary report contains a considerable number of examples of good 
practice and a few encouraging trends (including measures to tackle 
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marginalized groups, notably the Roma), many of its overall findings were 
rather glum: 
... the situation has not changed radically in the acceding and 
candidate countries. A range of important initiatives has been 
taken in most of them, however… they have… been too 
recent or still ongoing so that no assessment is possible yet.  
…the formal education system continues to receive priority 
with adult education as an important part of it, while little 
attention is paid to ways of acquiring job skills and informal 
forms of learning.  
Coordination between ministries is still weak and no country 
has as yet an integrated policy covering LLL [lifelong 
learning]...The involvement of social partners in the definition 
and implementation of strategies for LLL is still poor. 
…references to the Lisbon objectives as well as the EU 
benchmark in education and training are surprisingly absent 
in all country reports. 
…there is little evidence of learning support in the workplace 
by means of incentives or other approaches, as well as to 
initiatives aimed at supporting private investment in training.  
Finally, the quality of the VET system still needs very serious 
improvement… even if many ongoing initiatives are about to 
provide better equipment and infrastructure (pp.2-4) 
The three great aspirations of European policymakers: an ‘integrated’ 
strategy, concrete plans with demonstrable progress, and full engagement 
of the ‘social partners’ still seemed a long way off as the first batch of 
countries went through the last stages before their accession in May 2004.  
It might, though, be argued that many of the same criticisms could be made 
of existing member states, if perhaps not to quite the same extent. 
 
Means of influence 
Through the progressive crafting of the enlargement process the EU had 
developed a number of means of influencing VET in the East by the end of 
the 1990s.   
First to emerge was financial support for the eastern countries which we 
have noted was agreed as early as the Strasbourg Summit at the end of 
1989.  We shall discuss this programme in detail in Chapter Nine.   
There were also a number of measures designed to involve eastern 
European practitioners of VET in the networks of cooperation already 
established in the EU, and further ones which were set up for the 
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Community as a whole during the period that the enlargement process was 
taking place.  We have seen that the eastern countries were invited to 
participate in the EU education and training programmes at an early stage, 
before there was any agreement on future membership.  This meant that 
during the 1990s and up to accession many thousands of, students, 
teachers, managers of VET institutions and  policymakers had the 
opportunity to visit VET establishments in EU member states and to receive 
visitors themselves.  Ideas of what might be possible were generated 
through these exchanges, as well as joint working on projects and the 
‘study visit’ component of many aid programmes.  For the individuals 
concerned, some of whom occupied, or went on to occupy, influential 
positions within their own countries, such experiences were surely much 
more vivid in terms of influence than the weighty reports full of 
recommendations and injunctions which they received from official sources.   
We also saw, in Chapter Four, that the eastern countries joined those from 
the EU to design new instruments of VET co-operation at the very start of 
the Copenhagen process in 2002.  CEDEFOP, too, began to involve the 
eastern countries in its conferences and research programmes.  Such 
measures were a way of exposing eastern VET to western practices, and 
given the natural curiosity of those who had been denied both travel and 
external information for many years, these encounters were a popular, if 
somewhat uncontrolled, means of dissemination of alternative approaches. 
Then there was ‘conditionality’ – the setting of conditions without which EU 
membership would be slowed or, at the extreme, denied.  We may 
distinguish, as many on the EU side did at the time, between ‘hard’ and 
‘soft’ conditionality.  Hard conditionality refers to the legal requirements in 
the acquis itself or in the Copenhagen Criteria.  Soft conditionality (also 
known sometimes as the ‘soft acquis’) referred to the ‘agreed’ goals of the 
EES and Lisbon pursued through the open method of co-ordination.  As we 
have seen, the ‘hard’ version was limited in the case of VET, because there 
were few legal requirements in the acquis.  However the ‘soft’ version was 
an important feature, focussing on employment-related matters at first and 
then broadening after Lisbon.  We shall look at its operation in Chapter 
Eight. 
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EU integration 
The enlargement process as a whole is a key test of EU integration theory.  
Liberal inter-governmentalists have some problems in accounting for it, 
since many established EU members looked likely to be losers as the 
poorer East began competing for EU budgets.  This school therefore tends 
to play up the geo-political interests of ensuring stability and cementing ties 
of particular interest to particular countries (Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig, 
2009).  While it could be argued that the western governments found it 
convenient to pool the negotiations and aid effort through the central 
community organizations, there is little evidence of inter-governmental 
bargaining about VET policies, either between western governments to 
agree the line to be taken towards the East, or by the eastern governments 
in shaping the demands made of them. 
Neo-functionalists have an easier task, pointing to a natural, geographical, 
‘spillover’ involving more and more countries as momentum for EU 
membership built up through the region, a progressive incrementalism as 
the ‘association agreements’ led on to ever firmer plans for actual 
membership, and a leading role being played by EU institutions with the 
Commission taking a pro-active role (Niemann and Schmitter, 2009).  It 
seems that the Employment Strategy, developed for the West, was 
transferred pretty well wholesale for application by the candidate countries, 
and quickly became an important feature in VET policy towards the East.  
The principles of the European Social Model, articulated in and after 
Maastricht, also became a touchstone for social and labour market policy in 
respect of the East. 
The social constructivist case, too, seems plausible.  The assent to 
enlargement, perhaps against their national interests, of a number of 
governments of established member states was achieved as a result of 
some kind of mutual solidarity, with the Commission cajoling them to hold 
to their oft-repeated beliefs in liberal, democratic and market-oriented 
‘European Values’ (Risse, 2009).   Conversely the candidate countries 
were, according to this school, as much motivated by the idea of coming 
‘back to Europe’ culturally and politically, as by the prospect of immediate 
benefits in what they could see was likely to be a hard road to accession.  
The decision to open up the Community’s VET and education programmes, 
which involved transnational mobility of teachers and students and cross-
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border co-operation between education professionals, policymakers and 
professionals, was clearly motivated by an expectation that such joint 
exposure would positively influence both old and new members to the 
prospect of enlargement. 
Those subscribing to the interpretations revolving around political economy, 
on the other hand, point to the interests of the West (in terms of large firms 
rather than governments perhaps) in prospective eastern locations for 
investment and new consumer markets.  They cite the undoubtedly 
superior bargaining position of the established EU (representing those 
interests) over the impoverished East in dominating a one-sided 
‘negotiation’.  This resulted in the East bearing most of the social costs of 
accession while being forced to conform to the Single Market and economic 
stability mechanisms which the forces of capital had established for the 
existing Community (Cafruny and Ryner, 2009). 
It is true that the EU business community, as represented by the ‘European 
Round Table of Industrialists’ (ERT), was keen on enlargement.  Part of 
their argument was that incorporation into the EU would allow access to 
relatively high skilled, but relatively low-paid, workers – though they 
considered these gaps would erode fairly speedily (European Round Table 
of Industrialists, 2001).  It is also the case that the ERT considered that 
improvements could be made to the eastern workforce who they 
considered deficient in the areas of “sales, marketing, commercial 
management and finance”, not always familiar with “up-to-date working 
methods” and with “problems amongst some workers, particularly in terms 
of their levels of personal initiative, creativity, commitment, and efficiency.” 
(European Round Table of Industrialists, 1998, p.22).  The ERT went on to: 
request...all parties to work together and establish an "East-
West Training and Skills Programme" designed to improve 
the range of skills and attitudes to work needed in the new, 
more competitive free-market economies of C&EE. These 
programmes should be coordinated on a public-private basis. 
(p.25).   
However the ERT said no more about the nature of these programmes, nor 
do business interests seem to have taken any part in designing them or 
providing staff to become involved in them.  ERT companies, of course, 
played a major part in training staff in the new ventures which they 
established in the East. And some ERT companies were involved in 
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establishing ‘Business Enlargement Councils’ where representatives of 
their new plants in the East could dialogue with eastern government 
departments.  However, there seems little evidence that this kind of 
company-specific importation of VET practices is capable of influencing 
wider VET systems in host countries (Lauder, 2001). 
While there is scant evidence of employers taking any detailed interest in 
the policies on VET being developed for the East, considerable care does 
seem to have been taken to preserve – and replicate – the ‘balance’ 
between market forces, corporatist traditions and social ‘solidarity’ 
represented in the European Social Model.  There were fears that this 
could be upset by competition of cheap labour from the East, and a 
concern that the East should quickly learn the ways of ‘social dialogue’ 
practised widely in the West.  This seems to accord with the ‘varieties of 
capitalism’ school which would predict a negotiated settlement about such 
matters within and between countries, though an alternative explanation is 
that this was simply exported from West to East without any real 
involvement of the ‘social partners’ in the candidate countries.   
To take the analysis further we require a more detailed account of the 
treatment of VET in the accession process on the one hand, and in the 
support programme on the other.  Chapter Eight is devoted to the former, 
and Chapter Nine to the latter.  But first it will be worth reflecting on the 
ideas and concepts that were coalescing around VET in the context of 
transition and enlargement, for these ideas would surely inform the future 
trajectory of VET policy in the East. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN  
 
IT’S ALL IN THE MIND:  
Concepts in Circulation 
 
Introduction 
At this point we pause for reflection.  It is the late 1990s and we are 
witnessing the coming together of eastern European VET systems, formed 
under communism and buffeted by economic transition, with an EU VET 
policy which has evolved over many years and which has to be adapted for 
use in the process of enlargement to the East.  It is not enough to record 
context and events.  E H Carr spoke of : 
"...the historian's need of imaginative understanding for the 
minds of the people with whom he is dealing, for the thought 
behind their acts... History cannot be written unless the 
historian can achieve some kind of contact with the mind of 
those about whom he is writing." (2001, pp.18-19)  
As discussed in Chapter Two (page 38) policies are influenced by ideas as 
well as what went before and by extraneous events.  If we are to 
understand policies we must try to understand the ideas which influenced 
them. 
To give a framework for this chapter we shall start with the most obvious 
sources of ideas which had a bearing VET in eastern Europe and which 
were prevalent in the 1990s.  Following the pattern of chapters so far these 
are: 
- from the perspective of the gradual development of EU policy on 
VET (Chapter Four), the notions of lifelong learning and of 
transparency; 
-  in reaction to the countries’ communist past (Chapter Three), the 
notion of decentralization; 
- in response to the pressures of transition and of accession 
(Chapters Five and Six), the notions of flexibility and 
Europeanization; 
We first examine the provenance of each of these notions and then 
elaborate them in order to identify associated and subsidiary concepts with 
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a more direct reference to VET policy issues.  A final section examines 
some tensions between these different strands. 
It should be made clear that this chapter is – to an extent – speculative.  
We seek to distil the important new concepts which gained currency in the 
1990s.  Although it is fairly plain that the larger concepts were very much in 
use, the extension which this chapter makes to concepts in VET is not, at 
this stage, evidenced.  Rather we shall use the template of constructs 
presented in this chapter as a framework for analysis of actual policy texts 
in Chapter Eight and see whether they were in the event important in an EU 
VET context, and what further VET concepts were in play. 
 
Lifelong Learning 
In Chapter Four we saw how the European Commission had lighted on the 
idea of lifelong learning in the early 1990s.  There were a number of 
strands to this.  First it was an idea which was gaining currency, particularly 
in the circles of international organizations, notably the OECD (Martens et 
al., 2010; Taylor et al., 1997).  Second, it usefully shifted the focus away 
from school-based education policies, which were clearly nationally 
sensitive and virtually off-limits for the Commission by virtue of the Treaty, 
to the less clearly delineated sphere of learning in general across the age-
groups.  Finally the framing of lifelong learning as part of an agenda 
focussed on economic competitiveness (rather than culture or identity) 
enabled it to be presented as both a legitimate area of activity for the 
Community, and also an important one in the light of the challenges for 
competitiveness which were considered to be faced by individual European 
countries and the EU as a trading bloc. 
As we have seen, lifelong learning was a feature of the ‘Delors’ White 
Paper of the early 1990s and was reinforced in importance in the Lisbon 
developments in the years after 2000.  It very much coincided, therefore, 
with the period of accession for the new member states. 
If lifelong learning was a reasonably novel idea in the West, it was to a 
large degree an alien concept in the former socialist states.  Though, as we 
saw in Chapter Three, there had been a reasonable level of adult 
education, first through literacy campaigns, and subsequently through 
institutions such as the ‘people’s universities’, these had not had an overtly 
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economic focus.  And while state enterprises had trained their workers in 
the occasional new production technique, workers were not expected to 
exert initiative to upgrade themselves.  The idea that individuals might need 
to constantly learn in order to make their way through a changing jobs 
market was an entirely inappropriate one in a communist system.   
So the idea of lifelong learning was both a new and attractive one for the 
EU, and pretty much a blank canvas in the East.  Associated with this 
economic version of lifelong learning were a number of related ideas with a 
particular application to VET: 
• the responsibility of individuals and private enterprises for retraining, 
rather than reliance on citizens being moved inexorably through the 
structure of the state education system; 
• the idea that training could be undertaken in different modes – with 
different types of provider, through work and life experience itself – 
and did not need to be confined to laid-down curricula, public 
institutions or recognized in official qualifications; 
• that individuals possessed a quantum of ‘employability’ or 
‘competence’, and could enhance this to their own, and society’s, 
advantage (Dale and Robertson, 2006); 
• that government’s role in supporting lifelong learning was something 
very different from its traditional function of providing and regulating 
education and training opportunities.  If learning could take place in 
many modes and was at individual’s initiative, government was 
much more in the business of promotion, facilitation and steering; 
• the significance of a sector, largely unknown in the East, of adult 
training providers going well beyond initial VET qualifications offered 
on a part-time basis by established vocational schools. 
 
Transparency 
We also saw in Chapter Four how the Commission had tried, 
unsuccessfully, to give expression to a common VET policy through the 
devices, first, of ‘harmonization’ (common content for VET programmes in 
different countries) and then of stating ‘equivalences’ (mechanisms to 
analyze the contents of one country’s VET programmes in such a way as 
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they could be directly related to those in other countries).  The first was 
aborted in the 1960s and subsequently expressly prohibited by the 
Maastricht Treaty of 1992. The second, as we saw, ran into the sands as it 
became clear that the ‘correspondence tables’ that CEDEFOP envisaged 
would be endlessly complicated and in practice impossible to update (see 
page 77 above). 
The way forward eventually came with the example of the Bologna initiative 
in higher education.  Here a basic architecture of a ‘common higher 
educational space’ allowed countries to map their qualifications in a way in 
which – though they were different – allowed other countries fairly readily to 
see certain key aspects, such as level and duration of programme and 
progression routes.  Under the Copenhagen Process, starting in 2002, this 
technique was replicated in the VET arena, particularly through the 
European Qualifications Framework (EQF), a common system of 
transcription (Europass), and proposals for a credit system for VET 
(ECVET). 
In the jargon of EU policy circles this approach is referred to as 
‘transparency’.  The theory is that if other countries, and the interested 
public more generally, can readily ‘see’ the nature of qualifications and 
programmes in other countries, they do not need an official calculus of 
correspondence but can make up their own minds – in an informed manner 
– as to whether or not to recognize training undertaken elsewhere with the 
EU. 
The EU’s promotion of transparency is by no means confined to VET or to 
education.  The general approach is applied to matters such as food 
labelling, the courts system and border security, to give just a few 
examples.  Transparency is held to contribute to ‘mutual trust’ (a phrase 
which recurs within the documents of the Copenhagen Process).  It is also 
a necessary condition for the operation of the ‘open method of co-
ordination’, which relies on a common understanding of different countries’ 
progress towards the various economic and social targets. 
From the point of view of the eastern European countries, the idea of 
transparency had an obvious resonance with the mood of reform following 
the communist era.  That era was identified with secrecy and the hoarding 
of information within government.  It was not the business of citizens to 
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make choices, and they did not need ‘transparent’ information to do so.  By 
extension there were obvious attractions in the notion that the new era 
would provide the public with clarity, where previously there was 
obfuscation.  Moreover, the association, in the field of VET, of transparency 
with the idea of travel, studying and working abroad (through devices such 
as mutual recognition through the EQF and Europass) constituted an 
added, and very practical, attraction. 
Moreover with the structured, regulated and codified system which 
characterized education under communism, the basis of transparency was 
– on the face of it – in place.  If internal training systems had been 
fragmented and informal it would have been very difficult to map them onto 
a common EU-wide architecture.  However in the case of initial VET there 
was already a well-known formal structure, though, in the case of 
continuing VET, transparent organization would present more of a problem. 
Associated with the central idea of transparency when applied to VET we 
can brigade a number of subsidiary concepts, including: 
• formal qualifications and within them the idea of levels – again an 
accepted and important part of the communist system (Parízek, 
1992); 
• qualifications and programmes which are ‘transparently’ linked to 
occupational demand in the labour market – for example the 
methodology of deriving  ‘occupational standards’ and basing 
vocational qualifications on these; 
• learning outcomes as a unifying concept, divorcing the results of 
VET from the various syllabuses, durations of training and modes of 
education which differed between countries, and giving a 
‘transparent’ account of what the goals of a course were; 
• the availability of information about VET provision, gathered 
according to reasonably common classifications; 
• quality assurance arrangements for VET which inspire the required 
degree of confidence and ‘mutual trust’ that qualifications truly 
represent their declared standards; 
• governance of VET which is technocratic rather than political so as 
to preserve the integrity of the system and to inject stability over 
time.  The added attraction, from the EU point of view, was that 
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permanent cadres of technocrats could relate to their counterparts 
in the central EU agencies, providing a channel of communication 
and consensus-building independent of the vagaries of national 
politicians.  This technocratic emphasis had an especial attraction 
for officials in eastern Europe, giving them personal access to 
travel, status and legitimacy on an international stage, and possibly 
future job opportunities (Dimitrova and Steunenberg, 2004). 
In a slightly different context, transparency was an important part of the 
accession process itself.  As we saw in Chapter Six, a great deal of 
emphasis was placed on accession countries developing plans for different 
aspects of the accession agenda, and an important area for ‘transparent’ 
and public planning was employment policies, which included VET.  Open 
planning can therefore be seen as an aspect of transparency, allowing the 
Commission to check progress and allowing domestic stakeholders to 
monitor, and contribute to, published plans for the development of VET.  
Planning, of course, was not a new concept for eastern European 
countries, though the practice of encouraging public consultations about, 
and scrutiny of, plans was entirely novel. 
 
Decentralization 
We saw in Chapter Three that, except perhaps in the countries of the 
former Yugoslavia, the communist era had been one of very considerable 
centralization, a feature which affected education as much as other facets 
of public life.  It was a natural reaction, after the fall of communism, to 
undertake a programme of administrative decentralization, as described in 
Chapter Five.  Despite transitional difficulties (page 92) the principle of 
decentralization was an attractive one, marking a clear distinction from the 
old politics of centralized Party rule. 
At around the same time, decentralization of education responsibilities was 
also a discernible common trend in many western European countries 
(Green, Wolf and Leney, 1999).  Furthermore, decentralization was 
attractive to the European Commission, as it offered a way to work around 
the sometimes obstructive stance taken by the national governments of 
established member states.  We saw in Chapter Four how, in devising and 
operating the various educational programmes well before there was any 
138 
question of enlargement to the East, the Commission attempted – and to a 
large degree succeeded – in opening direct channels between itself and 
national education and labour market ‘players’.  The operation of the 
structural funds also became more overtly regional during the 1980s. 
The idea of decentralization, therefore, had attractions on all sides, though 
for rather different reasons.  More problematic, though, was what was 
meant by ‘decentralization’.  This was a multi-dimensional concept and, like 
‘flexibility’, which we shall discuss in a moment, could be invoked as a 
justification for many different policies related to vocational education. 
When applied to the administration of VET, it could simply mean a greater 
degree of discretion given to local as opposed to central government; local 
governments were in most cases nominally responsible for schools under 
the communist system (though subject to Party discipline which itself was 
highly centralized).  Though arrangements differed between countries, a 
fairly common arrangement after 1989 was for local governments to be 
responsible for decisions about, and (at least partially) financing of, school 
premises, costs of utilities and major items of equipment, while central 
budgets covered teacher salaries.  Decisions on the number of classes 
were also taken centrally, as these dictated the numbers of teachers to be 
employed in any given school, whose costs fell on the central authorities.  
Adjustments to this mix in favour of local governments, though not always 
accompanied by corresponding budgetary transfers, were made in the 
1990s (Ringold, 2005). 
These were the arrangements applying to initial VET.  Continuing VET, 
however, was new and lacked any established administrative structure.  
Countries therefore had considerable freedom to decide how to organize 
this new sector. 
On another interpretation, administrative decentralization could mean 
greater autonomy for schools, through giving greater managerial autonomy 
to school Directors or to governing bodies.  This was the course taken in 
Czechoslovakia from the start, though it was not widely replicated across 
the region.  Paralleling this type of decentralization came the question of 
framing school budgets, with arguments for and against formula-based 
methods such as were developing in some western European countries (cf. 
139 
UK, Denmark), and for vocational schools to be able to retain revenues 
raised by production activities and adult training. 
In the same way it was not always clear whether the favouring of 
decentralization applied to the content of vocational education and, if so, to 
whom decentralized powers were to be given.  As a rule the content of 
initial vocational education programmes was centrally developed and 
regulated, usually in considerable detail, including for example the numbers 
of lessons in different subjects which each ‘profile’* should contain, and 
schedules of equipment and materials that should be used.  This pattern 
did not change greatly after the fall of communism.  In this context 
decentralization could mean: 
• power for schools to devise curricula or some portion of them; 
• continued, but less detailed, central prescriptions linked perhaps to 
the move to learning outcomes noted earlier; 
• delegation of central curriculum powers to professional groups 
and/or ‘social partners’; 
• greater facility for schools to mount or terminate particular centrally 
devised vocational profiles without central authority. 
Given these various possible interpretations we should not be surprised if 
the precept of decentralization were to be taken very differently in different 
places and at different times, and that the expectations of a number of 
actors were liable to be disappointed. 
 
Flexibil i ty 
Chapter Five charted the economic ructions connected with transition.  
Unemployment in general, and youth unemployment in particular, were a 
feature of all countries at some period of the 1990s.  It was widely 
                                                
* The concept of a ‘profile’ is a common one in eastern Europe.  The vocational 
sphere in IVET is typically split into approved programmes, each leading to a 
particular occupation (or, less frequently, a limited range of occupations).  Each of 
these profiles is then structured to contain a set number of years (usually 2-4), a 
stipulated mixture of general education, technical theory and practical work, and 
the former two are further stipulated in terms of individual subjects with a given 
number of lessons in each.  Sometimes profiles are referred to as ‘qualifications’, 
but – though they invariably lead to the issue of a certificate relevant to the 
occupation(s) in question – they are more than the certificate, but rather the 
‘package’ of programme, syllabus, required facilities and certificate. 
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observed, and eventually widely accepted, that the structure of industry – 
the size and location of firms, their ownership, the mix of goods and 
services they produced, and the occupations they employed – was to be 
permanently changed.  But whereas it was fairly plain which industries were 
declining, it was not at all clear what the new sectors would be. 
More clear was that the future structure of the economy would be fast-
changing as, hopefully, domestic industry responded to changes in demand 
within and beyond Europe.  The cessation of economic planning, the wider 
product markets available, plus the previously virtually unknown challenges 
of competition, would require a workforce which was flexible and in turn 
demand training arrangements which secured this flexibility (Barr, 2005). 
‘Flexibility’ of the labour force was clearly to be at a premium.  And it was 
not an attribute which was associated with the workforces of the previous 
communist regimes, despite their relatively high level of education.  The 
need for flexibility of course stretched wider than VET, with ramifications for 
labour mobility, statistical classifications of occupations, and providing a 
rationale for the advent of national employment services which sprang up 
across the region to provide exchanges for labour and to help unemployed 
people adapt to the new labour market. 
Within VET the idea of ‘flexibility’ often went hand in hand with the call for 
‘modernization’ – an even vaguer term.  The need for modernization had, of 
course, been urged by internal reformers before the fall of communism, 
notably in Gorbachev’s call for perestroika (restructuring) in the Soviet 
Union.  Used together, as they often were, they represented the idea that 
the ‘traditional’ communist (and sometimes pre-communist) approach to 
VET was ‘rigid’ and not easily capable of responding to new circumstances.  
They also encapsulated the idea that a trained worker could not rely on a 
single trade to last a lifetime and would face uncertainties which could best 
be dealt with through access to re-training, itself provided in a responsive 
manner (Voicu, 2007). 
But, like ‘decentralization’, flexibility could be interpreted in many different 
ways in a VET context: 
• it might be taken as a call to review and rationalize the vocational 
profiles on offer (often numbering many hundreds), so that their 
content matched the new needs of industry; 
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• as a logical next step it might be interpreted as the need to institute 
machinery to ensure regular and frequent review of profiles in the 
future, so as to continue to keep pace with industrial change; 
• alternatively it could be invoked to provide a rationale for fewer and 
broader vocational specializations which provide a foundation of 
relevant knowledge and skill to be supplemented by industry or 
higher education later on; 
• linked with decentralization it might be taken as a call for schools to 
be able to devise or customize their own vocational profiles, in 
response to the needs of local employers; 
• a specific instrument for curricular flexibility, widely promoted in the 
West, was modularization which would allow both the devising of 
different specializations according to student or employer choice, 
and allow the speedy revision of parts of a profile without requiring 
the restructuring of the whole syllabus; 
• a further interpretation was the provision of general ‘employability’ 
skills which would be useful in a wide range of contexts, together 
with personal attributes such as learning to learn, to be fostered by 
student-centred learning techniques; 
• yet further in this direction was a challenge to initial vocational 
education itself, arguing that the communist system had over-
invested in this sector and that the modern world would value 
people who had extended general education rather than early 
specialization, a viewpoint – as we saw in Chapter Five – held by 
the World Bank; 
• finally flexibility, interpreted as an individual virtue, had much to do 
with the concept of lifelong learning.  Flexible workers would 
undertake learning throughout life and a modern VET system 
should be able both to respond to that and to encourage it. 
There were, therefore, a number of possible different directions in which 
subscription to the general notion of flexibility could lead.  By no means 
were they mutually exclusive, so – even on its own – the rallying cry of 
‘flexibility’ could stimulate a large agenda for reform. 
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Europeanization  
The power of the idea of Europe was very obviously an attractive one.  We 
have seen (page 115) that many in eastern European subscribed to the 
idea that their countries were, in some sense, going ‘back to Europe’.  And 
of course the EU was founded on an explicitly European idea, with the 
Commission specifically remitted to pursue it.  
However there are, and were at the time, very different ideas of what the 
essence of ‘Europe’ is, and therefore of what a ‘European’ approach might 
consist of.  At the simple geographic level Europe is a collection of 
countries situated within a region – in this context Europeanization has 
much to do with fostering interchange, whether of goods and services, of 
ideas or of people. 
At the cultural level the notion of Europe is about attempting to identify and 
promote a certain shared culture and sets of values, often exemplified by 
reference to history and common heritage(s) of art, music, concepts of 
Christendom and conventions about the nature of government.  
Europeanization therefore refers to the progressive subscription to these 
values. 
Again the idea of ‘Europe’ can be a simple shorthand for the European 
Union as a particular political entity, together with its constituent institutions 
(Commission, Parliament, Council and other agencies).  Rather more 
generally it can refer to the ‘Single Market’ as a trading bloc and customs 
union (replacing the Comecon).  Europeanization therefore means joining 
this club and applying its particular conventions. 
In some contexts the connotation of ‘European’ has to do with an 
alternative to liberal free market (‘Anglo-Saxon’) philosophies.  
Europeanization therefore can be interpreted as adhering to the European 
Social Model of proceeding through negotiation between employer and 
worker interests and providing significant protection to those who are, or 
might be, affected by economic change. 
With the possible exception of the last, all of these versions of the 
European idea were in currency in eastern European countries soon after 
the 1989 revolutions (and of course before the revolutions amongst certain 
groups).  All of these, too, form part of the narrative of the EU itself, with 
143 
greater emphasis being put on some strands at different times and by 
different interests. 
Applied to VET, we may detect a similar variety of impetuses by the idea of 
Europeanization.  First we have noted some moves in the East to revert to 
‘European’ patterns of schooling and VET, meaning those patterns which 
were prevalent before the pressures to mirror Soviet systems.  These often 
replicated arrangements under the ‘old’ empires.  The most obvious 
examples are those of the restitution of Gimnasia and occasional moves to 
divide lower secondary education into tracks in place of the ‘basic schools’ 
which predominated under communism. 
Similarly there was an obvious rationale in moves to replicate western 
European VET models in the belief that these were bound to be both 
‘European’ and appropriate for the new economic climate.  Such moves 
could be both promoted and supported by bilateral links with the countries 
in question. 
A more institutional interpretation would put at a premium the need to follow 
and actively participate in the developing VET policy of the EU itself.  We 
noted in Chapter Four a series of initiatives taken by the EU in the late 
1990s and early 2000s to create a ‘European space’ for VET.  These 
initiatives were closely related to the idea of ‘transparency’ noted earlier.  In 
particular there were attractions in participating in measures to foster cross-
border collaboration in VET.  This appealed greatly to the eastern 
European publics who saw the prospect of future job opportunities in other 
countries if their qualifications were to become transferable as a result of 
the EQF and the other EU instruments, and to students who wanted to 
study abroad or needed to accompany their parents to other EU countries. 
Taking the interpretation of ‘European’ as connoting the European Social 
Model, there were clear implications for VET, for example the involvement 
of the social partners in the provision and governance of VET, and 
regulation of VET through licensed programmes linked to recognized 
occupations.  This strategy appealed both as something of an evolution 
from the regulated and protected labour market under communism, and as 
a means of coping with the gross insecurity arising from economic 
transition (Rashid, Rutkowski and Fretwell, 2005). 
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However an alternative ‘market based’ model also appeared, to those who 
had experienced the communist system, to be one of the essences of being 
‘European’.  In contradistinction to aspects of the European Social Model, 
this called for competition amongst more autonomous VET providers, 
choice for participants, relatively free markets in qualifications, and job 
security being reliant on the amount and quality of VET undertaken by an 
individual rather than the stipulations of the central authorities.  In any case 
a growth in the informal economy, and of part-time workers, was forcing 
this kind of direction (Gebel, 2008), and the direction of EU lifelong learning 
policy also appeared to be envisaging this as the ‘European’ way (Stuart 
and Greenwood, 2006). 
To summarize, therefore, the idea of ‘Europeanization’ might involve some 
or all of the following features in a VET context: 
• promotion of ‘typical’ European forms of vocational education; 
• active participation in EU initiatives relevant to VET; 
• the fostering of interchanges with other EU countries; 
• advocacy of the European Social Model of social dialogue and 
protective regulation; 
• conversely, advocacy of competition in a VET ‘market’. 
 
Tensions 
Some of the concepts we have enumerated are mutually consistent or even 
reinforcing (for example lifelong learning and flexibility), but a few have 
problematic relations with each other.  The codification of qualifications and 
the formalization of quality assurance, which are necessary for 
transparency, might inhibit the less formal types education and training 
which are stressed in calls for lifelong learning.  Indeed a desire to square 
this circle might explain the stress placed by the EU on the ‘recognition of 
non-formal and informal learning’, a rather abstruse and apparently little-
used device (Werquin, 2010)  to allow the large section of adult learning 
which takes place outside formal education establishments nevertheless to 
attract the recognized qualifications which are necessary for transparency 
in the labour market. 
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Similarly there is some tension between – on the one hand – the flexibility 
of many short courses and other less formal learning opportunities which 
go to make up a rich culture of lifelong learning and – on the other – the 
emphasis on regulated trades and approved VET programmes which tends 
to feature in the European Social Model. 
Again, there are tensions between transparency and flexibility.  While one 
of the points of a transparent pan-European VET system is to erect the 
essential architecture to allow differences to co-exist with mutual 
understanding of, and trust in, vocational outcomes gained in varying ways, 
this architecture does impose constraints on flexibility within countries.  For 
example it implies the imposition of quality assurance and classifications of 
some kind, as well as reporting requirements if the ‘transparent’ information 
is to be transmitted.  All this, in theory, adds to costs and to timescales for 
change, to the detriment of flexibility. 
It might be argued also that two different forms of decentralization are not 
readily compatible.  If one delegates the construction of the vocational 
curriculum to social partners, it would be strange, at the same time, to allow 
schools or local governments the freedom to ignore them.  Decentralization 
may also clash with Europeanization.  The EU’s ‘transparency’ tools 
presume a degree of co-ordination and regulation at the national level.  
Similarly, countries participating in the ‘open method of co-ordination’ are 
expected to report on, and be accountable to, the organs of the EU for 
progress towards common European economic and social goals (including 
VET) across their territories; this must presume that they have the capacity 
at least to chivvy decentralized units to move towards these goals.   
But enough of theory and speculation.  Having delineated what would 
appear to be the most important constructs, we shall now examine whether 
they were actually brought to bear, and if so in what form.  To do this we 
shall look in some depth at the various reports drawn up by the EU during 
the accession process. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT  
 
DIAGNOSIS AND PRESCRIPTION:  
The Policy as Applied during the Accession Process 
 
Introduction 
This chapter presents findings from a detailed examination of two series of 
EU documents drawn up in respect of each of the ten eastern European 
countries preparing for accession in 2004-7. 
As we saw in Chapter Six, neither the assessments made under Agenda 
2000 (page 122 above) nor the guides for negotiating the relevant chapters 
of the acquis (page 124) contained much by way of specific requirements 
on what a suitable VET system in the newly acceding states should look 
like.  Moreover, as we saw in Chapter Four, VET policy at the Community 
level was itself fairly minimal in the early 1990s, being confined, formally at 
least, to Directives on the mutual recognition of qualifications, the mounting 
of a number of relatively small-scale community-level programmes and the 
fostering of pan-community networks organized by agencies such as 
CEDEFOP.   
However, during the 1990s education, and VET in particular, moved higher 
up the EU agenda as a result of the EU-wide focus on competitiveness for 
the bloc as a whole, finding expression, first in the Employment Strategy of 
1997, and then in the Lisbon Strategy of 2000.  On a rather different tack, 
the ‘tools’ for co-operation and transparency in VET began to find 
expression starting from the initiation of the Copenhagen process in 2002.   
So the accession process at country level, which formally started in around 
1996-7 and finished with the admission of Romania and Bulgaria in 2007,* 
was characterized by a shifting policy stance on the part of the Community 
in relation to the existing member states.  Though this shifting position 
could not be reflected in formal requirements for accession, which were 
stated at the outset, we may be able to detect whether it was reflected in 
the demands and recommendations by the Community in relation to the 
eastern European candidates. 
                                                
* Though we can now report that Croatia joined in July 2013. 
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As explored in Chapter Five the other dominant feature affecting these 
countries was the process of political and economic transition which was 
taking place regardless of their membership or otherwise of the EU.  VET 
was seen, both internally and externally, as a key component in any policy 
response to these societal pressures.  A further question, therefore, is the 
extent to which the EU took it on itself to offer guidance and support on 
what the response in terms of VET should be.   
Given that the negotiations were taking place throughout the accession 
period, a good source to reveal the actual policies of the EU regarding VET 
in the East – the items it focussed on, its criticisms of existing 
arrangements, the items that it praised or pressed for – are the reports on 
VET in the East which were drawn up at the time. 
As explained in Chapter Two (page 40) the analysis involved examination 
of all the annual ‘regular reports’ on the negotiations drawn up by the 
Commission between 1997 and 2005.  These were made each year from 
1998 to 2002 for all the countries, culminating in a ‘final report’ in 2003 for 
those countries which acceded at the beginning of 2005, and a further 
regular report in 2003 and 2004 for Romania and Bulgaria, with a final 
report for these two countries in 2005.  This analysis is also based on a 
series of ‘Monographs’ drawn up by the European Training  Foundation 
(ETF) between 2002 and 2004 to examine the situation in each country in 
relation to expected progress in VET (and employment services) towards 
EU goals (page 126 above). 
In the analysis the coding frame derived from the last chapter was used, 
namely: 
Decentralization 
Europeanization 
Modernization 
Lifelong Learning 
Transparency 
Each of the main categories was split into a number of sub-categories 
relevant to VET, most of which were detailed in the preceding chapter.  A 
further specific category related to EU Directives with which the candidate 
states would need to conform.  In the process of coding certain other 
themes were added as references to them began to appear frequently in 
the reports.  At the end of the exercise these ‘free’ items were re-classified, 
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some as new sub-categories within the original groupings, but four further 
groupings were established: 
Social inclusion (references to minorities, regions and gender 
issues); 
Whole system issues (references to participation in VET and upper 
secondary education, drop-out and educational progression); 
Active Labour Market Policies; 
Changes to machinery of government. 
Finally codes were generated for ‘Policy Status’ – whether the report 
appeared to criticize, approve, recommend, note a plan in place, or doubt 
the capacity for implementation of particular items. 
A full listing of the hierarchy of categories and sub-categories, together with 
the number of references to each in the entire corpus of texts is given in 
Annex A. 
The numerical analysis presented here could be criticized as giving 
excessive weighting to certain ‘standard’ items which were invariably 
commented on in the Commission’s progress reports – there was evidently 
a laid-down template which applied to these reports and which prompted a 
passage about certain items whether or not there was anything of 
significance to report;  this applied, for example, to participation in the 
Commission’s education programmes which – as we shall see – was not a 
particularly problematic issue.  On the other hand, the very fact that certain 
items were specified for reporting does surely mean that they were 
regarded by the Commission as an important element of policy and it is 
these elements, after all, that we are trying to locate. 
It might also be argued that the identification of the pre-set categories listed 
above, and the brigading of elements of VET practice into these, is 
somewhat artificial and pre-judges the outcome of the exercise.  On the 
other hand there is evidence, given in the preceding chapter, that these 
constructs were significant at the time.  The facility – used here – to erect 
further categories, and the fact that some of the presumed categories in the 
event had few entries, should demonstrate that the approach taken was 
reasonably robust. 
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Results of the analysis 
What do the results tell us about the EU’s overall preoccupations?  The 
headline results are set out in Table 6.  They distinguish between 
references in the Commission’s reports and those made by the ETF.  The 
two sets of reports were made at rather different times and fulfil somewhat 
different remits.  Whereas the Commission’s covered all of the items of 
accession negotiations, the ETF focussed on employment and VET 
matters.  The Commission’s reports spanned nearly a decade, whereas the 
ETF’s monographs were confined to the early 2000s.  And no doubt the 
Commission’s reports were taken more seriously by the eastern European 
countries, since they were the authoritative judgement of the Directorate 
General for Enlargement which directly advised the European Council on 
accession issues. 
 
Table 6: References by Theme and Report Type 
Theme Commission reports ETF reports 
Decentralization 54 75 
Directives 105 0 
Europeanization 349 103 
Lifelong Learning 55 130 
Modernization 140 228 
Transparency 206 211 
Social Inclusion 79 40 
Whole system issues 60 104 
Active Labour Market Policies 65 38 
Machinery of Government 22 11 
 
At this very broad level it is plain that the Commission was more concerned 
than the ETF with issues pertaining to Europeanization, and with 
compliance with existing Directives.  Issues to do with transparency were 
important to both bodies.  Compared to the Commission, the ETF was 
concerned with the system within countries as a whole and with its 
modernization.  It was also notably more concerned with lifelong learning, 
perhaps because EU policy had only started to stress this in the early 
2000s after the Lisbon summit – the ETF reports were from this period. 
150 
We can look within these broad categories to discover the precise issues 
which were being remarked upon. 
In the case of decentralization, the principal concern was the involvement 
of ‘social partners’ in the governance of the system amounting to half of all 
the references under this theme.   However, the main proponent of this 
interpretation of decentralization was the ETF; the Commission’s regular 
reports tended to give more weight to decentralization to regional and local 
authorities.  There were few references in either sets of reports to looser 
regulation to give more freedom to schools or advocating autonomy at the 
school level. 
Directives and the business of concluding formal negotiations were largely 
bound up with the issue of the mutual recognition of diplomas.  This issue 
was only lightly touched upon in the early years (just three references in 
1999), but much more heavily remarked on as time went by (26 references, 
or nearly three for each country by 2002).  By the end of the process there 
were strong warnings, even in the final reports little more than a year from 
accession, that matters were far from satisfactory.  An example gives a 
typical tone: 
Serious concerns exist relating to the Czech Republic’s 
preparations in the area of mutual recognition of 
professional qualifications. ... The required administrative 
bodies must be fully established and the capacity to 
implement this acquis reinforced. .... Unless immediate 
action is taken across an important and extensive range of 
issues, the Czech Republic will not meet the requirements 
for membership in this area (Final report on Czech 
Republic, 2003, p.19) 
In contrast the conclusion of negotiations on the formal requirements of 
‘Chapter 18’ concerned with education and training was clearly a relatively 
straightforward affair; all countries had effectively been signed off in this 
respect by 2000 (negotiations had ‘provisionally closed’ in the jargon of the 
Commission).  This was doubtless because the chapter had very few 
formal requirements. 
The theme of Europeanization is to do with adopting ‘European practices’ 
either in terms of practices of the existing member states or of the declared 
policies of the Community.  The predominant weight of references is to the 
latter rather than the former.  Participation in EU initiatives – the education 
programmes, projects under Phare,  and particularly preparations for 
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operating the European Social Fund (ESF) are all frequently commented 
upon.  The candidate countries seem eagerly to have taken advantage of 
the education programmes, including operating the necessary 
administrative arrangements.  On the other hand, the ESF seems to have 
been an increasing concern as accession loomed, for at that point the new 
member states would start operating the Fund themselves.  There were no 
references in 1998-9, but over 20 a year in 2000-3.  Less than 15 per cent 
of the references were complimentary – the main concern, amounting to 
over a third of the references was lack of administrative capacity to operate 
the ESF.  Again an extract gives the flavour: 
...the capacity of the Ministry of Social Security and Labour 
should be strengthened to effectively monitor, evaluate and 
financially manage the fund, through expansion of its ESF 
Unit (currently four persons). The tasks of the other 
intermediate body, the Ministry of Education and Science, 
have been clarified thanks to the establishment of its own 
ESF unit. Its staff (currently three persons) should be 
reinforced.  Additional capacity building in the Ministry of 
Finance is also required .... Co-operation between these 
bodies should also be improved. (Final report, Lithuania, 
2003, pp.34-5) 
The second prominent grouping under the theme of Europeanization was 
that of social dialogue.  A specific section on this topic appears in most of 
the regular EU reports.  Under this head countries were expected not just to 
display a corporatist approach to social and employment policy (through the 
involvement of employer and trade union organizations at the national 
level), but also to foster bilateral bargaining between employers and unions.  
This stance derives from ideas of the ‘European Social Model’ and has an 
clear bearing on VET – we have already seen the ETF noting with approval 
the involvement of social partners in VET governance arrangements.  This 
strand is referred to regularly over the whole period of the reports, and it is 
clear that the Commission considers that progress has been made – 
supportive comments balance critical ones.  By the end of the period 
concerns are largely about company-level rather than national 
arrangements, and about the capacity of employers’ organizations and 
trade unions to engage in meaningful negotiations.  There are also some 
concerns that tripartite negotiations are being conducted for form’s sake, 
with government by far the most powerful party, though sometimes it 
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seems they were all too real – major trade unions withdrew from 
negotiations with the government in Poland in 1999 and in Bulgaria in 2005. 
Apart from a stress on the importance of social dialogue, there are fewer 
references to practices in existing member states which those in eastern 
Europe might copy.  There are a number of decidedly vague references to 
‘European standards’ of VET, and similarly to ‘alignment’ with European 
practice.  The reference to ‘European standards’ is tantalizing.  It could not, 
surely, refer any common expression of training standards at the European 
level since efforts to agree these had been aborted much earlier (see 
Chapter Four, page 77); it could, perhaps, hark back to the early 
expression of ‘Common Principles’ (page 61);  more likely it simply refers, 
in a general way, to common VET practices in existing member states.  
More concretely, countries which actively sought out relevant practice 
abroad, for example by participation in EU networks or bilateral links, are 
commended.  The revival of apprenticeship is also noted in a number of 
countries where it had been in abeyance under communism – for example 
Estonia, Latvia, Hungary and quite significantly in Slovenia; however for the 
most part apprenticeship in its western European sense seems not to have 
taken off, and indeed to have been positively discouraged in Poland: 
... a consistent concept of practical training is lacking. It is 
mainly applied by the ‘apprenticeship system‘ which functions 
in the crafts sector. However, a new regulation in preparation 
by the [Ministry of Education] intends to reduce the share of 
practical training in enterprises in favour of schooling. There 
are signs that employers will boycott this regulation in 2002. 
(ETF Monograph, Poland, 2002 p.14) 
The import by certain countries of more student-centred teaching methods 
focussing on problem-solving, rather than acquisition of factual knowledge, 
and associated with some western European countries, is noted and 
commended by the ETF.  As we saw in Chapter Three, there was a 
common perception, not least on the part of critics within the countries, that 
teaching and learning was based on “..an encyclopaedic approach, they 
neglect individual education, and do not promote the pupil's or student's 
creativity” (Svecová, 1994, p.117); this was one element of western 
practice which was frequently imported through the Phare support 
programmes (Smith, 2001).  
In contrast to the emphasis on social dialogue, part of the ‘European Social 
Model’, there are only two references to a more market-orientated 
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approach in the official Commission reports.  The ETF, though, makes a 
number of references to this, particularly in respect to encouraging (and 
controlling) a private market for adult training: 
...enlarged provision due to establishment of numerous 
(private) training institutions have contributed to enhancing 
employability and competitiveness. (ETF Monograph, the 
Czech Republic, 2002, p.17) 
..there is still over-reliance on public institutions, both in 
education and on the labour market, and a certain distrust 
towards non-governmental institutions. This has so far led to 
an underestimating of the role of non-formal and informal 
learning as opposed to education provided by the formal 
education system as well as to an underdevelopment of 
private capacities for the management and implementation of 
employment measures... (ETF Monograph, Slovenia, 2002, 
p.68) 
The modernization theme is to do with items which suit VET to the new 
market-orientated economy, or which otherwise mark a departure from 
communist times.  Although it is a major concern of the ETF, the majority of 
the remarks under this theme in the EU regular reports are very general, 
referring for example: 
Substantial efforts ...[are] needed to develop human 
resources, notably through training and education helped by 
reform of the higher and vocational educational systems. 
These systems have to be in tune with the future needs of the 
economy. (Bulgaria, EU regular report, 2004 p.86) 
...there is a need to increase reform efforts in the areas of 
technical education and vocational training. (Estonia, EU 
regular report, 2000, p.30) 
Indeed one is rather left with the impression from the Commission reports 
that reform is desired for its own sake.  At first sight it is somewhat 
disappointing that the Commission does not give a sharper view of what 
kinds of reforms that it favours, but this focus on ‘reform for its own sake’ 
may reflect the frustration of EU officials with the slow-moving approach of 
the ex-communist education departments, and this may have led to the 
view that persuading administrations to implement practically any reform 
would be a mark of real progress.   
Of the more specific items under this head, the Commission is most 
concerned with the issue of relating VET to skills needed in the new 
economy.  While in many cases there are complimentary remarks about the 
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general levels of education of the populace, there are frequent references 
to ‘mismatch’ and the need for ‘updating’: 
The average educational attainment in Latvia is relatively 
high. In 2000, 19% of the labour force had higher education, 
a relatively high 62% had second-level, and 18% only basic 
education. However, the majority of second-level 
qualifications are vocational; in many cases these vocational 
qualifications, gained in the past, are over-specialised and 
not adapted to current and future patterns of skill demand in 
the economy. (Latvia, EU regular report, 2001, p.36) 
The ETF is also plainly interested in curriculum reform within VET.  There 
are references to items associated with modernization in other EU 
countries, notably modularization, ‘key competencies’ associated with 
employability, and the introduction of broader programmes leading to a 
range of occupations.  However the most common specific call is for a 
greater amount of practical training with employers: 
The traditional links between schools and enterprises under 
the former regime no longer exist. Industrial restructuring led 
to a decline of specific sectors, and many large companies 
were closed or reorganised. In parallel, small and medium-
sized enterprises gained importance. This development had a 
big impact on vocational education provision, as practical 
training is now almost exclusively provided in school-based 
workshops. (Czech Republic, ETF Monograph, 2002, p.13) 
The ETF refers quite frequently to the need for vocational guidance, or 
plans to provide it.  Another fairly common theme is rationalization of the 
network of schools, a need arising from defunct vocational specializations 
(and therefore the institutions supporting them) and from demographic 
decline. 
The ETF frequently comments on out-dated equipment in VET schools, and 
is clearly interested in promoting efforts to introduce computers, which in a 
number of countries accelerated dramatically (with Estonia the star), often 
as a result of aid projects.  
There are very few references of any kind in the EU regular reports to any 
aspect of lifelong learning before 2001.   Perhaps we should not be too 
surprised, since officials in DG Enlargement (who wrote the regular reports) 
may not themselves have been familiar with the term which had not 
achieved much currency outside educational circles in the 1990s.  In the 
2002 reports (the last substantive report on most countries), however, there 
are 18 references, nearly two per country.  This ‘late showing’ of lifelong 
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learning is likely to reflect the boosting of that theme generally in the EU as 
a result of the Lisbon Summit in 2000.  In fact, though, the references to 
lifelong learning in the Commission’s reports are largely about the formal 
system for adult and continuing training; indeed the efforts of many of the 
countries in establishing systems for organizing adult training at all, are 
frequently remarked upon.  It is plain from the reports that the Commission 
concern is largely with establishing an adult VET system running parallel to 
that for young people, with recognized institutions, courses and associated 
qualifications, all subject to quality control: 
Improving quality and accountability remain top priorities, as 
emphasised ...in the proposed Adult Training Law.... Based 
on the concept of lifelong learning, the proposed Law aims at 
providing a single regulatory, accreditation and financial 
framework covering the whole of the adult training sector. 
(EU regular report, Hungary, 2001, p.69). 
There are few (only six in all) references to promoting training by 
employers. 
The ETF, in contrast, has many more references to lifelong learning and 
seems to distinguish more than the Commission between an organized 
adult training sector and the more cultural and pervasive concept of lifelong 
learning which characterized the Commission’s 2002 Memorandum on that 
topic (see page 69 above).  This “holistic approach... is still missing” 
(Monograph on the Czech Republic, 2002, p.13).  It is “still not in place” in 
Estonia (though plans are afoot and consultation under way); it is “not well 
embedded” in Hungary or “firmly embedded in the mentality of Polish 
society” (Poland, 2002, p.10) and “only partly” so in Bulgaria.  In Romania 
the lifelong learning vision is “still lacking”.  In Slovenia “the principle of 
lifelong learning has been adopted in many recent policy documents [but] 
measures that would support the implementation of these principles are 
very scarce in practice” (Slovenia, 2002, p.49). 
Like the Commission, the most frequent lifelong learning area to be 
commented on by the ETF is the adult training sector.  The ETF goes into 
the matter in some depth.  It seems that there are a range of issues to be 
dealt with: 
• in a number of countries (Bulgaria, Estonia, Poland, Slovenia, 
Czech Republic) a large number of private training providers grew 
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up in the 1990s, though they were not regulated and could not offer 
recognized vocational qualifications; 
• at the same time active labour market measures taken through 
employment services included training programmes, but were co-
ordinated through ministries of Labour leading to “the creation of 
two separate systems. One under the auspices of the Ministry of 
Education and Science for initial vocational education and the other 
under the Ministry of Social Security and Labour for labour market 
training (primarily for the unemployed).” (ETF Monograph, Lithuania, 
2002, p.10); 
• arrangements whereby older people could participate in the regular 
initial VET system in mainstream VET schools, on a part-time or 
accelerated basis, thus gaining recognized certificates.  This 
element is significant in the Czech Republic and also (though 
waning) in Poland.  But in other cases it is small and there are 
difficulties in stimulating schools to be responsive: 
It seems that there is a fear within the formal system that the 
introduction of some innovations may endanger the 
established position of schools, while at the same time their 
own adjustment to changing conditions is very slow. (ETF 
Monograph, Slovenia, 2002, p.37) 
The recipe for this involved picture is to introduce accreditation for the new 
private sector, thereby permitting the providers to offer ‘flexible’ 
qualifications in exchange for agreeing to quality assurance measures 
(Hungary, Estonia, Romania), to introduce some new, more specialized 
and responsive, state-run education centres for adults (Hungary, Poland), 
and to press for greater co-ordination between the ministries, perhaps 
resulting eventually in a unified system (ETF Monograph on Slovenia, 
2002). 
Unlike the Commission, the ETF pays attention to training by employers, in 
most cases noting that this is relatively low compared with the older 
member states (the Czech Republic and Estonia seem to be exceptions).  
But apart from pointing out that this needs to be developed, there are few 
specific policy ideas – the employer levy introduced by Hungary is noted, 
but not commended;  tax incentives are, however, mentioned in a few 
cases. 
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It is plain that the theme of transparency is a significant one, though seldom 
referred to directly.  Both the Commission and the ETF set considerable 
store by candidate countries participating in open planning exercises, 
setting targets and being prepared to be held to account for them.  There is 
a rapid increase in 2000 to references in particular to the Joint Assessment 
Papers (see page 126 above) and National Action Plans for Employment, a 
device introduced as part of the Employment Strategy; in relation to VET, 
these cover both short-term action on training as an active labour market 
policy for the unemployed, and longer-term actions to strengthen the VET 
system as a whole.  
But the emphasis on published plans goes wider than these ‘set piece’ 
exercises.  There are many references to ‘human resource’ components of 
National Development Plans.  More specifically, Bulgaria drafted a ‘National 
Education Strategy’ and a ‘national concept’ for VET (EU Regular Report, 
1998), in 2002 the Czech Republic adopted a ‘long-term strategy on 
education’, while in 1998 Estonia is criticized for  “lacking a clearly defined 
policy and strategy in the field of labour market and human resources 
development” (Regular Report, p.33).  A further ‘concept’ (on “the 
Development of Education”) appears in the Latvian regular report of 2002, 
and in 2001 Poland adopted a “Strategy for Development of National 
Education for 2001-2006” (Regular Report, 2002, p.99).  Slovakia was 
evidently very busy on this front: ‘strategic documents’ concerning VET 
were ‘approved’ by the Government in December 1999, January 2000 and 
May 2001 (Regular Reports for 2000 and 2001).  We might note the use of 
‘approval’ by governments in this context, which seems a little odd – one 
might expect governments to devise plans or to present them, rather than 
to endorse them as if they came from elsewhere.  The likely explanation is 
that many of these plans were initiated, and sometimes written, as a result 
of external aid projects.   
Legislation is a step on from having formal plans.  The countries, and the 
EU, considered it necessary to enshrine their education and VET policies in 
specific laws.  The Commission makes 34 references to these laws and the 
ETF makes 23 references.   Apart from modernizing the legal basis for 
education (which had often been done earlier in the 1990s, though 
sometimes needing amendment), the laws mentioned are frequently to do 
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with giving a legal basis for adult education and for instituting new systems 
for accreditation of providers and for qualifications. 
On the same theme of governance, there are also a number of references 
to the introduction of ‘arms-length’ agencies to manage VET or aspects of 
it.  These sometimes, but not always, involve an element of social 
partnership; even without the ‘partners’ it is clearly felt helpful either to 
distance VET somewhat from the normal business of a ministry in order to 
give it an explicit managerial focus or to bind in stakeholders.  Thus a 
National Agency for Vocational Education and Training was established in 
Bulgaria in the late 1990s.  Estonia created both a School Network 
Administration Office, charged with implementing VET reforms, and an 
Estonian Qualifications Authority, as well as a National Adult Education 
Council, supported by an Institute for Adult Education.  Latvia created a 
Council for Co-operation in Vocational Education in 2000, and Lithuania 
formed a Lithuanian Labour Market Training Authority.  In 2001 Slovakia 
created a Council for Vocational Training – “a positive development” 
according to the regular report of 2002 (p.94).  Romania created a National 
Centre for the Development of Vocational and Technical Education* within 
its Education Ministry, and in 2004 a tripartite National Adult Training Board 
took over the functions of the previous Council for Occupational Standards 
and Assessment.  Slovenia had a Centre for Vocational Education and 
Training and an Institute for Adult Education, advised (respectively) by a 
Council of Experts for Vocational and Technical Education and a Council of 
Experts for Adult Education.   
The other strand to the theme of transparency concerns qualifications and 
standards which give public recognition to achievement and quality.  
Altogether 50 references to these matters are made by the Commission 
and over 100 by the ETF.  Although the idea of being certified or licensed to 
engage in different types of economic activity had been a feature of 
communist times, this seems to have been considered – by the EU or the 
new administrations – to have been a somewhat murky process, depending 
largely on attendance on a programme of study during initial vocational 
education and training, and on subsequent progression within a state 
enterprise.  There is evident pressure in the reformed systems for 
                                                
* This is the office that I visited that day in January 2005 (page 7) 
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standards to be public and explicitly based on the new requirements of 
market-orientated industry, and for assessments to be able to withstand 
public scrutiny.  In particular there is pressure for adults, on re-training, to 
have access to public qualifications and for this access not to depend on 
their having attended courses in the mainstream school system, or indeed 
necessarily having attended courses of training at all.  A few extracts give 
the flavour: 
Amendments to the Law on Vocational Education and 
Training ...aim at a more detailed and comprehensive 
regulation of the acquisition of professional qualifications. The 
amendments also modified licensing procedures for training 
institutions to provide training leading to state-recognised 
vocational qualifications. (EU regular report, Bulgaria, 2003, 
p.86) 
The National Institute for Vocational Education has started a 
rolling programme to update and modernise the National 
Vocational Qualification Register in line with the changing 
needs of the economy. (EU regular report, Hungary, 2000, 
p.60) 
Employees can have qualifications acquired in the course of 
work certified in front of state examination boards appointed 
by school superintendents, thus obtaining the title of skilled 
worker or master craftsman in a given profession. There are 
also examination boards appointed by employers (e.g. the 
chamber of crafts) which certify equivalent qualifications 
...(ETF Monograph, Poland, 2002, p.18) 
...the Act on National Occupational Qualifications ... was 
initially intended to regulate the acquisition of a limited 
number of qualifications for which the formal education 
system did not provide education programmes ... In its final 
version, it now regulates more generally the procedures, 
bodies and organisations competent for approving standards 
for selected qualifications as the basis for assessment and 
recognition of prior and non-formal learning. (ETF 
Monograph, Slovenia, 2002, pp.10-11) 
It seems that the system for certifying vocational skills was seen both as a 
key means of influencing system reform (to a more varied array of training 
pathways) and to modernizing content through industry-related standards.  
References to aspirations for a National Qualifications Framework are 
made in the Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania and 
Slovenia, all relating to 2001 or earlier – considerably before the idea of a 
European Qualifications Framework (EQF) saw the light of day in the 
Maastricht Communiqué of December 2004 (European Ministers of 
Vocational Education and Training and European Commission, 2004).  
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Indeed, work on national frameworks did not begin in many of the older 
member states until the promulgation of the EQF in 2008 (CEDEFOP, 
2010), with most still remaining to be implemented even today (Raffe, 
2013).  In this respect it seems that policy in the new member states 
preceded that in the older ones by a considerable margin. 
We may also note an emphasis on standards in vocational education (in 
the sense of attainments for individuals to reach).  Work on these (or in the 
case of Poland, the need for them) is mentioned in six out of the ten 
countries.  More specifically, references to ‘occupational standards’ are 
made in the cases of Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia and Latvia.  
This is interesting as being associated with the earlier development of 
National Vocational Qualifications in the UK.  In the same vein there are 
references to ‘competency-based’ standards in the ETF Monographs for 
the Czech Republic and Hungary. 
Although there is not a large number of references to the quality of 
vocational education, it is noticeable that they increase, rather than 
decrease, over the period.  Better assessments and examinations are most 
commonly mentioned as the means of achieving improved quality. 
Training as part of active labour market policies to counter unemployment 
is mentioned frequently, particularly in the Commission’s regular reports.  
The references increase in frequency with time; by the end of the period the 
Commission comments on these measures as a standard item within the 
Employment and Social Affairs section of the reports.  In general it seems 
that progress is being made, but that more needs to be done.  The ETF 
also comments, and frequently considers that training is too small an 
element in the array of active policies, for example: 
Although passive measures* still represent the bulk of labour-
market policies, the authorities have designed and 
implemented an increasing array of active measures. These, 
however, are still heavily concentrated on subsidies to 
employment rather than training measures. (EU regular 
report, Romania, 2002, p.48) 
Under the category of social inclusion the majority of references are to 
issues concerned with minorities.  The great majority of these concern the 
Roma population, featuring in the reports on all the countries with the 
                                                
* See Glossary for difference between ‘active’ and ‘passive’ measures. 
161 
exception of the Baltic States – these however contain references to the 
Russian-speaking minority.  The situation of the Roma is increasingly seen 
as intractable.  A number of countries made considerable efforts to extend 
the education of Roma (who often did not even complete primary school) 
and to integrate their schooling with the mainstream population; it was 
frequently segregated through allocating Roma children to ‘special’ schools 
for those with learning difficulties.  Extracts from the final reports before 
accession point to continuing problems: 
The strategic documents and programmes on the educational 
integration of children from the Roma minority have not 
significantly changed the situation on the ground. Initiatives 
aimed at attracting and keeping Roma children in school (e.g. 
free lunches, subsidised textbooks, teacher assistants in 
schools with Roma students, bussing programmes) were 
largely unsuccessful. Although an Agency for Educational 
Integration of Children and Pupils from Ethnic Minorities has 
been established, this body has not succeeded so far in ... 
the coordination of efforts made by different ministries to 
enhance the educational integration of children from 
minorities. (EU final report, Bulgaria, 2005, p.15) 
The overall responsibility for Roma affairs was transferred to 
the Prime Minister’s Office. However, despite these 
developments, ...the majority of persons belonging to the 
Roma community are still exposed to social inequalities, 
social exclusion and widespread discrimination in education, 
employment and access to public services. Segregation in 
schools has remained a serious problem. The long-term 
Roma strategy announced under the previous Government 
has still not been adopted either. (EU final report, Hungary, 
2003, p.37) 
Romania, though, is an exception with its last report mentioning that 
“positive developments have been made in improving access of Roma to 
education and health sectors.” (EU final report, Romania, 2005, p.19). 
There are very few references to gender issues in any of the reports; those 
that exist merely report that boys are more likely to take VET programmes 
than girls (by no means an advantage).  There are rather more references 
to disadvantaged regions, usually rural areas with restricted opportunities 
for initial VET or re-training. 
Comments on the education system as a whole are much more likely to be 
made by the ETF than by the Commission (see Table 6).  This may reflect 
both the lack of educational expertise by the authors of the Commission 
reports, and the fact that the reports focused more explicitly (though far 
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from exclusively) on the formal acquis which had little locus in the field of 
education.  Taking both sources together, though, the references are 
numerous and tend to focus on: 
• finance – not just the lack of adequate funding (in Romania and 
Bulgaria especially) or commendation for increasing it (Poland and 
Latvia gain honourable mentions), but some particular issues such 
as the low pay for teachers (Czech Republic, Latvia, Hungary), lack 
of resourcing for adult training (both employed and unemployed), 
and inability to scale up promising initiatives which have been 
piloted (Lithuania); 
• participation at upper secondary level is favourably commented on 
in many cases, though referred to as low but improving in Poland 
and Slovakia, and still problematic by the time of the ETF 
Monograph in Romania; 
• more specifically the incidence, and particularly the status, of VET 
within secondary education, where it was losing out to competition 
with general education.  This was more a concern of the ETF, which 
mentions the decline of VET and problems with its image in many 
countries, as in Poland: 
The old system could be described in outline as an 
overemphasis on vocational education at secondary level 
(rather diversified, with four different types of VET schools), 
suffering from an image of providing education that was too 
narrowly profiled, outdated and overlong, and even 
considered as producing the unemployed. The tradition of 
maintaining certain types of VET schools prevailed and a 
clear vision of VET was lacking. (2002, p.1 4) 
Romania and Slovenia, though, are mentioned as cases where the 
popularity of VET held up fairly well. 
 
Country differences 
How much did these themes differ between countries?  Table 7 gives the 
number of references to each of the top ten items in the Commission’s 
reports, with the shading indicating those items which are significantly 
different from the average. 
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Table 7: Common themes by country 
 
Est Lat Lit Pol Cz R Slk Hun Slv Bul* Ro* 
European Social 
Model 12 9 9 9 10 13 10 9 16 12 
Participation in 
EU initiatives 9 9 9 6 8 9 9 10 11 13 
JAP or NAPE 7 8 6 7 10 9 5 11 12 10 
Mutual 
recognition 10 8 7 8 10 11 7 6 9 9 
ESF 6 9 6 9 6 10 5 11 8 8 
Minorities-
Disadvantage 2 2 1 0 11 12 12 3 9 12 
Active Labour 
Market Policies 3 10 5 5 4 5 2 5 14 6 
Modernization 9 10 5 5 4 5 1 2 8 2 
Projects 6 2 5 2 6 0 3 1 4 3 
Skills mismatch-
LMI 5 2 1 7 1 7 1 3 5 0 
*Bulgarian and Romanian figures have been adjusted to take account of the fact 
that they had two more reports than the other countries. 
  Less than half the average 
  More than twice the average 
The two items for which there is the greatest variance are those for 
minorities/disadvantage and for skills mismatch.  In the former case the the 
countries with a low incidence had very few Roma.  The skills mismatch 
variance may be explained by the fact that the issue was less of a factor in 
countries where the industrial base was not greatly changing (Czech 
Republic and Hungary), or where a new industrial base had yet to grow up 
(Romania).   
Apart from these two items the noteworthy thing is how constant the issues 
are for all the countries.  This would point to a conclusion that the EU’s 
policy on VET for eastern Europe was generated, not by the particular 
needs of each country, but by a vision held by the Commission and the 
ETF of what VET should be like.   
 
Judgements on items and countries 
Items were coded, where applicable, by whether actions in the country 
were being approved or criticized.  Table 8 shows the five items most likely 
to have a balance of criticism (i.e. the largest number of critical references 
after netting off the positive ones) and, on the other hand, those with the 
greatest balance of approval (i.e. favourable references minus critical 
ones). 
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Table 8: Most Critical and Most Favourable References (ETF and 
Commission combined) 
Balance Critical Balance Favourable 
Adult Training Sector -15 Participation in EU initiatives +29 
Lifelong Learning -14 JAP or NAPE plans +9 
Active Labour Market Policies -13 Modernization +9 
Open planning -10 Apolitical governance +7 
 Financing -8 Preparing for the ESF +5 
 
The weak development of lifelong learning, including the adult training 
sector, is plain.  Both the Commission and the ETF are critical of slowness 
to adopt active labour market measures – again linked to training for adults.  
The criticisms under the ‘open planning’ item were largely to do with 
absence of comprehensive plans for education or lifelong learning. 
On the other hand, countries were quick to implement the education 
programmes as part of the EU initiatives and to engage with the planning 
system of the Employment Strategy.  At the most general level, their 
preparedness to undertake some modernization of their VET systems was 
praised.  The establishment of VET Agencies and the like was very 
frequently commended – an example of apolitical governance.    
Problems with administrative capacity were mentioned frequently.  The 
most common item here was the capability of running EU projects and 
programmes and particularly readiness to administer the European Social 
Fund, though the Commission recognized that countries were making 
strenuous efforts to make prepare.   There was also concern about the 
capacity of employer organizations and unions to undertake meaningful 
negotiations with the government and (particularly) with each other.  
Although overall expressions of approval in the Commission’s reports 
increased over time, so did the number of criticisms – at least until the final 
round of reports, which unlike the earlier ones focussed strictly on items in 
the formal acquis.  Worries about capacity and recommendations for 
improvement increased over the period before accession.  In some cases 
there were concerns that agreed actions were not being implemented. 
Finally it is possible to construct a league table of countries by the EU 
judgments made of them, combining those of the Commission and the ETF: 
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Table 9: Countries by approval/criticism 
Country Balance Favourable/Unfavourable 
Hungary 16 
Slovenia 14 
Czech Republic 8 
Estonia 6 
Lithuania -4 
Slovakia -6 
Romania -7 
Latvia -17 
Poland -18 
Bulgaria -32 
 
On VET matters, therefore, Hungary fulfils its ambition to be ‘top of the 
class” (Prime Minister Viktor Orbán quoted in Kosztolányi, 2000), and 
Bulgaria is by some measure the most problematic.  The situation of 
Poland is a little surprising and may be not so much due to lack of capacity 
or intrinsic problems as to deliberate policy, with the government at one 
point taking an apparently anti-VET stance.  The ETF Monograph of 2002 
records that Poland “made less progress in many respects than other 
Central European countries in restructuring and updating its secondary 
education system...”   Indeed government actions at the end of the 1990s 
were severely tilted against VET,  “with a strong focus on general and 
higher education” and with the intent of: 
abolishing almost all types of VET schools and qualifications 
at secondary level (policy target of the previous government 
to shift from about 60% VET participation to 20% in 2004). 
(p.12). 
Poland may have been following the advice of certain international 
commentators who favoured a deliberate tilt towards general education 
(page 103 above). However, this policy was modified by a new government 
in 2001. 
 
Elements of policy 
What can we conclude from this in terms of EU policy on VET?  In the first 
place it is clear that the Commission used the regular reports to comment 
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quite widely on aspects of VET policy, even though these did not feature as 
part of the acquis.  Though adverse comments were not pressed in the final 
reports before accession, the intention was surely to influence VET policy in 
the candidate countries. 
Our finding that there was a consistent indication of the direction in which 
countries’ VET practices should develop, which did not differ much between 
the various countries, would seem to point to the fact that the Commission 
had developed a ‘preferred model’ of VET systems and was not trying to 
make prescriptions to suit individual country circumstances. 
The first, explicit (and understandable) element in that steerage was that 
the countries should comply with the Directive on mutual recognition and 
participate in the various EU initiatives relevant to VET.  Compliance with 
the Directive was at first seen as unproblematic, but the process ended with 
something of a scramble to get everything into place.  Participation in the 
education programmes was achieved early on, though with some doubts 
about administrative capacity.  There were more severe doubts about 
capacity to use the ESF funds after accession. 
A  second strong strand is a focus on those elements of VET which had a 
bearing on the European Employment Strategy.  As we saw in Chapter 
Four, this was the earliest manifestation of the ‘open method of co-
ordination’, and the Commission was intent on engaging the candidate 
countries in it.  The emphasis on active labour market measures – and to a 
certain extent the broader concern with adult training – can be explained in 
this way, but perhaps more significant is the focus on the cycle of planning, 
making public commitments and opening one’s policies and practices to 
external scrutiny – that is to engage in ‘transparency’.  In contrast to this 
definite script emerging from DG Employment, there does not seem to have 
been an equivalent approach from the Commission’s education interests, 
whose main concern, at least in the early stages of accession, seems to 
have been that the countries should engage with its suite of education 
programmes. 
There is evidence that this emphasis on ‘open’ planning went wider than 
participation in the Employment Strategy, and was expected of countries in 
respect to their VET (and education) systems as a whole.  Clearly countries 
struggled with this: plans were some time in coming, were often criticized 
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for not being sufficiently comprehensive, and often seemed to confront 
difficulties in implementation.   
There was also a presumption that a new legislative base was an essential 
precursor to effective action.  Allied to this was a preference for 
decentralization to the regions, involvement of ‘social partners’, and the 
establishment of agencies at an arm’s length relationship to ministries.  In 
short, there is something of a distrust of political governance and a bias 
towards more technocratic and legalistic approaches. 
This preference for the technocratic approach, together with clear evidence 
that the central EU institutions were seeking to extend to the East the 
ground that they had won through the Employment Strategy, provides a 
considerable amount of evidence to support the neo-functionalist 
interpretation of EU integration. 
Though there are plenty of references to market mechanisms in other parts 
of the Commission’s ‘regular reports’ which deal with the need for a 
‘functioning market economy’ and the ‘capacity to cope with competitive 
pressure and market forces within the Union’ (to take two standard sections 
of the reports), there was little by way of suggestion that VET should use 
market mechanisms to achieve the greater match to labour market 
requirements that was urged.  Instead the scientific calibration of formal 
standards to the needs of employment and the involvement of employers 
and unions in the governance of VET are the mechanisms which are 
favoured.   
The numerous references to social partnership contrast with the lack of 
emphasis on the ‘market’ as means of steering VET.  This evidence of the 
EU in the late 1990s surely does not support those commentators who 
point to the role of supranational organizations in spreading a new neo-
liberal educational orthodoxy.  Rather, as we noted in Chapter Six, the 
emphasis seems to be to extend to the East the ‘settlement’ which had 
been achieved in the West between the competing ‘varieties of capitalism’. 
While reform of initial VET was clearly regarded as important, there is little 
indication from the Commission’s reports as to what such reform might 
comprise, beyond a perception that the VET programmes on offer were out 
of step with the actual opportunities of the new labour market, and that 
‘updating’ would rectify this.  The overall levels of secondary education 
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were often commended, though some (unspecific) problems with ‘quality’ 
were increasingly referred to.  The ETF went into the matter of initial VET in 
considerably more detail;  there is some evidence, in the ETF reports, of a 
preferred reform package for initial VET (modularization, broader 
occupational groupings, key competencies, more student-centred 
approaches).  
However, despite the few tantalizing references to ‘European standards’, 
there is very little to indicate that either the Commission or the ETF had any 
practices of VET in existing member states in mind when they made 
criticisms and recommendations for action in respect of the East.  Indeed, 
there is very little by way of comparison – either between the eastern 
countries and those in the West, or between the emerging practices in the 
East and those undertaken during communism. The criticisms of eastern 
countries seemed not to derive from an assumption either that they were 
‘behind’ the West, or that the Communist system had provided a poor basis 
for VET.  This absence of a perception that the East was deficient 
compared with West or had been disadvantaged by its prior history may 
simply have been diplomatic.  On the other hand it may reflect the fact that 
the Commission was, at the same time, making critiques of the existing 
member states as part of the Employment Strategy, as it would later as part 
of Lisbon Process; this being the case it would not have wished to limit its 
room for manoeuvre by commending their practices in its dealings with the 
East.  
The ETF did firmly pinpoint problems concerned with lack of practical 
training.  Their perspective was that previous links with large state-owned 
enterprises had disappeared, leaving a school-based, largely theoretical 
and technical curriculum.  Practical training was badly needed to 
counterbalance this, preferably through new links with the emerging 
private-sector firms, but – failing that – through better-equipped training 
workshops in schools.  This concern was paralleled by a perception that 
VET pedagogy needed reform, away from traditional, subject-based, and 
theoretical instruction.  Student-centred approaches were commended to 
encourage problem-solving, key skills for employability and an emphasis on 
enterprise at the personal level.  Again, this does not at all seem to 
exemplify the ‘neo-liberal’ consensus in international educational 
policymaking characterized by Ball (2007) as seeking to oppose  
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“...progressive experimentation in educational methods...” and replace it 
with  “...a set of reinvented traditional pedagogies” (p.38).  Indeed, in the 
case of the EU in the 1990s, the opposite seems to have been the case. 
There were clearly problems with adult training – a topic which was not an 
issue in communist times.  For the Commission, remedying this was largely 
a matter of developing a distinct sector of adult VET provision, whether 
through the initial VET schools or otherwise.  Even though half of the 
Commission’s reports were made after the establishment of lifelong 
learning as a key theme of the 2000 Lisbon Summit, they contain few 
references to this wider agenda.  In contrast the ETF was concerned not 
only with the adult training sector, but also with in-company training and 
with achieving a balance between formal, non-formal, and informal forms of 
VET, together with a balance between the private and the public sectors, 
recognizing the strengths and weaknesses of each.  It is perhaps a shame 
that the rather richer analysis of the ETF was not reflected more widely in 
the influential ‘regular reports’. 
Qualifications were seen as an important element in achieving 
transparency and improving quality.  A more formal system of qualifications 
would make achievement more visible in the new market economies, 
particularly if it could recognize achievement outside the traditional initial 
VET system.  Not only this, but if based on well-researched standards, 
qualifications could act as a mechanism to match VET to the requirements 
of contemporary industry.  Finally, objective assessments to such 
standards could improve quality by removing reliance on dubious, out-
dated curricula which were determined by what communist-era schools 
could provide.   
As well as considering what the EU included in its VET policies, it is also 
worth commenting on two items which did not feature.  First, though there 
are plenty of references to the Directives on mutual recognition of 
qualifications, the main purpose of which are to facilitate the free movement 
of workers, there are no references to the more general issue of migration 
in a VET context, even though it became apparent as accession 
approached, both that many eastern European workers would want to work 
in the higher-paying existing member states, and that many of these were 
demanding ‘transitional’ measures to limit migrants.  This was controversial 
territory (which perhaps explains the lack of references to it), and must 
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have raised the question just why eastern countries should invest heavily in 
vocational education when it was surely apparent that many of those that 
they trained would take their skills elsewhere.   
Nor is there much reference to the role of VET in equalizing access to the 
labour market from the socio-economic point of view.  Though Brine (1998) 
points to growing EU concerns about social exclusion at the time, the 
interpretation, at least in the accession context, seems confined to certain 
minority ethnic issues – most notably the Roma and in some countries to 
minority language groups – and also to problems of certain (usually rural) 
regions.  Socio-economic divisions surely went wider than this.  It may be 
that this was an alien concept in previously communist societies, where 
such divisions could not – ideologically speaking – obtain.  But the ‘new 
reality’ of open product markets and flexible labour markets would all too 
predictably open up socio-economic divisions, even if they were not already 
present.  It seems that this kind of thinking, though very common within 
existing member states, was not something with which the Commission 
was concerned, perhaps because this was seen as a matter for domestic 
policy, or perhaps because it did not fit easily within the Commission’s fairly 
standard frames of reference for social policies:  policy on minorities; 
spatial policy on disadvantaged regions; and policy on the unemployed.  
The idea that there might be a more generalized, systemic and class-based 
source of inequality of access is notable by its absence.  This dimension 
seems to have been ‘off limits’ for the EU. 
These two unaddressed issues may indicate that there were limitations to 
what matters the central EU institutions could deal with, and that they 
preferred to stay on the relatively safe territory of what had previously been 
agreed in the context of the established member states.  To open up such 
matters could upset previously hard-fought settlements. 
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 CHAPTER NINE  
 
A REMEDY IS APPLIED:  
Support for Stabil ization and Development 
 
Introduction 
As well as the ‘stick’ of pressure to abide by its rules and norms in the run-
up to accession, the EU also offered a ‘carrot’ to eastern European 
countries in the form of programmes of support to enable them to improve 
their VET systems.  Indeed this programme of aid, called Phare*, pre-dated 
the start of the accession negotiations, being eventually superseded by the 
structural funds available to all EU states once they became members. 
This chapter examines the strand of Phare directed towards VET as it 
developed over time, explains how it operated and considers whether it 
contained any consistent prescriptions for moving eastern VET in particular 
directions. 
Aid had been a long-established activity of the EU; a European 
Development Fund had been established as early as 1958 and, by the late 
1980s, amounted to over five per cent of the Community’s budget, most 
significantly in the form of the Lomé Convention which governed co-
operation between the EU and a wide range of African countries (European 
Commission, 1990a). According to the Commission the aim of this 
programme was not only to “narrow the gap between rich and poor 
countries”, and to “enhance Europe’s economic potential”, but also “to 
contribute to peace and stability in the world.” (p.4) 
We noted in Chapter Six that immediately after the fall of the Berlin Wall, 
the EU had made a decision to create a stabilization fund for Poland and 
Hungary (page 114), and at the same Strasbourg Summit it determined to 
set up a European vocational training foundation.  
Though “used primarily to support the process of reform by financing of 
projects aimed at economic restructuring” (European Council, 1989a, 
Article 3) the aid programme was wide-ranging, covering for example 
infrastructure and border security.  However,  training was particularly 
                                                
* See Glossary. 
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mentioned, and from its beginning Phare incorporated projects to assist the 
reformation of VET.  It is not possible to give a precise figure on VET 
expenditure under Phare for the entire period, but the Commission’s annual 
report in the programme of 2000 contained a breakdown showing €1,100m 
having been spent on “Education, Training and Research” from the 
inception of the programme, or some 14 per cent of the total (DG 
Enlargement, 2001, p.118).  Given that finance for research in the 
accession countries was not likely to have been large, and that primary and 
general education were generally in scope to other donors such as the 
World Bank, it seems reasonable to suppose that something approaching 
an average of €100m per annum was spent on aid to VET and higher 
education across the ten countries.  Masson (2003, p.21) estimates that the 
majority of the funds went towards higher education through the Tempus 
programme and that up until 1998 only eight per cent of the total for 
education, training and research was devoted to VET.  This, however, is 
likely to be an underestimate since there will have been VET measures in 
the increasingly important employment field (eg. active labour market 
measures), and training was frequently an important feature of projects in 
other sectors, ranging from agriculture to improving the capacity of the 
administrations. 
A regulation for the establishment of the promised European Training 
Foundation (ETF) was also quickly passed.  As well as designing and 
commissioning aid projects, the ETF was to “provide assistance in the 
definition of training needs and priorities” and to “disseminate information 
and encourage exchanges of experience, through publications, meetings, 
and other appropriate means” (Council of the European Communities, 
1990, pp.6-7).  The Commission had in mind that  “it should be set up very 
quickly during 1990” (European Commission, 1990b, p.2), and it considered 
that the new ETF should be separate from CEDEFOP to “safeguard the 
existing (tripartite) role of CEDEFOP as an intra community training 
agency.”  It was originally envisaged that the new organization should be 
co-located with CEDEFOP in Berlin in order to save costs and to “benefit 
from...CEDEFOP’s experience and contacts in the training field” (p.5).  In 
the event, though, there were considerable delays and it was not until 1994 
that the ETF became operational, based in Turin. 
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The phases of Phare  
Masson (2003) sets out a number of changes in aid policy so far as it 
affected VET.  In the early days of Phare, up until around 1993, it was 
‘demand driven’, with proposals for projects coming from the countries 
themselves, moderated by DG Enlargement.  In this first phase the stress 
was on particular training projects in various sectors of the economy, for 
example in re-training workers made redundant from declining industries.  
By 1993, however, it was considered that there should be efforts to bring 
about change in the eastern European VET systems themselves.  Rather 
than attempt this directly, the approach was rather to retain the ‘bottom up’ 
aspect of the earlier policy by intervening at the local, rather than national, 
level.  A distinctive pattern began to emerge of a limited number of ‘pilot 
schools’ intended to act as a demonstration of ‘modern’ methods (which we 
shall describe later), followed by dissemination.  
At around the same time, and also clearly with the intention of influencing 
the development of VET systems, though without any explicit central 
agenda, the ETF became engaged in: 
setting up a network of national observatories designed to 
provide structured information and analyses on national 
vocational education and training policies .... The expertise 
acquired was to enable the national observatories to 
contribute actively to the national debate on the reform of 
training systems. (Masson, 2003, p.35) 
These research-orientated centres served to provide relevant statistics and 
cross-country comparisons of VET to inform, and challenge, policy-making.  
The ETF involved staff from these institutions in its country reviews, and 
some went on to occupy positions in national policymaking and in the 
Phare projects.  In time some of the observatories accreted other functions 
such as acting as centres for CEDEFOP’s Refernet system of information 
exchange between countries. 
The intention seems clear – to stimulate change by demonstrating modern 
practice amongst practitioners, while providing the means for domestic 
commentators to prompt change at national level.  This emphasis on 
influencing national VET policy became more explicit in a number of 
countries in the later 1990s where support was given for “drafting green or 
white papers” (p.34). 
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However, there was a change of strategy from 1998-9 when the 
programme became very much more explicitly ‘accession driven’.  This, of 
course, marked the time when negotiations on membership had formally 
opened with each of the countries and an agenda of items started to be 
generated through the ‘Accession Partnerships’ (Chapter Six – page 122).  
So, instead of responding to local needs, the Phare programme became 
tied to the specific agenda of the EU for each country.   This meant that 
project proposals should emanate from agreed action plans negotiated as 
part of the accession process, including in time National Development 
Plans, and reflect items which had been identified as important to secure a 
smooth transition to EU norms.   
As we have noted in Chapter Six there was little in the formal acquis which 
impinged on VET, but Masson notes: 
...it was also felt important to assess carefully how far the 
‘non-formal’ or ‘soft’ acquis concerning VET were considered 
by the candidate countries. This referred to the ability of the 
countries to take on board general VET objectives in EU 
policy documents. This included the training-related 
guidelines included in the general framework of the European 
Employment Strategy... (p.41) 
The overall aims of Phare at this time tended to be directed to 
strengthening capacity in institutions, to investments which would result in 
being able to comply with EU norms (for example in environmental 
matters), and towards an ability to compete within the Single Market.  
Increasingly, also, the programme was seen as a pre-cursor to the 
country’s participation in the EU structural funds once it joined the EU (for 
VET, this would mean the European Social Fund). This pointed to using 
Phare to overcome regional disparities and for alleviating the position of 
disadvantaged minorities (eg. the Roma).  The result of all these changes 
meant that, for a period, Phare in the field of VET stopped being directed 
towards VET policy and practice, and reflected more the interests of 
promoting social dialogue, enhancing employment services, helping to 
institute active labour market measures, and addressing regional issues.  
The corollary, as Masson notes, was that Phare support was diverted away 
from ministries of education and towards ministries of labour.  There was 
something of a hiatus in the ‘policy orientated’ aid that had been gathering 
pace in the earlier period.  
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As well as the content of projects, the EU took a keen interest in bringing 
the country’s administration to a position where it could sensibly manage 
and account for Phare VET projects (DG Enlargement, 2002).   
After the Lisbon Summit of 2000, which introduced lifelong learning as a 
theme, the path was again open for Phare to pay attention to national VET 
policies as a whole, rather than in their regional or solely employment-
related dimensions.  With the launch of the Copenhagen Process in 2002 a 
fresh agenda opened up concerning the development in the East of the 
new ‘tools’ for co-operation such as qualifications frameworks and quality 
assurance methods. 
 
Mode of operation 
VET projects under Phare were for a time initially managed by the ETF, 
through teams appointed by in the various countries, aided by foreign 
experts (‘technical assistance’).  However when Phare became more 
‘accession-driven’ the ETF stepped back into an advisory role.  At that time 
it started to perform wider functions – of contributing to the ‘regular reports’ 
on accession and feeding information into the Employment Strategy.  Also 
during the ‘accession-driven’ phase, the participation of appointed foreign 
experts was largely replaced by ‘twinning’ arrangements whereby ministries 
and institutions in the candidate countries were paired with equivalents in 
established member states.  Later on, however, ‘technical assistance’ 
teams were re-instated through a tendering process. 
As Phare matured a standard mode of operation emerged: 
• at the highest level needs across all the relevant sectors in a 
country were identified in the Accession Partnerships incorporating 
both a ‘National Programme for the Adoption of the Acquis’ and the 
National Development Programme for “promoting economic and 
social cohesion in the candidate countries” (DG Enlargement, 2002, 
p.10); 
• from this a series of ‘project fiches’ were derived, spelling out the 
aims of individual projects and the resources agreed in respect of 
each; 
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• in turn, from these fiches, individual ‘terms of reference’ were drawn 
up giving a detailed specification of what was desired from each 
project.  These were made available to a short-list of organizations 
which had expressed an interest in tendering for a given project, 
and which the Commission had judged competent to make a 
realistic bid; 
• finally a tendering process took place, in which bidders outlined how 
they envisaged tackling the terms of reference, the personnel they 
proposed to deploy, and the price they would charge.  The selected 
contractor was then responsible for delivering the project, subject to 
various monitoring procedures involving both the Commission and 
officials from the country concerned, typically arranged as a steering 
group. 
In the case of VET, these procedures gave rise to a fairly limited group of 
specialist tendering organizations,* which developed mechanisms for 
writing proposals and for assembling at short notice teams of suitably 
qualified ‘international experts’ who matched the fairly detailed 
specifications for ‘key personnel’.  The terms of reference typically 
demanded that a number of these experts be foreign, with a view to 
importing relevant practices from existing member states.  This example of 
a ‘person specification’ comes from the (unpublished) terms of reference of 
a Phare project in Romania which took place in 2004-5. 
                                                
* Organizations in the UK included, for example, IMC Consulting (formerly involved 
in restructuring in British coalfields, and now part of White, Young Green), 
Cambridge Education, the British Council and the Scottish Qualifications Authority. 
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These personnel were typically complemented by ‘local experts’ from the 
country concerned, who could help the foreigners navigate the internal 
system as well as providing technical expertise of their own. 
Terms of reference for projects were fairly specific, very often requiring the 
‘technical assistance’ team to perform in an executive and operational, 
rather than advisory, capacity.  The same Romanian project, for example, 
expected the consultants to organize a large-scale curriculum development 
exercise: 
The bids from competing organizations were scored partly on the merits of 
the written proposal, but more so on the attributes of the various ‘key 
Task 5. Training Standards and curriculum development  
Outputs: (i) about 350 training standards for the existing qualifications at levels 1-3 and 
level 4 non university education to be elaborated/updated according to the 
evolution of technologies and work management,  
(ii) about 600 curriculum modules elaborated, representing the revised 
framework adopted during the Phare TVET 0108 project.  Special attention will 
be focused on level 3 and 4 of the vocational qualifications. Updating of levels 
1 and 2 will be done to meet the requirements of the Regional Education 
Action Plans (REAPs) and LEAPs [Local Education Action Plans] 
The Consultant will prepare, organise and deliver training programmes to continue the 
development and updating of training standards and curricula for 100 schools and 22 
resource centres. 
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experts’ who were to be deployed, based on their curriculum vitae, and 
sometimes also involving interviews. 
As a counterpart to the technical assistance team, countries were expected 
to set up a ‘Programme Implementation (or Management) Unit’ (PIU or 
PMU).  This could be a single official designated to liaise with the project, or 
a group of officials within a ministry or agency.  In a number of cases, for 
example in Romania, the PIU evolved into a semi-autonomous unit within 
government concerned with VET development. 
 
The content of Phare  
During the course of the 1990s a discernible pattern evolved in Phare VET 
projects, as summarized by the ETF in a review which drew on a number of 
individual evaluation reports (ETF, 2001).  Individual projects were typically 
charged with drawing up new ‘modernized’ curricula for vocational subjects;  
there were a number of dimensions to this, involving the elaboration of 
programmes for ‘new’ subjects such as informatics, and for expected 
growth areas such as tourism.  These reformed curricula also attempted a 
broader scope than the previous, highly specialized, versions of communist 
times. 
Beyond this, the projects often incorporated recent new ideas in curriculum 
design, including outcome-based goals or occupational standards, 
“competency-based assessment and certification” (p.12), the inclusion of 
cross-curricular “key skills”, and often a modular approach to curriculum 
design.  We shall explore this ‘curriculum package’ in more detail in a 
moment. 
Projects also typically included the training of school managers in school 
development planning, budgeting, personnel management, management of 
change, networking and marketing.  For teachers the training was not only 
in the new curricula and their modern design features, but also more 
generally in topics such as occupational mapping and functional analysis, 
standards, the modular curriculum approach, new (less didactic) teaching 
methods, student assessment and key skills (p.17). 
Typically one third of a project’s budget was devoted to the upgrading of 
buildings and equipment, so that the new curricula could be taught with up-
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to-date machinery and in attractive surroundings.  Study visits to 
counterparts in established EU member states were arranged. 
Though the interventions in individual schools were intended to be about 
“empowering staff at a local level to develop new curricula and 
methodologies of work” (European Training Foundation, 1999) and to 
attract an interested audience amongst domestic policymakers and other 
VET practitioners, the projects also increasingly attempted directly to 
stimulate and support national policy.  The “white papers” which projects 
assisted (and sometimes wrote) typically advocated decentralized 
management and tri-partite decision-making; integrating initial and 
continuing training; “shifting quality control over provision from input 
(curriculum contents, staff requirements) to output criteria (qualification 
standards),” and introducing new pathways and levels of training 
particularly between secondary and higher education (p.24). 
While this basic package of reforms could still be recognized in the later 
stages of Phare, which frequently sought to extend the range of schools 
involved in the original pilots, VET projects also became more varied, 
including (ETF, 2003): 
• mounting targeted re-training programmes for the unemployed, in 
response to countries’ increasing participation in the European 
Employment Strategy; 
• stressing a regional dimension to VET and/or targeting 
disadvantaged groups, particularly the Roma minority, mirroring the 
approach of the EU Structural Funds; 
• efforts to consolidate, regulate and institutionalize the newly 
emerged adult training sector, through the development of national 
agencies for this sector, accreditation schemes and associated 
legislation; 
• more generally developing national VET strategy and policy, for 
example in developing national qualifications frameworks and 
quality assurance mechanisms, reflecting the EU’s growing 
emphasis on these instruments as part of its Copenhagen process 
for VET. 
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The ‘Curriculum Package’ and its l imitations 
A distinctive approach to the vocational curriculum was associated with 
Phare from its early days.   This represented a particular approach to VET, 
and also influenced what was to be done in other components of projects, 
such as teacher training and dissemination.   Parkes et al. (1998) 
contrasted this approach with what had gone before in the eastern 
countries: 
A traditional understanding of teaching and learning in 
vocational education and training results in traditional forms 
of curricula with a closed system of instructional courses 
complemented by a systematic organisation of contents in 
subject form. This organisation of content fits a traditional 
teacher dominated process mostly described in a syllabus 
with learning goals, teaching media, and with timetables and 
tests … Conversely 'modern' vocational education and 
training as exemplified in the curriculum philosophy of the 
Phare vocational training programmes is intended to facilitate 
the acquisition of useful individual competencies, knowledge 
and behaviour related to a society which is (at least 
notionally) integrated in its concepts of labour, technology 
and the market. Curricula with these goals focus on specific 
individual learning processes. (p.5) 
A desire to promote flexibility and individualization (both contrasts to the 
communist system) gave rise to the promotion of modularization in many 
Phare projects from Estonia to Bulgaria.  A desire to give more autonomy 
over the organization of teaching to schools, while at the same time 
promoting accountability and ‘fit’ with demands of the labour market, 
pointed towards the western practice of “... the establishment of national 
qualification standards, often based on occupational standards elaborated 
with the assistance of the social partners” (p.10).  The ‘traditional’ 
separation of theory and practice within vocational curricula was replaced 
by a more holistic view of ‘competence’.  As we have seen earlier (page 52) 
many domestic commentators had identified an excessively didactic 
approach to teaching as unhelpful in fostering future adaptability, so the 
adoption of more student-centred methods involving problem solving and 
transversal ‘key skills’, held attractions to progressive educators in the East, 
as well as according with recent developments in some western countries.  
However Parkes et al. remarked that this is a very particular interpretation 
of the curriculum: 
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A ... set of critical issues relate to the rather narrow 
curriculum conception that has been adopted in most 
countries within the framework of the Phare programmes. 
This has resulted in a focus on changing learning contents 
and introducing assessment of learning outcomes. This 
approach is very much 'in vogue' in some EU countries 
(though not uncontested). (p.31) 
Moreover, the application of a particular recipe for modernization – in this 
case modularization – could be rather capricious, and be introduced without 
regard to its wider implications: 
The Central and Eastern European country cases which have 
attempted to implement a modular approach have variable 
approaches, from no modules (Latvia, Slovenia) to a 1000 
(Estonia) or some (the Czech Republic, Poland and Slovak 
Republic). The organisational, resourcing and institutional 
implications of such an approach are considerable. It is not 
clear why this approach has been advocated (or not) for 
Phare vocational training programmes in general or by 
specific advisers in particular. The organisational implications 
are barely grasped ... for example the complex relations 
between modularisation and a credit based or competence 
based approach. (p.29) 
Although there was a good deal of commonality in approach, the 
application of the ‘Phare philosophy’ in particular countries depended to a 
degree on the origin and predilections of the foreign experts.  Apparently 
Slovakia had adopted “the SCOTVEC* model of curriculum design” (p.61) 
whereas in Estonia “the Irish labour market skills training system” had held 
attractions (p.40).  But Celtic models were not the only ones: 
In Slovenia the introduction of several professions in a dual 
vocational education and training system was conducted with 
help from neighbouring countries. An exchange of curricula at 
the institutional level was organised. But a dual system also 
needs to include workshop practice and experience in 
companies. Companies in Slovenia are under reconstruction 
and not yet interested in vocational training. Without a strong 
commitment from local and regional companies (which is 
difficult in the near future) the link with labour processes is 
not possible. (p.15) 
What is more, different donors promoted different concepts resulting, in 
Romania, in a need to reach agreement between them and their client 
ministries: 
                                                
* SCOTVEC was at the time the authority responsible for the regulation and 
development of vocational qualifications in Scotland.  It also had a department 
concerned with consultancy aid to foreign countries. Following merger with its 
general education counterpart it became the Scottish Qualifications Authority. 
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The definitions of 'standards' of competence have been 
agreed between the World Bank (Ministry of Labour) and the 
Phare vocational training (Ministry of Education) projects. 
(p.16) 
With a number of different curriculum approaches vying with established 
models and being open to interpretation by different sets of foreign experts 
(Nielsen, 2004) it is not surprising that, rather than replace the old methods, 
the new ones tended to run in parallel, acting as an overlay to them.  
Uncertainty about concepts was widespread and resonated even a decade 
after the Phare interventions: 
Traditionally, the description of “educational goals” was 
essential for curricular documents..... Nevertheless, despite 
this, content based programming dominated within curriculum 
design. A “competence-based” paradigm become dominant 
in the early 2000s mixing up with a traditional approach, 
gradually complicated with a European ‘learning outcomes 
discourse’. (Refernet Slovakia, 2011, p.82) 
Parkes et al. questioned the wisdom of applying a particular curriculum 
model to different countries, regardless of circumstances: 
The principal characteristic of the Phare supported curriculum 
reforms ... has been the attempt to initiate a systemic reform 
of the whole system through the introduction of a particular 
curriculum model .... The model was imported from EU 
countries and, though ideologically attractive, paid little 
attention to the specific transition conditions of each 
individual country. (p.30) 
This manifestation of particular models and their pitfalls might be put down 
to initial enthusiasm on the part of certain international experts, but it is 
plain from a further publication eight years later involving two of the original 
authors (Parkes and Neilsen, 2006), that the approach had proved durable, 
and was still being applied in south east Europe.  The authors had become 
clearer about its origins: 
The specific curriculum package (in terms of such elements 
as curriculum values, modular organisation and competence 
based approach) derives more from the English-speaking 
approach than from the French or particularly German or 
Scandinavian organisation of VET. Hence in the chosen 
countries there is tension everywhere between the EU-
funded projects and the GTZ* approach. In short, there is a 
                                                
* GTZ (Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit) is a German 
government-owned company dedicated to technical co-operation in partner 
countries.  
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danger of an EU VET model which does not reflect the 
diversity of even member state practice. (p.14) 
Again, models from different countries are imported, but within a more 
restricted range: 
...a more or less common reform or curriculum development 
model has been applied in each (Scottish in the case of 
Bulgaria and Serbia; English in the case of the former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia; Irish in the case of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina – all with a broadly similar approach). (p.14) 
It must be noted, despite the evident scepticism shown here, that many 
evaluators at the time praised this type of Phare model, including one of 
Parkes’s co-authors: 
The Phare programme has made a remarkable and 
impressive contribution to the modernisation and 
decentralisation of Romanian VET curriculum development in 
terms of formulation and dissemination of curriculum policy, 
teaching and learning philosophy and methodology. (Nielsen 
and Steen Hansen, 1999, p.6) 
There is scope, no doubt, for much debate about the appropriateness of the 
‘Phare curriculum model’.  However, there were other reasons why 
improving VET through aid proved difficult. 
Spreading the approach outside the pilot schools could certainly not be 
taken for granted.  As the early ETF review makes clear the pilot schools, 
although much energized by their selection, “were allowed ... to operate on 
an ‘experimental basis’ without any major commitment by national 
policymakers to use results and integrate them into mainstream 
developments” (ETF, 2001, p.29).  Indeed, governments could stand back 
from these innovations, as in the Czech Republic: 
... the lack of receptiveness, interest and acknowledgement 
of results by the [Ministry of Education] prevented 
mainstreaming the outputs to national level. In addition the 
programme arrangement did not involve third parties from the 
policy level, e.g. the Ministry of Labour, resulting in the lack of 
linkage to labour-market restructuring and adult training. 
(Baumgartl, Strietska-Ilina and Schaumberger, 2004, p.170) 
What is more, the production of ‘concept papers’ and ‘white papers’ by no 
means guaranteed that systemic reform at the policy level would be 
followed through into legislation, or even be accepted by national 
policymakers and legislatures, as in Slovakia: 
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A key element in the terms of reference.. was the preparation 
of a national strategy. However such a strategy was never 
developed as there was no direct involvement of main policy-
makers in the programme. Social partners have been 
reluctant to participate in a project which the [Ministry of 
Education] itself did not fully recognise. (p.172) 
Moreover, the sheer scale of rolling out complex curriculum development 
and teacher training across the whole system was often too daunting for 
the country concerned to contemplate. Smith (2001) describes how a 
successful exercise in training Bulgarian teachers to adopt new approaches 
in a Phare project failed to be replicated across the system simply because 
the logistics were too daunting for the national authorities.  In a number of 
countries, the pilot schools, remained ‘stranded’, neither being replicated in 
the mainstream system, nor (no doubt in fear of criticism from Brussels) 
being wound up as inappropriate. 
Masson (2003) also points to problems with the complexity of, and frequent 
changes to, the Phare guidelines, to the number of parallel projects which 
were often running at the same time with different ministries or agencies 
involved in each, and to lack of capacity – particularly in the regions – to 
play a full part in the programmes. 
However, these difficulties should not lead one to dismiss the impact of the 
aid programme.  Materially, much badly needed equipment, modern 
textbooks, and refurbishments of appallingly deteriorated school buildings 
were provided through Phare.  Teacher-training was undoubtedly 
welcomed, as in many places this had fallen into disrepair; exposure to 
foreign practices through study visits stimulated interest and, in some 
cases, continued contacts.  At the policy level, in many countries Phare 
focussed attention on VET reform; indeed in places it was the only source 
of funding for reform at all (Laužackas and Danilevičius, 2006).  Certain 
‘landmark’ projects left a lasting impact, for example VETERST in Bulgaria 
“...had a positive reputation. The programme has supported continuing 
reform in a difficult and volatile environment” (Baumgartl, Strietska-Ilina and 
Schaumberger, 2004, p.174).  Slovenia’s MOCCA programme, according 
to Masson: 
gives an interesting example of a project in situation of failure 
at its end because of a lack of agreement among national 
stakeholders on the reforms proposed, and a final surprising 
rescue: The ex-post evaluation discovered that the project 
had created a community of stakeholders who kept promoting 
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the reforms and who eventually unblocked the policy-making 
process, enabling the implementation of the proposed 
reforms outside the scope of the Phare intervention. (p.31) 
and in Lithuania the formation, in a Phare project, of a set of ‘expert 
practitioners’ produced a cadre of ‘champions’ within the system who would 
be influential in subsequent reform movements (European Training 
Foundation, 2001). 
 
A consistent policy? 
In retrospect one can see a set of conflicting principles within the support 
programme.  The EU took different stances on each at different times.  In 
the first place there was a dilemma as to whether to adopt  ‘top-down’ or 
‘bottom-up’ strategies.  The ‘pilot school’ approaches, designed to 
demonstrate western models in practice, clearly had problems in making a 
wider impact in the countries concerned. These limitations prompted the 
EU to inject more policy advice into projects, stimulating ‘white’ and ‘green’ 
papers on national policy, and sometimes helping to draft legislation.  There 
were of course problems with this approach too, as domestic policymakers 
and publics questioned why internal policies were subject to external 
intervention. 
We can also detect some shifts between approaches which were primarily 
directed at employment, with VET seen as a vehicle for dealing with 
problems of displacement through re-training, as contrasted with more 
directly education-related projects which treated VET as part of a wider 
programme of educational modernization.  The emphasis between 
employment and education changed over time, in favour of the former for a 
time and then back again.  This had implications both for the style of project 
(for example, youth versus adult training) and for the sponsoring ministries 
involved, leading to internal tensions as the ‘European’ spotlight of funds 
and favour swung to and fro. 
 A constant tension was whether projects should be principally related to 
the EU agenda – whether in terms of the state of play of the accession 
negotiations in the middle phase of Phare, or of the Copenhagen and 
Lisbon agendas in the later stages – or whether projects should mainly be 
designed as a response to particular circumstances of particular countries.  
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It was not always clear to many of those involved in projects whether they 
were working on behalf of the ‘beneficiary’ country, or of the ‘donor’ EU.  
There was a balance to be struck between deploying foreign experts and 
domestic ‘local’ consultants.  Relying largely on the former ran the risk of 
importing inappropriate ‘solutions’ or of the pursuit of personal hobby 
horses, but external experts did bring injections of new thinking and 
objectivity.  ‘Local experts’, on the other hand could carry on the initiatives 
after the project had finished; however putting development in the hands of 
people who might be overly identified with particular domestic interests 
could prejudice initiatives. 
There were changes of policy about how best to deploy foreign expertise;  
whether through unattached individuals treating the countries as their 
‘clients’ or through designating institutions in selected member states 
through the ‘twinning’ arrangements.  While the former gave the EU 
authorities and the countries concerned more control, the latter type of 
arrangement, arguably, might give rise to more authentic insights about 
foreign practice and enable longer term relationships to be formed. 
Again, should projects focus on building up VET ‘infrastructure’, such as 
capacity-building in ministries and education institutions, and promoting the 
involvement of ‘social partners’ as well as investing in buildings and 
equipment, or should they rather attempt directly to influence teaching and 
learning by developing new approaches to the curriculum and pedagogy?  
The former was, of course, a necessary condition of future progress, but it 
was hard to influence and easy to misjudge the points of intervention and 
the readiness of participants to engage.   The latter gave more satisfying 
instant results and – in the right circumstances – could inject vision 
amongst practitioners who knew that the old ways were not working; 
however it could also be ephemeral. 
The story of Phare in VET is about the EU and its agencies navigating a 
course through these conundrums, paying attention, too, to the changing 
emphases of EU policy on VET as it unfurled over the accession period.  At 
the end of the day, though, a great deal depended on the attitude and 
capacity of the recipient government – whether it knew what it wanted and 
whether it was prepared to negotiate about, prepare for, and subsequently 
commit to the kind of change offered in Phare: 
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Reform efforts were especially successful in those countries 
where the national, regional and local levels had jointly 
worked to common targets in a complementary top-down and 
bottom-up approach. Definition of these targets needs major 
stakeholder involvement at all political levels, from the macro 
to the micro level, making the whole reform process more 
transparent. (Baumgartl, Strietska-Ilina and Schaumberger, 
2004, p.187) 
 
EU integration 
In terms of EU integration theory, therefore, the Phare experience presents 
a complex picture.  Without consent and – more than that – active interest 
at governmental level, interventions would be unlikely to bear fruit, as inter-
governmentalists would predict.  The widespread approach, in projects, of 
exposing one country to the experts and practices of others would also 
point to the importance of country-to-country interactions.   
Social constructivists, on the other hand, would point to the significance of 
exposure to foreign practice at the personal level, which was a regular 
feature in the many projects which incorporated study visits for 
policymakers and practitioners. Constructivists might perhaps also claim 
that there was some kind of ‘crucible effect’ in the way that a distinctive 
curriculum model emerged through the formation of an ‘epistemic 
community’ of experts brought together by Phare, though they might find it 
more difficult to explain why the model did not take root more often, given 
its evident appeal to many practitioners who were involved and the fact that 
it was identified as a distinctively ‘modern’ and ‘European’ approach. 
Neo-functionalists would also point to this distinctive curriculum model, but 
claim rather that it was formed through increments and default, 
representing an acceptable, rational choice for the technocrats concerned; 
EU officials must have been wary about adopting the VET model of any 
particular established member state, and so there must have been 
attractions in a such a new and relatively rootless approach, which arguably 
represented something of an amalgam of elements from different western 
VET traditions.  Neo-functionalists would also point to the way that EU 
policies to encourage countries to conform to the European Employment 
Strategy ‘spilled over’ into the support programmes for VET. 
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An interpretation based on political economy might want to focus on the 
specialized set of businesses which grew up to respond to, and perhaps 
influence, the tendering procedures around Phare and to claim that the 
particular mixture of support was governed by what such firms found it 
profitable to provide. They might also point to the involvement of certain 
western governments in promoting their VET systems through their 
sponsorship of tendering organizations (eg. the Scottish Qualifications 
Authority, the British Council or the German GTZ).  However purely 
economic explanations based would have difficulty in accounting for the 
apparent lack of involvement of major western companies in the projects 
and the tendency of projects to focus on the public rather than the private 
sector of VET. 
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CHAPTER TEN  
 
BEDSIDE MANNERS:  
Perspectives of Those Involved 
 
Introduction 
We have learned much about the EU’s approach to VET in the East, and 
garnered some reactions to it through formal evaluations and the published 
comments of participants or observers.  But this leaves a number of 
unanswered questions and gives little impression of the attitudes of 
participants at the time, of the difficulties they encountered and of the 
successes they considered they had achieved.   
To fill in some texture on these matters and to probe a little further into 
some of the more interesting questions, I conducted nine interviews with a 
view to exploring particular issues.  This chapter reports on those 
interviews.  The issues investigated were: 
• How were projects run in practice? 
• What were the attitudes of those involved in development projects 
and what difficulties did they encounter? 
• To what extent were projects tailored to the needs of individual 
countries, and how was this achieved? 
• What was the experience of the various other types of intervention 
(the pressures during accession negotiations, the ‘open method of 
co-ordination’ and the increasing participation of policymakers and 
practitioners in EU-wide networks)? 
• What was the experience of being a ‘foreign expert’ and what were 
the reactions of host countries to explicit foreign influence? 
• Why did the rather distinctive ‘reform package’ described in the last 
chapter take the form that it did? 
As explained in Chapter Two (page 41) I conducted interviews with a range 
of people who had witnessed the interaction between the EU and eastern 
European countries on VET matters.  All had been involved with the VET 
support projects in one way or another, though many had also taken part in 
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other aspects of EU activities.  The individuals, with the abbreviations used 
in the extracts that follow, were: 
 
Person Position 
POL Ro Former policymaker in Romania 
ETF Dk Senior official at ETF who had previously worked in DG Enlargement  
(Danish) 
ETF Nl Country manager at ETF (Dutch) 
ETF Fr Senior official at ETF (French) 
LEX Se ‘Local expert’ in Serbian projects, previously an official in the Ministry of 
Education 
TL UK Team leader of EU funded projects in Serbia and Romania (British) 
CON UK Consultant on projects, who has experience of drawing up terms of 
reference (British) 
CON Hu Consultant on projects, including Croatia and Romania, specializing in 
higher education and qualifications (Hungarian) 
CON Bg Consultant on projects, including Croatia, specializing in education IT 
systems (Bulgarian) 
 
Running Phare  projects 
Most of the participants had been personally involved in Phare projects.  I 
was interested to know what they thought of the way the projects operated. 
The first stage, involved drawing up the terms of reference (ToR).  These 
specified the tasks that a project should carry out, over what timescale, and 
what kind of expertise was to be deployed.  It was against these terms of 
reference that competing contractors bid and they formed the basis for the 
evaluation of the proposals.   CON UK was very experienced in the art of 
specifying terms of reference, and described the niceties of involving the 
relevant authorities within the country when doing so: 
Now, the problem is drafting these terms of reference, 
because in Bosnia, as you know, it’s a very complex 
structure.  You’ve got the national government, you’ve got the 
federal government, you’ve got two ‘Entities’, one the 
Republic of Srpska, and you’ve got a free city called Brčko ... 
No use me writing terms of reference where one or two of the 
Entities won’t go along with it... I wrote the terms of reference, 
but I went back three times with ...another Irish expert, to 
negotiate the fine details with the Entities; only, only to make 
them feel part of the process, and to bring them on board.  
We had to eliminate the opposition. 
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Sometimes he found problems in matching the required work to the 
available budget, and this could cause problems later if tendering 
companies took on projects that had unrealistic goals: 
CON UK I also did the decentralization of the Croatian 
employment service.  And I was short [of money] there, you 
see.  You obviously have to explain and justify why you’re 
doing it, but if you’re short, you’re short.  Now what you 
shouldn’t do is try and bend it... but I know consultants do 
this.  If they’re given €1m, they’ll write the terms of reference 
and try and fit the activities into it, and that often means that 
people can’t do the job... 
JW I’ve sometimes written bids and said “Look, this is 
crazy, you can’t do that, we’ll just have to say we can’t do it.”  
... But I’ve been guided by the firm that’s going to 
bid.  “No, we just have to do it.”  So there’s some kind of 
conspiracy or accidental connivance on an unrealistic 
proposition. 
CON UK Now, this is a decision for a company.  Often I will 
write the bids for a company, and then I’ll say to them “Look, 
this has not been properly costed – you can’t do it.” ... and 
there’s not much profit in this for you...”   In Albania there was 
a very badly drafted ToR.  It was for total reform of the civil 
service.  Badly drafted, incorrectly costed.  The company 
went along with it.  Their response to the ToR was often just 
a straight lift from the terms of reference.  And they went 
along with it.  A badly written ToR and a badly written 
response.  And you end up with trying to do something that’s 
impossible, right?  This is what happened in Albania.  
Writing a project proposal on the part of a tendering organization, which 
CON UK had also done, developed into a fine art, with the result that after a 
time it counted for less than it used to (with more emphasis on the experts 
offered in a tender): 
CON UK Well, you know way the projects are assessed, 
don’t you?  That there’s an element for methodology.  Now 
that used to be 70 or 80 per cent.  It’s now down to about 30 
or 40.  And the reason for that is that a lot of....I write them 
now, I’ve got a template that normally guarantees me very 
close to the top marks anyway.  And lots of companies [can 
do that]... 
JW They’re written by the same person probably? 
CON UK Yes...  I mean I could give you an absolute 
guarantee I could get you 28 out of 30 for the methodology. 
However, there was inevitably a considerable gap between the 
identification of a need in a beneficiary country and the deployment of 
resources to address it through a project: 
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TL UK ...you have to have the Terms of Reference 
agreed by the time the procurement notice is published so 
therefore you’re talking about typically you know six, eight 
months before the start of the project.  It should be less than 
that, but it is six-eight months and bearing in mind that the 
process of developing the TORs will have taken... and that 
the TORs themselves come from the project fiche which has 
been developed a long time ahead of that, so if you just take 
a gross part of the project such as, you know, support of NQF 
development, that idea is put into the system a very, very 
long time ago ...  
Bearing the risk of out-datedness in mind, the ability to adapt the project 
once it had actually started could be important.  However getting a later 
change agreed by the relevant authorities was not necessarily 
straightforward: 
CON Hu [If the project team] are really aware of what the 
country needs, they do a good job during the inception 
phase, they can make a lot of changes.  But then from the 
other side ....the beneficiary country;  if the persons with 
whom you discuss during the inception phase, if they are 
flexible and they really want the change, if they really want to 
use the project money efficiently ... in this case they will be 
flexible enough to accept for the changes ....  But in some 
other countries, you don’t have this flexibility at all, so if 
someone has signed, they want word by word, exactly the 
same job [as in the terms of reference], independently of 
what has happened in the meantime in the country. 
There were frustrations with the project process from the beneficiary 
country’s perspective, too.  For example, each project tended to have its 
own structure for involving the local communities it worked with: 
POL Ro Any single project proposed its own institutions 
and it was not very much co-ordination and therefore – not 
only in Romania, but also other assisted countries  – finalized 
by having a mushroom of committees ...  For example in the 
case of education and employment, the county agencies for 
employment they were deciding to have an advisory board... 
due to the fact that education has been assisted through a 
project, and employment through another project, we ended 
by having two different committees.  And nowadays it is very 
difficult to [disband] them ... No: committees, committees, 
steering committees. 
The ‘local experts’ from the beneficiary country who were frequently 
appointed to supplement the ‘international experts’ played a very important 
role in projects, acting as a link with the stakeholders in the country.  After 
the project they might well go on to be influential in their own right, at home 
or abroad: 
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TL UK As far as local experts go, they have an 
enormous role to play in sustainability of project interventions, 
and actually capacity building.  ...Local experts are 
volunteers, local experts actually want to get into a project, 
and once they’re in a project they work in close quarters with 
us, they take direction from us ... they tend to get recycled 
anyway, you know an expert becomes a Ministry consultant, 
becomes an advisor, becomes this, goes back to consultancy 
as an international expert.  It’s a fairly mobile kind of 
environment that they’re in....   and actually good local 
experts, you know, open all the doors for you and all the rest 
of it...  And local experts are the cream anyway, and they’re 
the urban educated, English speaking elite of the country. 
However their appointment to a project could be less than straightforward, 
with various interests promoting particular candidates: 
TL UK What will happen, and this is not just a one-off, 
what tends to happen ... is that before you win a project 
people will be dropping names, and the people who will be 
dropping names could be people in the Ministry, because 
these people were on the previous project and they wanted to 
adopt them. It can be your own consulting company who’ve 
just finished a project and want to do someone a favour, it 
can be – heaven forbid and shouldn’t be, but can be – the 
contracting authority [usually the EU delegation] itself who 
has slipped you a CV and say, “Look, you might be interested 
in this person.”  
JW But by and large that’s reasonably helpful is it? 
TL UK  It depends on the way in which it’s done.  I think 
that if a representative of the contracting authority gives you a 
CV and suggests that you might want to take this person on, 
and then... you’re in a difficult position in proposing someone 
else for that position.  But once you start letting other people 
take decisions for you, it’s a slippery slope... the system of 
favours that builds up, people expect this. 
Not everyone, though, preferred the younger urbanites favoured by our 
Team Leader.  There was something to be said for the generation that had 
grown up under communism: 
CON Hu In Bulgaria also I worked with very good local 
experts and the same was in Georgia.  In Georgia I had really 
excellent local experts, very highly qualified.  But, you know, 
my age so they had grown up in the Soviet era [laughs], they 
were open-minded, well-educated, so it’s much more different 
than the new generation.  The new generation is only money.  
Money and new clothes and ‘handys’*.  
JW Everywhere, or just Georgia? 
                                                
* Mobile ‘phones. 
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CON Hu Oh, almost everywhere. 
JW It’s the same at home... 
CON Hu [Laughs].  Yes, the same in Hungary, I know! 
 
Attitudes and keys to success 
From the point of view of the EU and project members, the attitude of 
policymakers in the country was key to ensuring that a project was 
appropriate and successful.  However positive and active co-operation of 
the authorities could by no means always be counted upon, as described 
by two members of the ETF: 
ETF Fr My understanding was that, at that time, it was 
not possible to trust very much the policymakers who were 
the same as before – they didn’t change a lot, particularly in 
the permanent Ministries which were not the most important 
in the socialist economy. 
ETF Dk So one of the big puzzles for me is how it has 
been possible to continue for so long in many countries and 
have so relatively weak capacity in the Ministries to actually 
define projects according to whatever criteria Brussels 
wanted.  
Our Hungarian consultant also instanced some out-dated bureaucratic 
habits, but also a rather cynical attitude to the motivation of the EU:  
CON Hu In countries... [which] has a staff which are not 
trained enough how to run an EU project, especially those 
persons who lived in the former system when everything was 
dictated by a central office, the Ministry or the Party or 
whatever – those will never change.  Those will stick to the 
original contract, they will never understand that this project 
is... to help the country to make some changes... Some 
friends of mine who are in the same business, they told me 
that in some countries they consider the project money 
nothing but peanuts for the EU and used only for PR 
purposes.  So therefore they really don’t mind what you do in 
the project... they consider it just as publicity for the European 
Union. 
If hostility, or lack of interest, on the part of the authorities applied to a 
whole strand of reform, then problems could become endemic and subvert 
a range of development activities, even where – on paper – they had 
governmental backing: 
CON UK More often the norm is that there is tacit support 
for a project.  There is a group of consultants who will come 
in and who will write a sector strategy.  Normally with, sort of, 
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en passant acceptance by the minister and his colleagues.  
And that document is not used.  It’s not enforced, and it 
remains in somebody’s drawer.  Now, out of that often is a 
series of projects, and those projects by and large don’t work.  
They don’t work.  And the reason that they don’t work is that 
really there is no enthusiasm for them.  They’re playing along 
with the process, rather than engaging in it. 
One ETF interviewee considered that in fact a ‘clean slate’ in terms of 
government could result in a more active engagement with reform: 
ETF Nl  You see also interesting there were a number of 
countries that became independent; they were not existing 
before.  So, in the former Soviet Union, all the Baltic states, 
Slovakia, Yugoslavia, so we’re talking about quite a lot of 
countries that suddenly had to develop a policy.. They had to 
set up the institutions, and the methodological institutions 
they were not existing in those countries.…But in those 
countries, [for example] Estonia, Slovenia you see the 
strongest reform because actually they had the opportunity 
that they could start from a clean slate.  “We want to do it our 
way”.  
Having reform-minded individuals in positions which could influence 
policies was clearly vital.  One interviewee at the ETF described what was 
needed in more detail, and touched on the delicacies of an external agent 
wanting to influence appointments in another country: 
ETF Nl You first have to probably reinforce the central 
level. 
JW So this is capacity building? … getting in people 
who wish to make reforms into more significant positions.  
This sounds a good process… 
ETF Nl Yes, it is a good process.  If you had some good 
people, for instance there were some good people in 
Romania, then it works...So you need a few people who are 
there, steady and who are ready to…I think they must not be 
at the political level.  So someone like [names junior minister 
in Serbia], she is going to disappear if the government will 
change, so you need really the level below [to be] strong.  
That needs to be there and you need somehow the strong 
people... 
JW ... did you have conversations about 
appointments with these countries? 
ETF Nl No.  It was not my [role].  And I don’t think it’s 
right.  You don’t know… 
JW But you said you were able to influence the 
building of capacity in the way you describe, but I'm not, I 
don’t understand… 
ETF Nl Well, it was more a discussion, putting ideas in 
their heads.  That’s it – discussing…  But you can't do much 
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about appointments ...  It’s empowering the people who are 
there – rather than more about increasing resources.  That’s 
what DG Employment did.  They could do that.  That was part 
of their [method].  ...  They would pressure for that, because 
they were much more about “Who’s responsible for that; how 
many people do you have in place, etc. etc.” 
However according to our experienced Team Leader, at working level 
within projects where day-to-day co-operation was what mattered, personal 
chemistry was an essential component: 
TL UK Everything is down to individuals.  Everything is 
down to individuals ... It really does make a difference.  You 
know I go into meetings in Serbia with certain men and I walk 
in – “Hello, hello” and you put your hand on someone’s 
shoulder ....It’s all a question of playing games, you know it 
depends who cares the most... to get something done. 
Personal relations and the motivations of the parties was not all.  Problems 
with language, and misunderstanding about important concepts, could be a 
significant barrier.  One ETF official pointed out that some fundamental 
ideas about VET – accepted in the West – could not necessarily be taken 
for granted in the East: 
ETF Fr When we speak about the VET system in the EU, 
in our countries, it’s something which is very broad – a lot of 
sub-systems, involving private, public, not only secondary 
education, but continuing training also is very much 
developed.  In the candidate countries the definition of VET is 
often very much limited to secondary public 
professionalization.  ... it was very striking to see that 
countries which had developed strategies for VET, and 
independently a strategy for adult education, ... without 
understanding that adult training is much more than adult 
educations. ... there is also some ambiguities – they just use 
the terms without understanding really what is behind them.  
Lifelong learning – a lifelong learning strategy – in the 
candidate countries people think that lifelong learning is just 
for adults.  There is a difference between VET and lifelong 
learning.  ... we don’t pay enough attention to the difference 
between wordings …   
Within beneficiary countries, a critical aspect was having a coherent 
concept of what kind of development to undertake in the field of VET, and – 
importantly – achieving internal consensus about this.  In Romania this took 
some time as our policymaker explained: 
POL Ro In fact in the education sector we find it as being 
useful to have a human resource strategy done by already 
’98 or ’99; so here it is a plus for the Minister at the time, he 
was a very visionary person and he said if we are going to 
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have all this reform going on with different support from 
abroad, we have to have our vision in our hand. And so the 
first strategy in human resource development has been done 
in ’98 and published in ’99 [but]...the other institutions, 
economic sectors they were not ready, in fact, to join us.  
How to fit the human resource development with the whole 
picture of the development of the country it was not 
achievable until 2002.  
In Serbia, by contrast, the Ministry of Education reached a firm view that 
VET reform was needed immediately after the fall of Milosević.  Without 
any prompting by the EU it rapidly took the initiative in building an agenda 
for change, drawing on practice in other countries: 
LEX Se ... the Ministry ... formed a group which could be 
this vehicle for the reform.  And this reform group for VET 
prepared many things, it was very involved in different 
communications, meetings, discussions with the EU experts, 
other country experts, officials, everything.  And this group for 
the reform of VET was this flagship body which facilitated 
discussion between the system, the Ministry and the EU 
countries or EU Commission.  And from this group arose 
many sub-groups for different areas, for different topics in 
VET reform. 
However in Serbia, as in some other countries, internal opposition soon 
manifested itself.  Having gained positions in EU-funded ‘CARDS’* projects 
which they had welcomed as promoting VET reform, the reformers then 
found themselves on the back foot: 
LEX Se We had many enemies.  CARDS had many 
enemies and in the time of 2004, 2005 and 2006, many 
pressures to close or change this approach from the CARDS, 
especially the modular approach, competences and ... people 
couldn’t use the term of competences or something like that...  
Especially it was difficult because the people in the Institute 
for the Development of Education, they didn’t have any 
communication with CARDS.  They made a big restriction on 
the people employed in the Institute [from] cooperating with 
CARDS. 
JW But why did they do this, do you think? 
LEX Se Because they didn’t accept this approach, new 
approach, new model of approach, new relation between 
theoretical and practical… 
JW But again, why didn’t they accept this new 
approach? 
LEX Se Because they didn’t understand, firstly.  ... And 
they were scared that this new curriculum orientation would 
                                                
* The equivalent of Phare in the western Balkans. 
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change the traditional position of the teachers of some 
subjects or some disciplines... 
Before she became an international expert, the Bulgarian consultant had 
worked in VET institutions in that country which EU projects had sought to 
influence.  She described how the ministries of education and employment 
had been cautious about being too closely involved in EU-sponsored 
reform initiatives, despite considerable enthusiasm on the part of the 
educational institutions: 
CON Bg In Bulgaria the project teams were working much 
more independently... the Ministries were not very much 
involved in development of the projects, in the outputs.  They 
were waiting for the projects to develop the outputs, and then 
they were analyzing and saying, “OK, this is fine for us, and 
this one we are using part of it, and this one is good idea, but 
actually it’s not applicable.”   
JW And this function of the Ministry and the 
authorities of sort of standing back, do you think it was 
deliberate, or was it because they were too busy...  Or was it 
just that they didn’t understand ... 
CON Bg Basically they were too busy.  Too busy.  Maybe 
part of the planning, but none of the institutions in Bulgaria 
actually had a department, or whatever, that is taking care of 
this kind of project, technical assistance or things like that.  
And people really did not have time to devote a lot to this 
project development... 
JW And the attitude, not of the policymakers, but of 
the schools, to the projects when they were involved, was this 
generally... 
CON Bg Generally the schools were very happy to have 
any kind of project.  ...  They were very active.  They were 
happy they are invited.  Especially for the vocational 
education and training projects, different projects operated on 
school level, but they all said that they are very satisfied with 
what happens with the projects. 
JW And was there any disappointment on the part of 
the schools that the Ministry was not so much involved? 
CON Bg I think that they worked on different levels, and 
this was not really felt by the schools. 
Apart from official support there were other features which, in the opinion of 
practitioners, were key to success.  The members of the teams assembled 
for a project usually came from different countries, and very often the first 
time they met each other was on arrival in the beneficiary country.  In such 
cases it could not be taken for granted that there would be a common 
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understanding, either within the team, or between them and the beneficiary 
country, as to what exactly the expectations were: 
CON Hu ... the team is very important, the key experts ... 
Can they work together or not?  Whether everybody 
understands in the same way the project, that’s very 
important because there are a lot of problems that people 
have totally different perceptions of what should be done in 
the project...  And then a lot of things depends on whether the 
country where you do, or the beneficiary on whom you do the 
technical assistance, whether they have the necessary 
capacity first to understand what is the project [about] 
because sometimes even the beneficiary does not 
understand what the project is about. 
A project needed also to be seen as relevant within the beneficiary country, 
and to come at the right time so that it meshed in with other developments.  
Again this could not be taken for granted: 
CON Bg For me, first of all this is the perspective of the 
project.  Is the project relevant to what the country really 
needs?  Because if the project is not relevant for the moment, 
it makes the implementation very difficult and ...sometimes 
there is a very big gap between the time the project is 
planned... and the project is implemented.  If this gap is very 
big, the project might be later, so if something was really 
urgent it is not waiting for the project.  So the time may be the 
second key factor.  The right project at the right time. 
For the Team Leader the ability of the project team to communicate with 
people in the country was what made a real difference between 
engagement and being sidelined as an ineffective repository of technical 
expertise:  
TL UK ...there’s nothing terribly original in VET, there’s 
no kind of high concepts to be wrestled with in VET.  And 
there are books and there is the internet, so sources of 
information are there.  You know, we have limited scope for 
action.  But it’s getting stuff across... in terms of getting stuff 
across, and that’s what counts... 
As we have seen (page 178) projects typically consisted of a range of 
different components.  I was interested to learn which of these the 
experienced practitioners considered to have the most impact: 
JW ...there are various elements of a project – the 
policy advice, the buildings you’ve commented on, the 
equipment, staff training, curriculum work, study visits again 
you’ve mentioned.  Would you single any of those out as 
having a particularly good impact? 
TL UK  Maybe it’s my background, my own personal 
background.  Training done well, followed then by study visits 
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done well.  But training done badly, study visits done badly 
take you backwards.  Then the curriculum, the paperwork – 
because in the end paperwork is literally that.  Someone has 
to interpret it ...  If people haven’t been trained – haven’t got 
the will to implement it – then it won’t happen.... 
There was a difference of opinion amongst interviewees about the impact 
of the policy advice offered as part of projects.  From the point of view of 
the Hungarian consultant this was a very effective way of promoting reform 
at minimal cost: 
CON Hu ...if the project is very small, in this case, it’s 
better ... the most useful thing is the technical assistance, like 
policy advice or writing strategies – helping the beneficiary 
how to write programmes or strategies. 
The Serbian local expert, who was personally committed to reform within 
VET, stressed the role of projects acting as a lobbying instrument for policy 
change, including writing policy documents for adoption by the government: 
LEX Se  CARDS had a big group of experts...at that time it 
was good because this group of experts prepared all the 
strategy documents.  Any other EU project didn’t develop this 
number of strategic documents which were submitted [to] the 
government, to the Ministry. 
JW So this was the “Green Paper”, the “White 
Paper”? 
LEX Se Yes, because from this strategic documents 
developed other national documents.  And it was very good.  
The second CARDS started very good, and covered exactly 
the whole reform of VET....  All in the same package.  In a 
box, how you say…And it was good that CARDS had this 
mechanism including experts and team leaders pushing.  And 
being very open and pushed the Ministry and CARDS had 
this energy [for] change. 
However one ETF interlocutor admitted that, to begin with at least, policy 
development as part of projects had been rather unsophisticated: 
ETF Nl ..the projects could not anymore stand alone. 
They needed strategies and policies.  Those policies, the first 
ones, that were developed, they weren’t very good.  They 
were sort of cut and paste. So then it took some time before 
they were ... discussed with all stakeholders and the 
Ministries.  So the first ones they were just two or three 
people who were given the time.  Because they needed to 
produce those, and they didn’t have the time and they didn’t 
know how to organize the process. So that was a bit 
dangerous. 
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and another ETF interviewee pointed to the possibility of project 
consultants producing ready-made policies with little support within the 
beneficiary country: 
ETF Dk There is much, much more emphasis now on 
policy.   So now whatever is done is always trying to be 
combined with policy development.  Probably also at times to 
an excess. ... [it’s] sometimes a condition in order to get the 
pilot projects or support for individual schools or teaching 
training or curriculum development, or standards developed. 
My own feeling is at times there has been too much 
emphasis on policy and also at times in not very stable 
situations.  Also there were expectations that you, as a 
consultant, would write a policy for a country.  And 
sometimes they were interested and involved;  in other times 
they directly would have expected the consultant to deliver a 
report ... but then we have moved more towards policy 
learning, trying to make sure that the country itself was fully 
involved in the drafting, but at the end of the day if the 
consultant has in his terms of reference that he must [write a 
policy]… if it doesn’t work in a collaborative way, eventually 
they will do it themselves. 
A further typical component of projects were the ‘study tours’, where groups 
of staff from a beneficiary country’s schools went to other EU countries to 
see conditions and practice at first hand.  Many of the interviewees though 
these were particularly valuable, for example the consultant from Bulgaria: 
CON Bg Also I think that all the study visits during the 
projects and all the exchange between people from different 
countries were very useful, nevertheless what the final result 
of the project is.  Because they also work on the level of 
capacity building.  People can see more ideas, they can see 
more things, and they can better decide what they want, what 
they don’t want, what they like, what they don’t like.  
Even our hard-bitten Team Leader acknowledged the power of first-hand 
experience to change perceptions about what is possible: 
...well-organized study visits can be very useful because in 
the end it’s irresistible to wander round an Austrian school 
and see that the kids are in class on time, not smashing the 
place up, and that employers are on their knees in front of 16-
year olds begging them to consider working for them when 
they finish.  Once you get to that stage, then people give in...  
The Danish interviewee at the ETF had worked in the Baltic States earlier 
and pointed to the possibility of serendipitous results from projects well 
after the event.  In Lithuania an ostensibly unsuccessful project had 
nevertheless brought key people together in a common experience: 
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ETF Dk [The head of the VET department in Lithuania] 
said several times to me that there is a lot of critical 
evaluation reports of the first project … which was not 
particularly positive.  However had they not had that project 
they would never had had a group of people with whom they 
could actually discuss the modern system that they wanted to 
implement ...if they only had people who basically knew the 
Soviet system, how could they even imagine anything else, 
so for him in the reality the first programme – even if he 
ended up having 8 schools at the wrong levels, so secondary 
VET schools were changed to post-secondary VET and 
university because they didn’t understand the names in 
Lithuania – ...the fact that they really got a group of people 
who could be used by themselves as a resource, [with views 
on] where should they go. 
JW And they kept this as a network? 
ETF Dk They used for quite a long time as a network and 
also many of these people have developed in the system, 
and came into positions… There was a base for them to work 
with.  Heavily criticized as a pilot project approach, but 
actually acted with themselves as a useful staff development 
tool. 
However, as our local expert from Serbia explained, getting grass-root 
champions was not sufficient for success if there were difficulties at the 
policy level.  Pilots could remain just that: 
LEX Se ... it was visible at the last conference, last week 
that our Directors [Principals] in some pilot schools they have 
now a good set of skills, they have good energy and they are 
strategic thinkers about their schools.  This is mobilization. 
JW So they are champions now – they can be a 
model to others… 
LEX Se Yes, this is something that is a direct effect... 
people in the schools were [understanding] what are 
competences, what is meaning the modular approach, how is 
going piloting, what are results.  ...A less good effect is that 
piloting is very long and schools didn’t have the power to 
push the Ministry ...  This is something which schools didn’t 
recognize themselves as pushing agents, push the Ministry 
more, be more… 
JW So they’re sort of locked in the pilots. 
LEX Se Yes, locked in the piloting...This is not good and 
this is a bad effect in the long-term of piloting.  
As seen from the point of view of advocates of reform within a country, 
projects could act helpfully as a mark of commitment from the EU for 
policies which some might otherwise write off as mere rhetoric: 
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CON Bg I should say that these technical assistance 
projects, actually are very important for the countries, from 
my point of view.  Because countries can see that the 
European Union actually has some instruments for 
implementing the policies.   
But the experienced Team Leader pointed out that some projects which did 
not catch the mood within the country could sink without trace in terms of 
impact because of an excessively mechanical approach: 
TL UK I think the worst kind of projects are those that 
take the ToR literally and verbatim.  You know, a tick against 
this: 300 hours... there are projects which are so bad that 
you’ll have never heard of them, because they have no 
impact whatsoever...And you have projects which come and 
go for which I’ve not seen one piece of paper, not one report 
in this Ministry.  Huge, hundreds of thousands of Euro 
projects, which actually achieve nothing. 
Our Hungarian consultant reflected that, in his country, there had been 
much waste because the basic design of many projects did not lend itself to 
sustainability: 
CON Hu Actually in Hungary ... the problem was always 
related to the impact.  You know when you make the reforms, 
when you start the reforms, there is a going down phase, and 
then when the project ends and the monitoring comes, then 
the development starts.  But that’s usually two or three years, 
and the projects are one and a half, or even one year 
projects.  In those cases, if you speak with most of the 
Hungarian beneficiaries they will say that the money was 
thrown into the Danube, in the meaning that, thrown out of 
the window.  It was wasted because they could not have the 
effect they really wanted.    
JW Because they wanted longer? 
CON Hu They were very short – the period was very short.  
So 80 per cent of their time was spent on administration and 
not on the implementation of the project. 
 
Tailoring to a country’s needs 
I was especially interested to find out the extent to which interventions were 
based on a diagnosis of a country’s individual needs, and how this was 
achieved.  As the Romanian policymaker explained, it was not the case that 
countries necessarily had a cogent account of their needs to begin with, but 
rather felt they needed to look abroad for the direction in which they might 
travel: 
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JW ... the diagnosis of what you needed to do was 
that made by the [donors] or did you already by that time 
have firm ideas? 
POL Ro No firm ideas because just the guided process by 
the different foreign interlocutors and when the process 
started in ’92 it was for example decided that a group of 
decision makers in the Ministry of Education and Ministry of 
Labour to go for visits in member states for finding out what is 
going on in the respective sectors ... And this was the basis 
for the Romanian government to get the first financial 
assistance from the Commission for a Phare project 
addressing VET, and a World Bank project addressing 
continuous vocational education and training... The weakness 
of this process, from my point of view, is the ownership of the 
process is such because the moment that the feasibility 
studies have been discussed with the key players in the 
country, I’m not very sure that Romania was already in a 
position  to have a vision about the position of VET. So it was 
it was, let’s say, driven from outside rather than from inside, 
so we were not in the position of having a shared vision and 
with the vision in our hands to start the negotiation.  We were 
very much inspired from abroad. 
Evidently feeling that they could not rely on countries specifying their own 
requirements, the Commission took a hand quite early in deciding what was 
needed: 
ETF Dk Many countries, and partly still, have chosen 
equipment if they have been able to get away with it.  What 
happened in the early days of course was that the EU sent 
out a consultant to prepare a programme.  ....  At times more 
in co-operation and with actual agreement of the country itself 
about what the priorities should be, but very much driven by 
the Commission and the consultants they introduced, or the 
ETF later.  
JW Just say, do you think that the countries resented 
that control, or were they quite pleased to have some… 
ETF Dk A mixture, a mixture.  They came to realize that it 
probably made sense, some of things that were suggested, 
and it was not only about buying equipment. ….It’s a strange 
situation because it’s not that the countries were saying “Let 
us prepare the [terms of reference]” 
And later on, as an agenda for accession began to build up, particularly in 
the area of employment policies,  the projects became more explicitly 
driven by EU: 
ETF Nl Phare around 97-98 became accession driven.  
Before ...we discovered the idea of accession, it was very 
much trying to deal with the problems that were in the 
country. Although people didn’t know about how to deal with 
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them.  Transition itself has been a situation that has been 
difficult to deal with... 
JW How did the approach change?   
ETF Nl Beforehand it was whatever the countries 
wanted.  So now actually it has become much more difficult 
for us.  Because vocational education [was a weak] area of 
the acquis.  So we had somehow to square it with the 
employment strategy, which is important because the 
employment strategy has a very clear framework for all the 
countries.  They will get the money if they fit within that 
framework…you had to link with it. 
The process of developing terms of reference, led by external consultants 
and agencies, could be a rather a ‘hit or miss’ approach: 
JW  ...do you find those terms of reference accurately 
reflect the needs of the country or the situation ... are they 
intelligently drawn up? 
CON Hu I should say it depends who wrote it and when, 
and when the project started.  Concerning Phare and CARDS 
projects ... the terms of reference for these...was written 
always by foreign experts, not by the beneficiary country... 
Because it was written by a foreign expert and depending 
whom this expert met in the country when they prepared their 
terms of reference, for which usually one or two weeks was 
allocated only, depending on that you may say that it was 
correct or not. 
CON UK described the basic process in drawing up the terms of reference, 
moving from policy intentions and agreed strategies to particular projects 
designed to achieve particular goals relevant to those strategies: 
JW So you were writing the high level programme 
which, if I understand it right is broadly speaking the priorities 
in that sector? 
CON UK Yes, at that time, because there was only a 
limited amount of money, I actually wrote the detailed terms 
of reference as well...  
JW They’re conceived as separate phases are they? 
CON UK They are normally.  One follows from the other.  
So you’d say, for example, you’d say things like, oh, “We 
really need to concentrate on SME competitiveness”, and 
then you would normally, you would normally liaise – at 
country level – normally with the minister or a senior adviser 
to the prime minister.  You’d normally liaise and say “Well 
really what do you think you need?”  But at the end of day the 
European Union has got to make that final decision because 
it’s their money.  Nowadays it’s rather more sophisticated, 
because you have a series of documents...  and based on the 
agreement, the international agreement, signed between the 
206 
EU and the country, you will then be able to determine what 
the key priorities are. 
However, as the UK consultant explained, a ‘standard approach’ could 
easily develop and be transferred from one country to another: 
CON UK Well, one of the interesting things in respect of 
the response is you sometimes will get – shall we say in 
Albania – a project that has loads of references, all the way 
through, to Kosovo.  ...There is a temptation in some of the 
weaker, let’s say weaker [EU] Delegations, or younger 
Delegations, to do that.  I mean for example in Kosovo...all 
the people there joined this delegation, and they all brought 
with them their terms of reference – it was the natural thing to 
do.  So what tends to happen, if they get an identified 
problem, they don’t spend too much time on researching or 
refining the local situation. 
JW So everyone’s copying from another Delegation?  
The consultants are copying the things they did last time, or 
somewhere else ... There’s a sort of accepted wisdom, is 
there? 
CON UK Yes, well, in respect of SMEs there are 
internationally agreed policies and guidelines and what have 
you.  And it’s quite clear that there’s not much deviation from 
those.  
But perhaps fine tuning to needs was not the real point. From the Team 
Leader’s point of view a project marked real, rather than merely rhetorical, 
engagement by the EU: 
TL UK Our current terms of reference you can identify at 
least four different styles of writing in there....Once the TOR’s 
developed it’s not so important what’s in it – the fact is that 
there is a project and VET, in this case, is being supported ...I 
don’t think they are necessarily appropriate to the problems 
facing VET.  I mean obviously that’s the focus of them, but 
there’s also this issue that what is important is to have some 
engagement, form of engagement by the EU with VET; how 
appropriate it is is another thing. But the question is, when we 
talk about appropriacy if you look at the amount of money 
that’s spent on equipment – and I don’t think there’s anyone 
who has any doubt that this often a waste of money to a large 
extent, and yet this goes on time and time again.  
On the topic of money for new buildings and equipment, which as we 
learned earlier from one of the ETF interviewees was often the first item 
wanted by countries, there evidently is some feeling that such concrete 
items were necessary to ‘sugar the pill’ of less palatable attempts to bring 
about changes in curriculum and policy: 
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JW I suppose there’s a sense in which equipment, I 
mean looked at not cynically, but it is an outward and visible 
manifestation of a sort...? 
TL UK  It photographs well, and you never ever get a 
Head of Delegation or a Minister being photographed next to 
a curriculum document, but ... you will get them smiling at 
equipment.  ...So it does serve a purpose; people think that, 
you know, they’re getting something and certainly, you know, 
I’ve been around the country a lot, and countries a lot, and 
there is no doubt that a local television station, a local radio 
station, local newspaper, local mayor, will all be extremely 
interested in €12,000 worth of equipment. 
However our Hungarian consultant was not so cynical, pointing out the poor 
condition of vocational schools and the importance of basic refurbishment: 
CON Hu ... it can be a very important part also the 
infrastructure – investment into infrastructure.  Because 
specifically the Balkan countries, the eastern Balkan 
countries, in education they have really, really terrible 
infrastructure... 
 
Other interventions 
As we have seen in earlier chapters, projects were only one type of 
intervention by the EU, though perhaps the most obvious on the ground.  
Other interventions included the pressure in the accession negotiations, 
participation – first in European Employment Strategy and later in the 
Lisbon and Copenhagen processes – in the ‘open method of coordination’, 
and also more general participation in EU networks. 
It was clear to all the interviewees that there was very little specific in the 
acquis concerning VET.  However evidently the distinction between 
‘voluntary’ participation in the various ‘open method’ instruments and the 
strict requirements for accession was not understood by all in the eastern 
countries: 
ETF Fr ...since those countries are far from the 
development of the [older] EU countries about policy 
development, there is a tendency to take the message as a 
prescription.  More than something voluntary, and probably… 
it’s because the EU officers when dealing with the 
preparation for the acquis communautaire they are very 
systematic, not soft, they play a role in this prescriptive role.  
So, “if you want to accede, you have to …have a national 
qualifications framework”  In the [existing] member states it’s 
just a recommendation for countries. 
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However the discipline of the ‘open method’s’ requirement to produce 
evidence for the enactment of policy and of its results, was welcomed by 
the Romanian policymaker as healthy in itself: 
POL Ro  ...we had more or less been guided during the 
Ceaușescu regime ... on political will, or I should say 
sometimes on a discretionary basis, rather than based on the 
evidence that there is a need to address education.  So all 
these exercises for inclusion memorandum, for employment 
policy were very good for developing in the country an 
evidenced-based culture.  And in this respect the policy 
reporting, it is in my opinion the crucial and the best result of 
everything.  
Moreover politicians in the candidate countries, with their publics aspiring 
for EU entry and a newly invigorated press keen to hold leaders to account, 
probably experienced pressure more than those in the existing member 
states: 
POL Ro And you might say it is not binding, but you can 
read carefully all member states are caring about how they 
are presenting their situation.  It is going now to happen in 
Bruges, the next reporting, and again we can share reading 
the way that the member states are [presented] with a draft of 
the report based on their answers, you will understand they 
care.  They care. 
JW So this quite a strong pressure? 
POL Ro I think that it is more [than] the pride that is 
putting them in this position...Because media is playing a 
role.  .. it’s because the media is showing “look where you 
are”.  They are trying to define what education and training is 
doing 
Our Dutch officer in the ETF recalled some pretty forthright exchanges 
between EU agencies and country officials over the degree of real 
implementation of commitments made in policy statements, as opposed to 
‘going through the motions’ to fulfil the letter of them: 
ETF Nl ...we presented first results [of a report on 
employment policy] on a one-day meeting.  And after about 
fifteen minutes I had presented the main conclusions – they 
were about policy.  Because there were a lot of policy 
documents, but they didn’t say much.  That’s what I said 
there too.  That it was not clear what they wanted to achieve 
with the documents.  And there was also the social 
partnership ...  They were consulted, but they were not given 
any say, and even I quoted the Deputy Minister who told us in 
one of the interviews that the social partners would approve 
his work plan on Friday.  So it showed a bit how it was 
working, the social partnership.  There was no real dialogue, 
there was a formal dialogue.  And they had difficulties to 
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accept those [conclusions].  And there were a lot of other 
things, for instance very few active labour market measures 
which were aimed at training.  No consideration of 
efficiency…There were a lot of issues. 
JW But nevertheless you were now engaged… 
ETF Nl Exactly.   
Though the ‘open method’ was powerful, the fact that it only really started 
to impinge on education (as opposed to employment and active labour 
market measures) after the 2000 Lisbon Strategy meant that connections 
were not immediately made with the accession process which was by then 
well underway: 
ETF Fr I remember it has been a big conference 
in…Bayonne about lifelong learning.  When the Commission 
was launching its lifelong learning policy after Lisbon 2000.  
And a big consultation by the Commission and the French 
government about lifelong learning.  They had not invited the 
candidate countries.  So I told the Commission “Why didn’t 
you ask them?”  “Because we made a mistake; we should 
have invited them, but we forgot.”   …and if you look at the 
Council conclusions in this period, ’99-2001 you see inside of 
Europe a big development of education, and when you look 
at the chapter on enlargement, it makes no reference at all to 
these developments. 
When the right connections were made, though, the new international 
context allowed some countries to indulge in very welcome bouts of policy 
learning and borrowing.  Serbia, which had suffered international sanctions 
for much of the 1990s, was a good example: 
LEX Se Serbia was closed for eight years.  But now it is 
open there is the possibility to share what happened in this 
eight years – what is new, what isn't new, and how to get into 
step with Europe, and other countries.  And many things 
happened in 2001-2 organized by the Ministry, many visits, 
many people travelled to Europe in different countries 
learning about experience, especially in the VET area.  
Romania, too, had suffered from isolation in the later part of its communist 
times, and approached the prospect of forming international connections 
with some relish: 
POL Ro Because in many, many cases the fact that 
during Ceaușescu regime we were not allowed to have 
access to information it was a revenge attitude – looking for 
information, looking for information... 
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This meant that they were especially interested in participating in the 
collective EU networks, most prominently through the Copenhagen 
process: 
JW  I'm thinking of the Lisbon process on lifelong 
learning and in particular the Copenhagen process about the 
instruments for qualifications and so on.  How seriously did 
you take these European initiatives? 
POL Ro  Very seriously I have to say and I will tell you 
why. Because the looking for solutions to our problems in 
Romania I was very much considering if 27 countries were 
ready to find a sort of a compromise between their different 
approaches I thought that at least for Romania it should be a 
reference point to set our discussions... Romania was the 
very first country to pilot the framework for quality assurance 
because we thought instead of re-inventing the wheel, let’s 
take a solution that has been negotiated for years by the 
different member states... and see if it is feasible to be used 
in Romania.  And by the end we adjusted it to our, let’s say, 
specificity. 
However the Team Leader expressed scepticism about whether learning 
from abroad, at the policy level as distinct from the level of practitioners, 
could really be effective: 
JW At the policy level ... people were always going 
off to conferences, ETF or CEDEFOP, and meeting people 
from around Europe and coming back with ideas.  I mean is 
that, sort of, being accepted more or less physically into the 
club, is that effective do you think, or is it just a gravy train? 
TL UK  I don’t know.  I suspect ... you know it’s a gravy 
train, I think.  When it comes to organization of work in a 
vocational school classroom, this is something which can be 
applied elsewhere.  Policy – there are so many reasons why 
you cannot just take – I'm sure people will have their heads 
full of “Cannot be done, and that cannot be done”.  ... what’s 
very difficult to deal with is “It’s alright for your country giving 
support for this, but we’ve just recovered from Ceaușescu  or 
whatever, or Milosević or whoever”.  So I don’t know, and this 
‘member of a club’ business, I don’t know how effective that 
will be... I mean it’s not a meeting of equals, not even 
remotely equals, whereas at least if I'm a teacher of technical 
drawing in Germany and Bosnia, at least lines are lines... but 
policy level stuff, showing people around... No. 
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Foreign expertise 
I was interested to learn about the attitudes to foreigners arriving as 
‘experts’.  Was this welcome, or was there a wariness about 
carpetbaggers?  As we have seen there was certainly an interest in what 
happened in other countries, and from our Bulgarian consultant’s point of 
view this extended to seeking advice from what were seen as the more 
experienced European countries: 
JW In these projects ... typically there are foreign 
experts and you’ve already said that people are interested in 
ideas from abroad.  Was there ever any resentment that here 
were these foreigners telling us how to run our country? 
CON Bg There always is, yes. This is psychological. It’s 
psychological issue.  You always have, “OK, we have been 
doing this for so many years and we know what happens in 
our country.  And why should somebody from outside come 
to here.”  So from psychological point of view, this always 
exists.  But actually I think that people in Bulgaria were 
interested to see what the European experts will say.  And ...I 
think that the trust in the experts who come from the EU 15 
countries, the original European countries, the trust was 
higher than the trust in the experts that were coming from 
eastern countries.  And this is also psychological thing.  
When – as in Romania – there was not a firm view about what was the right 
path, then it was very helpful to be able to make comparisons with, and 
between, the new set of European countries in which they found 
themselves: 
JW ...was there any opposition, did people say we’re 
just pursuing the policies of the European Commission, we’re 
the puppets … Because in my country we would have 
some… 
POL Ro No, no, no, no.  because you have to distinguish 
very clearly between the old and the new.  Because we were 
very much looking to the European Commission and not 
pretending that everything that is coming from there is very 
good for us, but at least the degree of acceptance was higher 
than the one usually [seen in] member states where you 
already have a policy that is giving results. So in our case 
because we were ...having nothing in our hand but looking for 
developing ... people would say that there are other, let’s say, 
approaches on the planet, let’s question to which extent the 
others are also valid to us, but not being reluctant to take 
them, but by having a sort of, I should say, comparative 
analysis.  
However attitudes towards the question of learning from foreigners did vary 
between countries in the experience of the Team Leader: 
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TL UK ...here, it came up even this morning, a 
conversation with people I’ve worked with for four years, you 
know, the issue that I'm a foreigner and we’re a foreign 
project was raised.  That we were imposing foreign ideas, 
and I just held my hand in my head (sic)... In Romania... 
basically you put an EU flag on it and people would salute it 
and .. OK, we all know it’s a game, but it worked, it got them 
into the EU. ... Here it’s exactly, well not exactly, but it’s 
almost exactly the opposite with some people.  That the fact 
that it’s done [abroad] is a bad thing because what’s done 
here is how things should be done, and there’s no reason to 
change it. 
When it came down to the effectiveness of individual consultants, most 
interviewees stressed that it was their individual qualities and preparedness 
to understand the domestic situation that was important, rather than their 
nationality: 
LEX Se  Some experts were excellent.  Really excellent 
because they understood the situation and they understood 
in what country they are, what is the previous experience, 
what we had and what is now.  And the whole situation 
regarding politics and economy – everything.  But some 
experts they didn’t know in what country they are and some 
experts they didn’t prepare [themselves] for Serbia and they 
tried to give something what is a typical framework or model, 
never mind that it’s not real in Serbia.  
One ETF official, who had dealt with many different projects, made an 
interesting distinction between those consultants who viewed working on 
projects as their long-term career, and those who took part as a break from 
their domestic career: 
ETF Nl You have two types of consultants, I think, 
possibly … The first one these are the … [professional] 
consultants.  Actually they are not any more in contact with 
their own system.  They operate anywhere.  And they are 
very good at marketing themselves. 
JW Project people? 
ETF Nl Project people.  Hopping from one country to 
another.  There are quite a lot of them around. ... And then 
there are some exceptional cases where you have people 
who are looking for a break of their routine.  One year out, 
etc. They of course are very much embedded in the context 
of where they come from.  I think it depends at what stage the 
countries are as to what type of consultant would be good for 
them.  In the beginning somebody who is more general.  Who 
knows a bit about everything, how to sort out things.  ... The 
problem is that they have commercial interests not to finish 
their job.  For if they finish their job they have to go out, so 
they have an interest not to finish, so they can get the next 
assignment. ...  The others ... think more in systems, because 
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they come from a system, and I think that’s important 
actually, because ...[it is] the connection with the system 
which is actually the most difficult part.  But without that we 
won't have any results. 
Our rather world-weary Hungarian observer had a whole lexicon of national 
types, graded in terms of their certainty that their own country had found 
the best solutions: 
CON Hu Some experts ... simply repeat their own 
experience which was a solution for some problems within a 
given country....  In my opinion this is a big mistake, and 
actually I can tell you that the most rigid, the most rigid from 
this point of view are the Germans and the French.  But some 
also, a lot of UK experts.. are simply not willing to understand 
the country’s specificity, but this is somehow, you know, the 
old Empire – the whole world is for us, and you are a 
foreigner even in your own ...  And those who I met, this type 
of rigidity I met with Greek experts.  But in their case I think it 
was just that they were rigid.  Not because of their own 
cultural background, but they...they are also from a 
totalitarian system in a way so ... But for example when I met 
people from Central Europe, Czechs or Slovaks or Polish – 
even Bulgarians – they were not this type, they will always try 
to understand what are the specifics of that given country... 
JW And from the way you talk, it sounds as if the 
French and the Germans and maybe the British too, have a 
firm idea of what is a good system. 
CON Hu Not all of the UK experts but some of them.  But 
the Germans almost always [laughs]. 
For the Team Leader, national background counted, but it was experience 
in the project role of consultant rather than specific technical expertise 
which mainly led to effectiveness: 
TL UK I don’t think that the national background, in a 
sense, has much to do with it at all.  It’s very useful being 
British rather than Bulgarian.  It’s very useful being Austrian 
rather than Macedonian.  ... Just in terms of initial credibility. 
JW So there’s some kind of pecking order..? 
TL UK  ...  Seriously though, there is.  I think that Britain 
is well thought of, and I think that this is not unreasonable.  
OK, it’s not total, and it’s not something which we should take 
for granted, and I don’t say that Brits outrank Germans or 
Austrians, they’re all well thought of.  So, in that sense, yes, 
being a particular nationality is important, but it’s [much more] 
about personal qualities. It’s down to experience now, 
because some of the most effective experts, and experts who 
can deploy most rapidly and make connections most quickly 
are those – not of particular nationalities – but those that 
have done this kind of thing before, and having experience of 
other countries rather than your home country actually helps 
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most – having been involved in this kind of change 
management or VET development or whatever in any other 
comparable situations... 
Nevertheless the country background of projects, and of influential 
consultants within them, could apparently be critical in terms of the 
subsequent trajectory of a beneficiary state, with a certain level of 
identification with the country which they had drawn on as a model: 
ETF Nl ... we speak about the Irish model for Estonia, the 
Scottish model for Slovenia, because the consultants came 
from Ireland or Scotland. 
Some countries engaged in a deliberate policy of ‘shopping around’ for 
attractive or workable VET models.  We have already seen something of 
this in Romania, but Serbia was also an example: 
JW Were there any countries which offered a model 
that people were particularly impressed by? 
LEX Se Denmark, especially Denmark, Slovenia and … 
Especially Denmark.  It was many people came and visited, 
and in Slovenia.  Of course Slovenia was very close because 
we had the same background, educational background, 
regarding pedagogy, didactic and everything [concerned with] 
the understanding of educational process. 
If countries shopped around, it was also the case that some ‘donor’ 
countries engaged in active marketing, as in Bulgaria: 
CON Bg People were really interested ... from Germany 
and in Austria, maybe because...these were more close.  And 
also maybe because there were organizations from Germany 
... like GoPA, who were already investing in education and 
training in Bulgaria.  So this was a kind of synergy between 
European fundings and fundings coming from German 
government.  This could be one of the reasons that people 
were really interested what happens there. 
JW So it wasn’t so much because you wanted to 
have the same system, but because in a way these countries 
were prepared to invest and were good at marketing. 
CON Bg Yes...For sure. 
 
The reform package 
We saw in the preceding chapter how a distinctive mode of intervention 
emerged in the early days of Phare and – with some additions and changes 
– seems to have survived well into the 2000s.  The interviewees had little 
difficulty in recognizing it when I referred to it.   
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I was keen to learn where this model came from.  Before he joined the ETF, 
the Danish official had been in the task force that preceded the creation of 
DG Enlargement where the Phare support packages were first devised.  
His explanation for the form of the package was simply down to the 
predilections of the individual staff members who designed the first 
interventions: 
JW But what strikes me is how similar the projects 
are.  You’ve mentioned just now the pilot school approach, 
broader curriculum, decentralization, social partnership – you 
know the list.  It seems that there is somewhere a model of 
what a VET system should look like.  Where did that come 
from? 
ETF Dk From ’93 to ’96 there were two individuals in the 
pre-DG Enlargement who prepared all the projects.  So they 
split the countries between them.  And that is the approach 
they had.  …It was really what individuals brought with them 
of experience.  These two individuals in education came from 
Ministries of Education. 
JW Could you tell me their countries? I don’t want to 
know the names… 
ETF Dk The Netherlands and Denmark.   
JW It’s like a little ball which grows, a critical path.  
That is fascinating. 
ETF Dk And then of course it has moved over to ETF, but 
also here the first projects or programmes that we then 
managed would still have been, at the least the basics, would 
have come from colleagues [in the Commission]. 
One might think that the Commission’s Directorate General which dealt with 
education (DG EAC) would have had a hand in determining the nature of 
the interventions, but the same interviewee was definite that they had not: 
JW …staying with your impressions of the 
Commission, these decisions came from DG Enlargement.  I 
guess they didn’t know much about education, and certainly 
not about VET.  Was your impression that the DGs 
concerned with education in particular had any influence 
about the nature of … 
ETF Dk No. 
JW You say that very definitely… 
ETF Dk They were not considered much of a partner.  In 
VET they were not considered a partner at that time. 
JW Do you know why not? 
ETF Dk They were trying to steal the budget through the 
Tempus [higher education] programme.  That’s partly a joke, 
but only partly... DG EAC has never really seen the Western 
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Balkans or the pre-accession region as a priority.  And their 
focus was higher education.  And for the rest they were not 
involved.  Personally, though I worked in ETF since 96, I think 
2008 is the first time I have actually gone to visit people in 
this DG, maybe 2007, the first time I went to see DG EAC… 
JW … your overall impression was they were not 
very active? 
ETF Dk  That was it;  they had a formal role as part of the 
inter-service consultation.  And that has, in reality, continued 
up until today.   
JW But not being involved is one thing – did you have 
the impression there was any conflict about this or just 
different priorities? 
ETF Dk I think DG EAC has different priorities, I think DG 
Enlargement has at times not understood why they took so 
little interest.  That’s more the informal [talk] … that you don’t 
get any input from them. 
If, for the Danish ETF officer, the model stemmed from the instincts of a 
couple of early members of DG Enlargement, for his Dutch counterpart in 
the ETF, it represented the prevailing international consensus of the time: 
JW Turning back to the VET projects…What strikes 
me is how similar, there’s pilot schools, a modular curriculum, 
competence assessment, now there’s a qualifications 
framework  [ETF Nl agrees throughout this list].  If you look at 
this mixture, it’s not the same as probably any old member 
state.  It’s like a new model VET system – where did this 
come from? 
ETF Nl This is a sort of common denominator.  Of 
reforms.  And what is happening elsewhere also… 
JW … If we call it a model system, these elements 
did they just come from the previous projects – did you inherit 
them? 
ETF Nl  The model approach [was in vogue] very much.  
Boosting the labour market in many countries, you can see it 
in the Netherlands, you can see it in Spain, in the UK too.  So 
that came.  And the ILO was promoting it also.  And these 
models of [employability] skills which they promoted as active 
labour market measures and employability issues.  It was 
really a [big] issue at the time.  It was also adult learning, the 
decade of adult learning…. They’re not only in our projects, 
you can find them with other agencies too, and other reforms.  
However, from the three experienced ETF interviewees, it transpired there 
was yet another explanation for the nature of the reform package.  The 
French interviewee considered that the origins of the consultants was 
critical, coupled with the practical difficulties of introducing the admired 
German ‘Dual System’: 
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ETF Fr ... it was my observation that it was [apparent] to 
see when I started to look at the programmes that... the 
Anglo-Saxon approach was dominant because of people, of 
experts working in this technical assistance. 
JW Do you think that was the reason? 
ETF Fr They came from the UK or from Ireland....  So I 
think we had at that time two big models trying really to be 
developed in the countries according to this technical 
assistance, and also by bilateral assistance.  The Anglo-
Saxon approach and also the German approach.  Because 
countries they were very [conscious of] the big success of 
Germany – the influence of Germany was very strong.  But 
they were not ready due to the low preparation of enterprises.  
Enterprises were just becoming private, so it was difficult for 
them [to develop apprenticeship]. 
JW And I think you need some kind of history….? 
ETF Fr Absolutely.  And some countries like Slovenia 
who decided immediately for ideological reasons to start with 
apprenticeship, after 5 years or maybe 10 years they 
understood that it didn’t work and that it was not so easy....  
So the Dual System was really a reference for many 
countries and [the Germans] were pushing very much – they 
were trying to influence the process.  And at the same time 
the other model which was also very prominent was the NVQ 
system developed in the UK and which was maybe supported 
very much by many consultants. 
And why did the French not feature more prominently?  After all they had a 
school-based vocational education system similar in many ways to those in 
eastern Europe: 
ETF Fr  And my big observation, and also maybe a 
frustration, is that in those countries who are much closer to 
the French system.  But the French they didn’t really [feature] 
… the Ministry of Education in France is organized in such a 
way that there are no consultants going round to tender, so I 
haven’t seen any French consultant in that period in the field 
of VET – never, never.  The consultants came from the UK, 
Ireland, Denmark, the Netherlands and Germany, and that’s 
it.  The French were very much involved in Phare 
programmes about ... telecommunications, transport but not 
at all in vocational education and training, where they could 
have brought very important things... 
Whatever its origins, the curriculum package faced difficulties of 
assimilation in new soil.  Though apparently simple and flexible, a modular 
curriculum did not mesh in logistically with the established practices in 
vocational schools in Bulgaria: 
CON Bg We had a technical assistance project in the late 
90s on trying to develop module-based curricula.  And what 
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happened is that during the project everything was quite OK, 
all these modules were developed, the content was 
developed, and they were piloted in the schools.  But later on 
they did not become a reality because actually the modular 
system – within the schools – is quite contradictory to the way 
that the school year in Bulgaria is organized.  And they were 
contradictory to our administration system.  They were 
contradictory to the way the curricula is designed concerning 
time schedules.  It was contradictory towards the assessment 
of the students; we don’t have this modular system of 
assessment, we needed to have a mark at the end of the first 
term, which you cannot have.  So what actually happened is 
... the modular system is not really used in the schools.  It 
moved to adult education, because it is much more relevant 
to the way the VET for adults is structured. 
In Romania there were different interpretations of outcome-based 
standards emanating from different sources and giving rise to considerable 
confusion, as the ETF officer who had been in charge of monitoring 
developments in that country explained: 
ETF Nl  You always find only occupational standards, 
that’s really what they are stuck with in many countries, and 
this is a real area of concern.  It started with the World Bank – 
promoting very much occupational standards.  ...  But what 
we saw in Romania, they started to develop big sets of 
occupational standards, so training could become more 
responsive to the labour market.  But those occupational 
standards were not really linked with the training, so that’s 
often the problem.  ... Now you have the standards – how are 
you going to use them?  And it still is a problem in many 
countries.  In Romania they are also not being used for IVET 
because the training standards that have been developed by 
the [Ministry of Education’s] VET Centre they are also 
occupational standards in a way.  They’re broader and 
they’re... 
JW They have some pedagogical feel to them… 
ETF Nl Yes, exactly.  And of course that’s the difference 
between labour market entrants and people who are already 
active as professionals. 
In Serbia the new curriculum package fed straight into the conflicts between 
reformers and traditionalists that we noted earlier, with little consideration 
on either side of the actual merits of a modular structure to the curriculum: 
JW ...my own experience in Serbia has been that you 
just have to say “modular” or you just have to say 
“competence”, and this is like a signal for a fight to begin.  Do 
you recognize this? 
LEX Se Yes.  Yes.  ... maybe understanding what 
modules [are] could be different.  But in this situation if you 
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say “module” there will be fighting.  Never mind if they 
understand or not.  Never mind if they accept it or do they 
need modules.  No, just fighting. ...We don’t have flexibility 
because we are thinking “module on this way it should be” – 
nothing else.  Or, “no modules, nothing”, no.  It is just two 
poles. 
 
Discussion 
It is of course dangerous to draw conclusions based on the views of a few 
people, interviewed for the most part in a foreign language, and with – no 
doubt – all kinds of personal agendas.  However, taken together with what 
we have learned previously, we can be reasonably confident of a number of 
points. 
First, it seems plain that the EU’s policy on VET in eastern Europe was not, 
initially, the result of extending the VET policy initiatives of the EU itself to 
the putative new members.  The small group of staff in DG Enlargement 
were primarily concerned with building up the Phare programme, and did 
so in ways which made sense to them rather than following an agenda set 
by the Commission’s education unit.  In the early days, therefore, there 
seems to have been something of a vacuum which the new recruits to DG 
Enlargement filled as best they could.  The consultants, too, made some of 
the running, reflecting to an extent their own country backgrounds, but also 
promoting what were then ‘modern’ ideas of what new styles of vocational 
education should be, stripped of any very distinctive national 
characteristics. 
In due course it was DG Employment that took up the reins, promoting the 
‘open method of coordination’ which seems to have been particularly 
effective in spurring action in at least some of the candidate countries.  
Only later, after Lisbon in 2000, and particularly after Copenhagen in 2002, 
did the policies from the Commission’s education side start to elide with the 
agenda for VET in the East.  In practice this meant that it only had a 
marginal effect on accession issues. 
Though at the outset there was a preparedness to design projects around 
the needs and wishes of a country, it soon transpired that many beneficiary 
countries were not in a position to specify what they needed with any 
precision.  Again, this resulted in something of a vacuum, leaving room for 
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individual consultants to suggest the way ahead.  A further syndrome of this 
lack of steering was that something of a ‘standard model’ for reform took 
root, being transposed from country to country without serious questioning.  
Although with the advent of the Employment Strategy the Commission 
began to set an agenda, the standard model persisted in some shape or 
form well into the 2000s.  But where countries were in a position to shape 
projects in order to contribute to well thought-out reforms, the Commission, 
and project members, were likely to welcome this and to respond to it.  
The consultants involved in the projects and the companies that deployed 
them became quite specialized.  ‘Project people’ from a limited range of 
established member states, but not practising at home any longer, moved 
between eastern countries.  There was scope, therefore, for a distinctive 
professional approach to a ‘preferred model’ for VET to take hold in the 
world of the projects. 
Policy development in, and on behalf of, eastern European countries was 
increasingly undertaken by projects, though often not materially engaged 
with policymakers in the countries concerned.  Some policies were drafted 
by consultants working virtually in isolation. 
The reaction of countries to project interventions was highly varied and may 
have been unpredictable to those initiating projects.  While some national 
policymakers actively welcomed projects and shaped them to what they 
saw as their needs, others stood back either because they did not have the 
capacity to take initiatives or because they were uncertain of the direction 
they should take.  Moreover, as in the Serbian example, it was possible for 
projects to find themselves enmeshed in on-going or emerging disputes 
about policy within a country, with unpredictable consequences. 
Because the standard model was confined to pilot schools in the first 
instance and because extending beyond the pilots was either financially or 
politically problematic, this package did not take root in many countries.  
However domestic actors involved in pilots and projects (eg. local experts) 
went on to achieve influential positions in their countries’ VET systems, so 
the pilot approaches were able, to an extent, to endure. 
In principle the eastern countries were especially open to influence from the 
West at the time.  They were probably more attracted to seeing western 
practice for themselves, as opposed to having foreigners implement their 
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ideas in their own countries, which some in the countries concerned – 
though by no means all – viewed with reservations.  Some eastern 
countries actively shopped around for solutions, and most were keen 
participants in EU networks. 
However, as reported by the ETF officials and the Romanian policymaker, 
the difficulties in arriving at a coherent domestic programme about the way 
forward on VET, let alone achieving  anything approaching a national 
consensus, were evident.  It was easy for the EU authorities and project 
participants to underestimate the internal problems of co-ordination within 
countries. 
For all these reasons the interventions through development projects were 
pretty hit or miss.  The absence, at least at first, of a defined EU policy on 
VET, the somewhat serendipitous formation of the reform package, and the 
unpredictable receiving environment all meant that projects could by no 
means be assured of success, or even a warm reception.  However, 
exposure to ‘European’ influences and people with different backgrounds 
does seem to have been welcome and stimulating, though not always in 
the ways originally intended. 
 
EU Integration 
The evidence in this chapter would seem to lend some considerable weight 
to the constructivist camp.  Both consultants and practitioners have attested 
to the impact of interchange and study visits.  These concrete and personal 
interactions seemed to have been as, if not very often more, important than 
the expert ‘technical’ assistance offered through projects.  Rather 
surprisingly, few interviewees – whether representing ‘donors’ or 
‘beneficiaries’ – spoke of resentment about the importation of foreign ideas.  
Certainly, crass individuals could fail to make an impact, and there could be 
a reaction in defence of established national practices – though in the 
principal instance of this, in Serbia, one suspects that internal politics was 
more of a factor than external intervention. 
At the policy level, eastern policymakers seem to have participated in EU 
networks with enthusiasm – in the cases of Romania, and indeed of Serbia, 
we have heard of active search for ‘European’ models.  Interchange and 
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contact have undoubtedly been welcome, though just how far they have 
influenced domestic practice is not easy to discern. 
There is limited and mixed evidence to support inter-governmentalism.  
Consultants saw themselves, and were seen by others, as seeking to 
promote the approach to VET of their country of origin.  Thus there was talk 
of ‘Irish’, ‘German’ etc. models of VET.  But, with the exception of our 
Bulgarian interviewee, there was no suggestion that the natural tendency 
for a person to seek to transmit elements of the system of VET with which 
they are familiar had mutated into a government-to-government marketing 
effort.  It is true that there were examples of this in the VET arena – bi-
lateral projects were undertaken, for example by the German state-
sponsored GTZ which explicitly sought to promote the ‘Dual System’.  But 
none of the consultants interviewed seemed so see themselves as in any 
way representing their governments.  Even though some state-sponsored 
organizations acted as contractors for the EU (for example the Scottish 
Qualifications Authority, and the British Council), they did not necessarily 
exclusively employ their own nationals as consultants.  Indeed the British 
Team Leader interviewed was, at the time, working for a German 
contracting company. 
On the other hand this chapter gives something of an insight into the 
importance of gaining support from the government of the ‘beneficiary’ 
country.   While outright opposition in either the accession negotiations or in 
the course of development projects, was rare, and there were few attempts 
at explicit bargaining, there is clear evidence of recalcitrance, lack of 
support or evasiveness in some of these interviews, and to how such 
governmental attitudes could easily obstruct the outcomes desired by the 
EU.  Intergovernmentalists tend to assume that internal preferences in the 
countries participating in negotiations are set;  there is evidence here that 
they are fluid and may be influenced by the process of interaction with 
external forces. 
These interviews also allow an insight into the path-dependent and 
bureaucratic explanations favoured by the neo-functionalists.  The account 
given by the Danish ETF interviewee would seem to be a classic example 
of how some serendipitous events (in this case the presence of particular 
officials at a particular time, coupled with something of a policy vacuum) 
resulted in a  standard Phare approach to VET.  The import of terms of 
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reference in one project into those for another country illustrates ‘spill-over’ 
at its most basic level.  And the emergence of ‘project people’ increasingly 
detached from their countries of origin, but developing a standardized 
technocratic approach to capacity-building for VET, seems to accord with 
the neo-functionalist theory that institutions will naturally shape themselves 
to the tasks they need to perform. 
Conversely, there is little evidence from these interviews that economic 
rationales or factors played a large role on the ground.  It may be that this 
was assumed, or regarded as an issue for higher policy, but the emphasis 
from those interviewed seems to be that it was accepted – on all sides – 
that the modernization of VET on the lines proposed was either a good 
thing in itself, or because it was ‘European’ and promoted by EU 
institutions.*  While clearly there were interests which needed to be brought 
on side (or at least neutralized) in the beneficiary countries, the motivations 
of these stakeholders seem to have been interpreted fairly 
straightforwardly: there is no reference to wider global forces, or to the 
need to take account of any particular settlement between capital and 
labour.  Indeed, the evidence from the Dutch ETF official points to the EU 
institutions actively trying to stimulate participation in the form of social 
dialogue by employers and unions from a weak domestic base. 
                                                
* The Dutch ETF official does attribute the emergence of the ‘standard package’ to 
a contemporary consensus about VET in international organizations.  His two 
colleagues, though, consider that it arose as a result of other factors. 
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CHAPTER ELEVEN  
 
PATHOLOGY AND PROGNOSIS:  
Conclusions and Reflections on the Future 
 
Introduction 
In this final chapter I want do a number of things.  First, to answer the 
research questions initially posed (page 13), and then to evaluate, so far as 
is possible, what effects the EU’s intervention in VET has had in the 
countries concerned, including drawing on more recent evidence which falls 
outside the timeframe of the main body of this study. 
Second, I shall draw together what the story of the EU’s intervention in VET 
in eastern Europe has to say about the various theories of European 
integration, on which we have commented at various points throughout this 
study.   
Third, I shall reflect on the effectiveness of the methodological approach 
and methods used in this thesis and whether, with the benefit of hindsight, 
other approaches might have been more effective.  I shall also consider 
what future lines of research might prove fruitful in this field.   
Last, I shall consider the implications for future policy, reflecting on lessons 
that might be learned from this extended episode, as the EU continues to 
attempt to influence VET policies both amongst potential new members and 
more widely.* 
 
Research questions 
The nature of the EU’s intervention in VET 
Our first questions were to ascertain in what way the EU intended to 
influence VET in eastern Europe, and why it focussed on the particular 
issues selected for attention. 
                                                
* The European Training Foundation lists 30 non-EU countries, from Iceland to 
Tajikistan, where it is working on VET and employment-related issues (European 
Training Foundation, 2013). 
225 
The approach clearly evolved over time.  On the one hand it changed with 
the EU’s maturing assessment of what developments were desirable in the 
East.  On the other hand the EU’s stance also reflected shifts in its role in 
the VET policies in respect of its existing member states – what me might 
call the EU’s ‘internal’ VET policy.  Through the intertwining of these two 
separate strands – perceptions of the needs of the East and the evolution 
of EU VET policy itself – we can construct three phases, each concerned 
with rather different issues. 
In the earliest phase, roughly 1990-96, the first strand – changes in 
perceptions of what was appropriate in the East – seems to have been 
focussed on modernizing existing initial VET.  As we have seen (Chapter 
Ten, page 173), the early Phare projects were concerned with updating 
curricula and introducing new occupational profiles for what were thought to 
be the jobs of the future.  Funds for refurbishment of premises and 
equipment also featured.  During this period, internal EU VET policy was 
not well articulated, focussing on inter-country co-operation supplemented 
by modest financial support in the form of the Commission’s comparatively 
small education programmes.  Though talk was beginning about the need 
for European competitiveness and the role of VET in that, there was little 
direction from the Commission Directorates concerned with either 
employment or education.  In the East, therefore, the field was left open to 
co-ordination by DG Enlargement (whose principal interest was successful 
economic transition and accession), and – on the ground – to initiatives by 
teams of consultants from existing member states.   
The consultants, in turn, tended to favour either the widely admired German 
Dual System or a new curriculum model inspired by the outcomes-based 
NVQ movement in the UK and Ireland, which held attractions as heralding 
a ‘fresh start’.  Efforts to institute Dual System approaches to initial VET 
were limited by a lack of a wide tradition of apprenticeships in many of the 
countries and – especially – by the weak and rapidly shifting base of 
employers (Chapter Eight, page 152 and Chapter Ten, page 217).*  The 
outcomes-based approach, which evolved into a distinctive ‘curriculum 
                                                
* Even in what might be regarded as more promising territory, there were difficulties 
in replicating German apprenticeships “...the new Lander from the former East 
Germany face considerable problems in offering a VET provision which is 
anywhere near comparable to that which was taken for granted in the former West 
Germany.” (Evans, Behrens and Kaluza, 2000, p.142) 
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package’, also failed at the time to take deep root outside the pilots, but 
retained some currency amongst a number of domestic actors who had 
been involved in piloting. 
This early phase was therefore characterised by looseness of policy, 
experimentation, cross-fertilization from established member states and a 
belief in ‘bottom-up’ infusion of practice through the device of ‘pilot schools’. 
An intermediate phase ensued in the late 1990s.  At this point EU policy in 
the employment field, though not in education, took on a new force in the 
shape of the European Employment Strategy.  This approach, involving 
VET’s role in reducing unemployment together with an emphasis on 
planning and commitments to explicit targets at country level, was carried 
through to the eastern countries where DG Employment joined DG 
Enlargement as an active interlocutor.  The Commission education 
interests still did not play a significant part.  At the same time it was realized 
that the ‘bottom-up’ strategy was not greatly affecting national policymaking 
in the eastern countries and more direct efforts were instituted to elicit (and 
sometimes virtually to write) national policy and strategy documents leading 
in time to new legislative frameworks.   
As well as support from projects, pressure on the eastern administrations 
was mounted through increasingly frequent and critical public monitoring 
reports directly linked to accession.  In many ways these reflected the 
Employment Strategy’s ‘open method of co-ordination’ which was being 
applied internally to existing member states, but with higher stakes for the 
East where participation in it was seen as virtually a condition for 
accession. 
During this second phase the focus shifted from initial VET to adult training 
and re-training which would have a greater immediate effect on 
employment.  Preparation for the administration of the European Social 
Fund (ESF), which presumed a framework for national human resource 
planning on which future ESF projects would be based, was also a feature. 
The third phase, from around 2001 until accession, saw the emergence of a 
more definite internal EU stance on VET with respect to the existing 
member states.  First there was the extending of the employment strategy 
under the Lisbon agenda to include a role for education and training which 
went wider than active labour market measures and included initial VET 
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and lifelong learning.  Second, the Copenhagen process put flesh on the 
bones of co-operation in VET through the devising of, and securing 
countries’ participation in, a series of ‘common instruments’ such as the 
European Qualifications Framework.  Both of these new approaches were 
extended to eastern European countries pretty much from their inception. 
While continuing the pressure on policy formation and the generation of 
national development plans which emerged in the second phase, this third 
phase saw a rather more eclectic range of support projects which returned, 
as in the first phase, to focus on VET’s role as part of the education system, 
as well as its role in supporting employment.  Preparation for the 
Copenhagen instruments featured in the last rounds of the accession 
negotiations and in Phare projects, though the ‘curriculum package’ which 
had evolved in the first phase still featured a good deal.  Eastern countries 
were encouraged to advance reforms on a broad front, with more scope for 
national policymakers to determine what features should be attended to in 
what order – though not all responded to this invitation to steer reforms. 
 
The methods of influence 
Our next question was about process.  How did the EU pursue these aims?  
There were three basic approaches:   
• support for development through projects which continued 
throughout the period, though with a shifting focus;   
• the bilateral agreeing of aims with each country with regular 
monitoring and public reporting during the accession process, in 
much the same manner as the ‘open method of co-ordination’ used 
for existing member states;  
• rather less explicitly, the personal involvement of a range of eastern 
VET stakeholders,  including educational practitioners, national 
policymakers and relevant social partners, through a range of 
measures: the early and enlightened decision to open the EU’s 
transnational education programmes to the eastern countries (page 
114); the inclusion of study tours as part of many support projects 
(page 201); the formation of VET ‘observatories’ in each country 
which had the effect of drawing relevant academics into a broader 
network (page 173); and the participation of policymakers in working 
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groups formed to take forward the various instruments of the 
Copenhagen process (page 128), as well as in the activities of 
CEDEFOP and transnational thematic projects organized by the 
ETF. 
While we are dealing with process, it is worth reflecting on what the case of 
VET in the East has to say with regard to the observations of 
Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2005b) who outline three methods 
whereby the eastern countries were ‘Europeanized’.  These were through : 
(a) facilitating ‘lesson drawing’ – inspiring people inside the country to 
emulate established EU policies and practices; (b) through external 
incentives – rewards for desired behaviour and sanctions for failure to 
comply; and (c) through encouraging ‘social learning’ – whereby influential 
individuals take part in networks and identify personally with a reform 
agenda.  One can readily see that the three approaches which applied to 
VET (support projects, conditions for accession, and involvement in 
networks) map on to this template.  
Having examined the handling of a number of sectoral issues during the 
enlargement process (though not including either employment or 
education), Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier conclude that the second, 
‘rationalist’, method of explicit incentives  – the use of ‘acquis conditionality’ 
– was more significant in changing behaviour in the East than the other two 
‘social constructivist’ methods (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2005a).  
They consider that in the absence of conditionality “... the Europeanization 
of Central and Eastern Europe would have remained limited and patchy.” 
(ibid, p.220). 
Can we draw the same conclusion in the case of VET?  I believe we can.  
We have seen that the development projects had a distinctly ‘hit or miss’ 
character to them.  Although some were undoubtedly successful, many 
sank without trace.  This is not surprising given that – as our experts 
explained in Chapter Ten – a project needed to be undertaken not only at 
the right time, but on the right scale and with staff who had not only the 
technical ability but also the personal chemistry to establish credibility. 
None of these items was, or perhaps realistically could be, guaranteed by 
the design and selection processes for projects.  Even if these issues were 
successfully addressed, a further condition of success remained; active 
support from significant internal actors (typically within ministries or key 
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agencies) was needed, and moreover these supporters needed to be able 
to overcome internal opposition (from rival ministries or local vested 
interests).  It was very difficult for the EU authorities to gauge the internal 
situation down to this level of detail;  even good projects could fail to win 
vital local backing. 
While the pressures of conditionality – the requirement for action on 
specific fronts in the European Employment Strategy and the monitoring of 
them as part of the accession process itself – were inevitably rather broad 
brush, it appears that they certainly had effects.  It is true that the moves to 
expand adult training which took place across the region (Chapter Six, 
page 106) had started before either the Employment Strategy or the 
accession negotiations had begun.  However, it is hard to imagine that the 
increasing systematization of this new and disorganized sector – the 
application of qualifications to it, the accreditation of providers and the 
targeting of public funding to direct it towards particular groups – would 
have happened without the encouragement of the EU.  Similarly the 
recasting of VET legislation and the generation of national human resource 
development plans, which took place in many countries in the late 1990s 
and early 2000s, was plainly encourged by the EU and it seems unlikely 
that these would been undertaken without the external pressure which was 
applied in the accession process. 
The ‘social learning’ dimension should not be dismissed, but is harder to 
evaluate as it took so many different forms.  Undoubtedly participation in 
EU networks was popular with the individuals involved, if only for the 
opportunities it offered for the foreign travel that had been denied for so 
long.  And – as a number of our interviewees have testified – it opened 
eyes as to what might be possible at home.  We can probaly agree with 
Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, however, that “It required the credible 
prospect of EU membership and the credible linkage of membership with 
rule adoption to focus the CEECs on the EU [rather than other international 
practices]... and to overcome domestic inertia and resistance” (2005a, 
p.221).  In short, without the strong framework engendered by the 
pressures of accession social learning might have been unfocussed and 
ineffective. 
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Explaining the EU’s stance 
The fourth research question was how we can explain the approaches that 
the EU adopted on VET in the East.  It is difficult to track down any detailed 
EU statement of VET policy with respect to the eastern countries, and the 
fact that both the focus and the method shifted over time would argue 
against there having been any deliberate and consistent policy on this 
topic.  Rather it seems that policy on VET was something of a by-product of 
other forces, some internal to the EU and others external to it.   
External forces were certainly present in the shape of the stresses of 
economic transition, the influence of external consultants and – probably to 
a lesser extent – the preferences of political actors within the eastern 
countries themselves.  However more significant, it appears, were the 
forces within the EU which acted to form and influence its stance on VET in 
the East.  Policy on enlargement led the way, dictating the scale and nature 
of the projects in the early days.  The general enlargement process, setting 
conditions for accession and monitoring progress in conforming with them, 
also led naturally to the pressures on VET arising from the ‘regular reports’ 
and monitoring by the ETF that we examined in Chapter Eight.  Moreover, 
perhaps because it had no VET policy of its own, DG Enlargement seemed 
happy to permit and even absorb some of the approaches promoted by the 
various external consultants who were engaged on projects and who 
helped to design them. 
The internal EU forces which gave rise, first to the Employment Strategy, 
and then to Lisbon and Copenhagen, clearly influenced the stance on VET 
in the East as each emerged.  We can also cite, as a primarily internal 
feature, the preparations for participation in the ESF, which influenced both 
the ‘regular reports’ (page 151) and the design of Phare projects (page 
174) in the early 2000s. 
It is worth remarking on this finding.  It was not primarily the VET needs of 
the East, whether articulated by their national policymakers or diagnosed 
by the EU, which drove the EU’s support and influence, but rather the 
shifting agendas on VET within the EU itself.  These in turn, as we saw in 
Chapter Four, were a result of complex interplays of other EU-wide 
agendas with different stances on VET emerging at different times.  Thus 
Kingdon’s (1985) account of the policymaking process as being a 
somewhat inchoate affair with alternative policies jostling with each other 
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until appropriate windows for implementation open (see page 37), would 
seem to fit the case of VET policy towards the East.  We can also detect 
the influence both of ‘street-level’ actors (Lipsky, 1979) in the form of the 
external consultants, and of ‘epistemic communities’ (Adler and Haas, 
1992), in the shape of the ‘technicist’ groups (including participants from the 
East) which put together the Copenhagen instruments, and again in the 
emergence amongst the cadre of external consultants of something of a 
collective and distinctive agenda for reform. 
The primarily internal drivers of EU policy may help explain the rather 
curious lack of reference to there being a ‘deficit’ in eastern VET in 
comparison with the systems in the West.  While we have seen that some 
in the East presumed that western VET must be more attuned than their 
own systems to the market conditions they were having to adapt to, there is 
little evidence of this presumption on the part of the EU.  Most 
commentators (whether eastern or western) seemed to have begun with a 
presumption that vocational education was a comparative strength of 
communist systems, and it would seem that this confidence was first 
eroded in the East, largely due to the perception that VET was failing to 
cope with the economic pressures of transition.  Even when the EU began 
to adopt a more critical attitude towards eastern VET in the late 1990s, it 
seems to have been careful not to compare it unfavourably to western 
systems.  This may have been a result of tactful diplomacy, though the 
monitoring reports examined in Chapter Eight do not otherwise seem to pull 
their punches.  More likely, it results from the fact that the Commission was 
at the same time (through the Employment Strategy and the Lisbon 
Process) undertaking a critique of VET systems in western countries, and 
was disinclined to claim that these were well-adapted to modern conditions. 
The effects of EU interventions 
Our last research question concerned the effectiveness of EU influence in 
the East.  As envisaged at the outset (page 14), it is not possible to draw 
more than tentative conclusions.  There are two reasons for this.  First, it is 
probably still too soon to judge whether sustainable change has occurred in 
the East, less than ten years after the EU interventions connected with 
accession had run their course.  More significant, though, is the difficulty of 
establishing whether the undoubted changes that have taken place in the 
East can be attributed to the influence of the EU rather than, say, economic 
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transition or global trends in modernizing vocational education and training.  
What follows, therefore, is necessarily somewhat speculative. 
We can reasonably confidently ascribe certain changes to forces other than 
the EU.  The expansion of higher education in the East was clearly under 
way before any material support or pressure from the EU was manifested 
(page 97).  Similarly, as just discussed, a distinctive adult training sector 
started to emerge before the EU exerted any influence on VET.  It seems 
likely, too, that the up-dating of existing vocational profiles and the 
establishment of newly relevant ones in initial VET would have occurred 
without EU assistance.* 
However these early moves were inevitably piecemeal and somewhat 
chaotic. The unregulated private universities (page 98) and training 
providers (page 106) which quickly arrived on the scene were of variable 
quality and were not well articulated with the existing system.  We can 
probably put down some of the systematization that followed to 
encouragement and support from the EU.  In the case of the adult training 
sector (and rather similarly in the case of higher education, though out of 
the scope of this study), systems for accreditation of private and ‘third-
sector’ providers, often linked to the provision of publicly recognized 
qualifications, were established in the late 1990s and early 2000s.  This 
represented something of a middle-way – to be found in some other 
European countries – between a totally free market in adult training (which 
was what was tending to occur immediately after the fall of communism) 
and a public sector monopoly through the extension of initial VET schools 
to adult training, which tended to be the course favoured by many eastern 
education ministries. 
Similarly, the encouragement of systems for developing and recognizing 
qualifications in a ‘qualifications framework’ were prompted by the EU.  
Previously qualifications in the East had been a matter for ministries and 
schools, and methods of systematically including employers and trades 
unions in the process – again typical in many EU countries – were novel.  
Indeed the EU’s prescription for involving ‘social partners’ on a sectoral 
basis in developing, and sometimes endorsing, curricula seems to have 
                                                
*  In Serbia, for example, moves to modernize and reformulate vocational curricula 
started in 2001, before the first EU aid project for VET in 2002. 
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taken root in most of the eastern countries.  In some cases this is confined 
to their involvement in working parties which develop vocational profiles (cf. 
Latvia, Bulgaria), but increasingly it is on an institutional basis.  Romania 
has over 20 sector committees with legal powers to approve relevant 
profiles.  In the craft sector Hungary recognizes chambers as having 
jurisdiction over training in their trades.  Slovakia assigns profiles to 
relevant ‘Sectoral VET Councils’ for an overview.  Estonia’s ‘Professional 
Councils’ devise vocational standards for relevant profiles. Both Croatia 
and Serbia are establishing advisory councils on a sectoral basis.* 
Systematization can also be seen in the slew of ‘white papers’ and 
legislation concerning VET that emerged in the East at around the turn of 
the century.  These were certainly encouraged, if not actually prompted, by 
the EU (Chapter Eight, page 157).  Frequently these enshrined the ‘social 
partnership’ model of VET and the principle of equality of access by 
individuals as well as models of accreditation of providers and qualifications 
– all themes from the European Social Model, and promoted in the 
accession negotiations and support projects.  The central administrative 
machinery concerned with VET was also formalized.  Many countries 
established dedicated VET agencies, within or attached to ministries of 
education, sometimes combined with responsibilities for adult education as 
in Hungary, Serbia and Croatia, or devoted solely to initial VET as in 
Romania and Slovenia.  The establishment of these agencies was 
encouraged by the EU; in some cases their origins were in the ‘Programme 
Implementation Units’ set up to provide an interface with earlier Phare 
projects (Chapter Nine, page 178). 
The systemization of new VET structures, or at least the early adoption of 
such systematization, might therefore fairly be ascribed to EU interventions.  
It is no co-incidence, then, that these took roughly similar forms across 
many of the eastern countries. 
In terms of the actual content and forms of training, initial VET seems to 
have been less affected than adult training. Although a major development 
in the region was the expansion within initial VET of the ‘technical’ schools 
with access to higher education (Chapter Five, page 102), this form of 
                                                
* Information about current developments in this chapter is taken from the country 
reports on VET developments published by CEDEFOP (CEDEFOP, 2012). 
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school does not seem to have been especially promoted by the EU.  In fact 
the interventions that the EU did make in the field of initial VET seem to 
have had a limited effect.  Apprenticeship on the Dual System model, as we 
have seen, ran into difficulties as it encountered a weak employer base.  
Poland seems to be the only eastern country with a sizeable apprenticeship 
sector, accounting for something like 15 per cent of IVET students*.  
Smaller apprenticeship schemes are present in Latvia, Slovenia and 
Croatia, revived from pre-war arrangements and organized through craft 
chambers, and half of the (comparatively low number of) Hungarian basic 
vocational school students have individual contracts with employers for 
their work experience.  A number of countries (Estonia, Lithuania, 
Romania) have recently introduced regulations to recognize apprenticeship 
as an educational form, but take-up so far seems very limited. 
The other major EU intervention in initial VET was the ‘curriculum package’ 
(Chapter Nine, page 180), promoted by many of the external consultants 
engaged on projects.  As with apprenticeship, though for different reasons, 
this struggled to break out from the pilots.  However there is reason to 
believe that it is enjoying something of a ‘second wind’ in the form of a 
more generalized move to express curricula in terms of ‘learning 
outcomes’, spurred by the European Qualifications Framework (Méhaut 
and Winch, 2011) 
In adult qualifications and curricula the outcomes-based approach is 
practically universal in eastern Europe, and it seems increasingly common 
in initial VET too.  However this does not mean that the more traditional 
syllabus-based approach (involving the specification of teaching inputs) has 
disappeared.  In most countries, for initial VET, groups of practitioners 
(sometimes involving employers and unions) develop curricula based on 
previously stipulated learning outcomes.  In the case of Lithuania, where 
vocational curricula were devolved to schools early in the transition period, 
they are now expected to build these around new, national, ‘professional 
standards’.  Occupational standards (the formulation of competences 
needed at work in different occupations) are a particular form, being found 
in the Czech Republic, Latvia, Romania, and Slovenia, though not in all 
                                                
* Confusingly one of the main active labour market measures in Poland is also 
referred to as apprenticeship, though it is of shorter duration and is not recognized 
as an educational programme (OECD, 2009). 
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sectors.  In the same vein, modular curricula are present in a number of 
cases (Estonia, Hungary, Romania, Slovenia, and envisaged in new 
reforms in Latvia and Lithuania) though, again, modular approaches are 
more prevalent in adult training. 
Despite notable setbacks, the trajectory and durability of the outcomes-
based approach which has “...swept like an international wind of change 
through national qualification arrangements” (Oates, 2011, p.xii), raises 
interesting questions in connection with eastern Europe.  It is evidently not 
the case that the eastern countries were first introduced to this approach as 
a result of their participation in the pan-European Copenhagen Process, or 
in order to comply with the European Qualifications Framework.  On the 
contrary, they were already quite familiar with it (though often not entirely 
convinced) as a result of earlier Phare projects.  Before the eastern 
countries’ accession many had adopted policies “...at the front edge of the 
VET state-of-play in EU Member States” (Nielsen, 2004, p.45).  Indeed one 
of the early introductions of this approach into continental Europe was 
through the participation of British and Irish consultants in Phare projects in 
the East, and it may be that this was one way in which the approach gained 
currency amongst EU VET policymakers.  In a stock-take on the ‘learning 
outcomes’ approach across Europe, CEDEFOP (2009) noted that the UK’s 
‘NVQ approach’ was “the first of its type in Europe” (p.78), that it has been 
“widely adapted and used in central and eastern Europe” (pp.39-40), 
particularly in “donor-funded reform projects” (p.42), and that, at the time of 
writing: 
The evidence is that the identification and use of learning 
outcomes is beginning to occupy a prominent position, 
particularly where attempts are being made to modernise and 
reform education and training systems. (p.142) 
So the intriguing possibility is that, far from EU policy on outcomes-based 
organization of VET having influenced the East, the reverse has been the 
case.  It is possible that the emergence of an outcomes-based approach 
was transmitted to formal EU policy circles, in part at any rate, through the 
‘curriculum package’ articulated in development projects in the East.   
We have therefore some fairly immediate effects of EU interventions, 
largely to do with the systematization of adult training and the 
establishment of institutional structures, as well as some rather more 
diffuse effects in terms of spreading the ‘outcomes-based’ approach, which 
236 
may indeed go wider than its impact in the East.  But a basic question must 
be whether the intervention of the EU materially enhanced VET in the 
eastern countries. 
We saw in Chapter Five (page 101) that some countries (notably Poland, 
Latvia, Lithuania and Slovenia) saw a sharp drop in the proportion of upper 
secondary students pursuing vocational as opposed to general education 
tracks.  Was this process reversed in later years?  If so, we might 
tentatively ascribe such a reversal of an undoubted trend to the very 
considerable efforts of the EU to support vocational education.   
Figures for the ten eastern countries taken together seem to show a 
stabilization.  Following the drops in the 1990s, the period since accession 
(2004) has seen little change.  For the group of countries as a whole, the 
proportion pursuing vocational studies was 53.9 per cent in 2004, and in 
2011 was 52.2 per cent (Eurostat, 2013b).  However, there is a wide 
variation between countries; the Czech Republic and Slovakia had over 
two-thirds of upper secondary students following vocational tracks, whereas 
the three Baltic states had only around a third (the EU average was just 
over half). 
For adults, a further measure is the number of working age people engaged 
in education or training.  We noted in Chapter Five (page 105) that in many 
of the eastern countries this was comparatively low.  Has the situation 
improved since accession? 
Eurostat figures show that while in 2001 all of the eastern countries were at 
or below the EU average, by 2011 three of them (Slovenia, Estonia and the 
Czech Republic) had exceeded this benchmark.  However, the other 
countries remained well below the EU average, with Romania and Bulgaria 
having less than a fifth (18 per cent and 13 per cent respectively) of the 
average EU incidence of learning on this measure (Eurostat, 2013a). 
It would seem therefore that, at this macro level, the EU’s influence could 
have done nothing more than prevent the VET situation in the East from 
getting worse, rather than materially enhancing VET. It is also clear that the 
outcome has been very different across countries.  This would indicate a 
relatively weak effect of EU intervention on VET participation.  If the effects 
had been strong, we would surely have seen greater conformity between 
countries because, as we have noted, the EU’s prescription was similar in 
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all the countries.  Nevertheless it is possible that, in the case of initial VET, 
the EU helped to stop what might otherwise have been a severe slide as a 
result of the forces of transition in many countries, and, in the case of the 
propensity to learn later in life, it may be fair to claim that the effects of the 
EU’s efforts have not yet had time to work through into the behaviours of 
firms and individuals; most would acknowledge that lifelong learning 
involves fairly profound cultural shifts in attitudes to learning. 
It is undoubtedly too soon to say which of the regional models of lifelong 
learning presented by Green (2006) apply to eastern Europe, or whether 
indeed they could be said to constitute a distinctive regional model.  The 
tendencies towards centralization, comprehensive primary and secondary 
schools, and a fairly weak propensity for adult vocational learning shown by 
many of the countries would seem to put them in Green’s ‘southern 
European’ camp.  It seems unlikely that any will develop a strong enough 
apprenticeship system to put them in the same grouping as the German-
speaking countries.  Within VET – as we have seen – elements of the 
Anglo-Saxon orientation seem to have taken root, though it would be fair to 
remark that those roots are definitely shallow.  Certainly Estonia is showing 
signs of joining the Nordic grouping, and it would not be surprising if this 
also in time applied to Latvia and perhaps Lithuania.   
Given the variations in participation noted above, it may well be that we 
shall see a divergence in systems amongst the eastern countries with each 
finding it most natural to align to the existing regional groupings of their 
neighbourhood, though certain features of the common communist 
inheritance, and the common experience of accession, can be expected to 
be traceable for some time.  Green, Wolf and Leney (1999), writing about 
convergence and divergence in education systems of the established 
member states during the period we are interested in, comment that while 
pressures and policy objectives have been similar in different countries, 
nevertheless the details of reform pathways have been divergent.  In the 
case of the eastern European countries, we have in fact noted some 
similarities in the reform pathway while they were subject to close 
monitoring by, and aid from, the EU.  However, now that this period of 
intervention is at an end, there are signs that divergences are re-emerging. 
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EU integration theory 
In Chapter Two four different theories about the forces which determine the 
development of the European Union as an integrated political entity were 
presented:  neo-functionalism, inter-governmentalism, social constructivism 
and political economy.  We can now pull together the remarks that have 
been made in the various chapters about these theories of European 
integration.  We are, of course, only dealing with the case of VET in the 
East, and it is perfectly possible that different forces will manifest 
themselves in respect of different issues and fields. 
Two theories, those of liberal inter-governmentalism and political economy, 
seem to provide only weak explanations of what occurred. 
Inter-governmentalism holds that the course of European events is largely 
dictated by the decisions of the various national governments pursuing their 
own interests and interacting with each other to strike bargains.  In our 
story some episodes in the gestation of internal EU VET policy (Chapter 
Four) would seem to fit this description, notably: 
• the blocking by national governments of ‘excessive’ EU intervention 
in VET in the 1980s (page 64); 
• the four nation ‘break through’ in the field of higher education policy 
in the Sorbonne Declaration and Bologna which led to similar 
arrangements for VET under the Copenhagen process (page 67); 
• perhaps both the strong presentation and subsequent weak 
implementation of the Lisbon agenda (pages 67 to 70).   
Undoubtedly also it needed inter-governmental agreement to move from 
bilateral aid programmes for the East to ones co-ordinated and funded by 
the EU. 
However, while the attitudes of the several governments plainly played a 
part at a few key moments in the evolution of EU VET policy, the inter-play 
of governments would seem neither to be able to explain the detail of policy 
across the EU or much about the interventions in the East.  Indeed, as we 
have seen in Chapter Six (page 129), inter-governmentalism has problems 
in accounting for eastern enlargement at all, as so many of the established 
members stood to pay more into, or get less out of, EU budgets.  And the 
advantages to established members in terms of trade could have been 
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gained through the ‘association agreements’ which fell short of accession.  
Moreover, there is little evidence of the active bargaining by the eastern 
countries that inter-governmentalism would predict.  As we saw from the 
genesis of accession conditions in Chapter Six and the evidence of 
interviewees, many of these policies were instigated from outside.  The 
ETF experience (eg. page 194) was that it was often hard to get 
policymakers in eastern countries to engage actively in shaping VET 
activities promoted by the EU. 
At the ‘micro’ level, it does seem that various national models of VET were 
promoted, through aid projects, with certain governments being associated 
with some of the consultancy organizations which were active in Phare 
projects.  The fact that the French did not play a big role (Chapter Ten, 
page 217) may well help to account for the durability of the Anglo-
Saxon/Celtic ‘curriculum package’ which emerged in many projects.  
However, it is difficult to detect the deliberate activities of governments, as 
opposed to agencies and individuals with a commercial interest, in this 
spreading of national models.  Such government-inspired activities as did 
take place tended to be on a bilateral basis, rather than utilizing the EU 
programmes. 
At the macro level, there is also some appeal in the economic 
interpretation; that it is the forces of competitiveness and trade – rather 
than the interactions between nations – that have served to form and shape 
the European Union.  We have seen, in Chapter Four, that it was concerns 
about economic competitiveness that spurred a focus on VET and lifelong 
learning in the early 1990s, and which reinforced it under Lisbon.  
Undoubtedly too, there was advantage to be had for western businesses in 
having access to comparatively low-paid, but reasonably skilled labour in 
the East, and therefore in measures to modernize skills in these countries, 
as advocated by the European Round Table (page 130).  However, there is 
no evidence of involvement of these business interests in designing the 
intervention programmes or their participation in them.  So while economic 
factors undoubtedly set the context and underpinned much of the EU’s 
action – as, of course, they had done since the creation of the European 
Economic Community in 1957 – simply noting this fact does not of itself 
explain the nature of the interventions in VET. 
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There is an argument, surely, that the stance towards the East was much 
influenced by the economic settlement between the ‘varieties of capitalism’ 
maintained by Fioretos (page 23).  We have noted that the promotion of 
employment protection and social dialogue – both key elements of the 
‘social model’ – were significant features of the declared aims of accession 
negotiations (Chapter Six) and a constant point of pressure during the 
negotiations themselves (Chapter Eight).   However, I would argue that 
what we are seeing here is not a new ‘settlement’ between economic forces 
resulting from the incorporation of the new East into the EU as might be 
predicted by this theory, but rather simply the wholesale transportation of a 
previously accepted model regardless of the particular circumstances of the 
East, or any new accommodation which resulted from the accession of so 
many countries.  Attempts to transfer the model were a manifestation of 
something other than economics. 
There is, though, another sense in which economic forces served as an 
integrating force.  The very fact that the eastern countries were joining a 
Union which was founded on ideas of market-based trade meant that they 
needed to make profound departures from their previous economic 
systems.  Because VET arrangements are, by their nature, bound up in the 
labour market and the economy more widely, this meant that VET in the 
eastern countries was bound to change  and was likely to take on some of 
the characteristics of the established member states which were already 
subject to market disciplines.  An example of convergence due to economic 
pressures is the emergence of an adult training sector rather similar to 
those in many other EU countries, where nothing similar had existed in the 
East before.   
Arguably, though, this convergence would have taken place whether or not 
the eastern countries actually joined the Union – it was the transition to a 
market-based economy rather than accession which gave rise to these kind 
of pressures on VET.  Moreover, as with inter-governmentalism, the 
economic explanations only seem to have relevance at the macro level, 
and cannot easily be invoked to account for the focus on mechanisms such 
as qualification frameworks, or the ‘curriculum package’.   
What, then, of the school of commentators who see the EU as exemplifying 
the “global dominance of the neo-liberal policy paradigm” and who claim 
that its education policies are steered by a “late neo-liberal state of mind” 
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(Zarifis and Gravani, 2014, p.2).  One response to this belief is to point to 
the paucity of references to market mechanisms in VET that we noted in 
Chapter Eight, and to the emphasis made by the EU authorities on 
governance through social partnership as part of the European Social 
Model (page 167).  A pervasive neo-liberal ideology would surely have led 
to the opposite course – seeking to introduce elements of the ‘new public 
management’ into the public education services of the east, and seeking to 
diminish the role of trades unions and the amount of social protection. 
But the reductio absurdum in response to this school is surely this: if the 
characteristics of a VET system overly influenced by neo-liberal sentiment 
is one in which VET is used to respond to the short-term needs of 
industries in a trading bloc obsessed with gaining technological competitive 
advantage; if this instrumentalism is cloaked by an emancipatory and 
apparently humanistic rhetoric designed to mislead a populace who are 
encouraged – through the repetitions of an ideologically derived ‘discourse’ 
– to believe that there is no realistic alternative to the existing hegemonic 
system; if curricular tracks in secondary education reproduce unequal 
social divisions; and if the hallmarks of such a VET system are a stress on 
work discipline and competence in an ordinary working context rather than 
the expansive development of independent and creative talents such that 
“…the individual's aspirations [are] secondary to the perceived or projected 
needs of the labouring, producing community” (Sultana, 2007, p.217); then 
surely this is an uncanny description of the eastern VET system in the latter 
days of communism as described by observers such as Castles and 
Wüstenberg (1979) in Chapter Three.  One is forced, therefore, either to 
conclude that the communist system was an early example of the 
pervasiveness of neo-liberalism, or to concede that the ills described by this 
school (if indeed the ills are as they describe rather than rhetorical 
flourishes) can be caused by a wide range of social systems, ranging – it 
seems – from Soviet-era communism to the present day EU.  The first 
conclusion seems ridiculous and the second simply vacuous. 
The social-constructivist interpretation has evident force.  We saw in 
Chapter Four (page 83)  how technical collaboration within the EU had 
given rise to something of a community of VET experts operating across 
national boundaries.  Moreover, eastern practitioners and policymakers 
were undoubtedly and increasingly drawn into European VET networks as 
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a deliberate act of policy, and many have claimed (including those from the 
East interviewed in Chapter Ten) that this involvement was a powerful 
motivating force in their adopting ideas and practice from the established 
member states.  It was also the case that many in the eastern countries 
were open to, and indeed anxious for, influence from the West, 
representing the ‘back to Europe’ theme which held such great appeal 
(page 115).  Many eastern countries eagerly took part in the new and 
distinctively European ventures which were launched as part of the 
Copenhagen Process. 
However, the establishment of consensus and identification amongst 
policymakers and practitioners only takes us so far.  It cannot easily explain 
the directive, planned approach under the ‘open method of co-ordination’ 
which was designed to make policymakers and practitioners uncomfortable, 
through being held publicly to account for progress towards targets, rather 
than to foster collegiality.  And a constructivist interpretation would surely 
have predicted a positive reception for the Phare pilots and the ‘curriculum 
package’ which were designed to attract a critical mass amongst an 
informed domestic audience, but which in many cases failed to do so. 
While not denying that constructivist factors acted as an important means 
of giving a common, EU-based identity to an initially disparate group of VET 
actors, EU VET interventions evidently acted in advance of such bonding 
having taken place and were not dependent on it.  It may be more correct 
to see this process more as an effect of EU integration rather than as an 
explanatory factor for it.  
So, while economic factors formed an undoubtedly important backdrop to 
VET developments within the EU and for the eastern countries undergoing 
transition to free markets, and while inter-governmental bargains were 
needed to produce significant policy breakthroughs, neither of these factors 
would seem easily to be able to account for the more day-to-day evolution 
of EU VET policy affecting the East.  And while, at the individual level, the 
identification of important stakeholders in the East with the wider EU VET 
networks may have served to make certain reforms more durable than they 
might otherwise have been, such links seem to have been a tool of policy 
rather than an explanation of why it took the form that it did. 
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We are left, then, with the neo-functionalist interpretation which rests on an 
internal dynamic, holding that incremental change in the interests of, or 
consistent with the perceived missions of, the central EU institutions has an 
inexorable influence, and that actions in one sphere have a tendency to 
‘spill over’ to others. 
There is certainly a weakness in the neo-functionalist case.  It should surely 
predict that the Commission staff concerned with education and training 
would have made the running in elaborating VET policy, both in the 
established EU and in respect of the new countries of the East.  Yet, as we 
saw in Chapter Four, the first 35 years of the Union’s existence, up until 
around 1990, saw only modest and halting expansions of EU competence 
and activity with respect to VET.  Moreover, there would appear to have 
been a virtual absence of interest on the part of the Commission’s 
education staff in developments in the East, at least until the early 2000s, 
as reported by our Danish interviewee at the ETF (page 215).  While the 
first absence can be explained by the active hostility of many member 
states to an expanded education role (i.e. inter-governmentalism can play a 
blocking role which trumps the tendency for incremental change), the latter 
is less easy to account for. 
On the other hand, there is strong and continuous evidence for a neo-
functionalist interpretation.  The constant probing by the Commission in the 
1990s for an acceptable entrée for VET and lifelong learning policy (cf. 
Chapter Four,  page 83 ), which finally arose at Lisbon and Copenhagen, is 
evidence of incrementalist pressures at work, finding the line of least 
resistance to come through to the surface.  The Copenhagen instruments, 
such as the EQF and Europass, were hardly epoch-making for VET in 
Europe, but they did guarantee a continued role for the central institutions, 
and opportunities for them to consolidate their networks of national 
technical experts.  The commitment of the new DG Enlargement to their 
mission (Chapter Six, page 116) not only overcame a considerable number 
of obstacles and setbacks on the road to accession, but also helped to fill a 
vacuum on VET policy towards the East (page 225).  The decision to 
establish the European Training Foundation gave rise to a new institution 
which evolved its role from running projects to helping to design and 
monitor them and providing authoritative reports on countries’ progress.  
The use of external specialists to design and work within Phare 
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programmes represents an essentially technocratic approach, as does the 
support for the establishment of apolitical VET agencies within the eastern 
countries (Chapter Eight, page 158).  
We can, in particular, see a number of examples of the concept of 
‘spillover’ at work.  The opening afforded by Bologna in the field of higher 
education was carried over to VET in the Copenhagen process.  The ‘open 
method of co-ordination’ first embodied in the European Employment 
Strategy was extended both to the wider field of education and training 
under Lisbon and – as we saw in Chapters Six and Eight – to the accession 
negotiations with the eastern countries.  Within the Phare programme, 
particular approaches, such as the curriculum package, were replicated 
from one project to another (Chapter Nine page 178, and the evidence of 
the British consultant, page 206).  Perhaps, as noted above (page 235), 
there was even some ‘reverse spillover’ in transporting the outcome-based 
VET approaches promoted by the new breed of international VET 
consultants into mainstream EU thinking. 
So while neo-functionalist interpretations cannot account for the relatively 
few strategic decisions which gave rise to new directions in EU VET policy 
– which were the result of inter-governmental bargains and dynamics of 
relative power, sometimes in turn influenced by the changing economic 
climate – they do seem to provide a good explanation of the meso level 
evolution of policy, following an evolutionary path of least resistance 
accompanied by persistent pressure from within the EU institutions.  The 
picture, at least as far as VET in the East is concerned, would seem to be 
that the climate and constraints of decisions were very often the result of 
economic factors, and that occasional démarches and a continuing licence 
to act were the result of changing inter-governmental equilibriums.  
However, the precise course of policy appears to have been largely a result 
of internal institutional forces, heavily influenced by technocrats within the 
EU institutions in collaboration with their counterparts in member states and 
‘street level’ associates in technical consultancy.  This network evolves and 
reinforces itself, absorbing new members as new issues, and new member 
states, emerge. 
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Reflections on methodology and methods 
The main methodical approach used in this thesis has been that of a 
historical narrative, though taking the various strands separately rather than 
following a strict chronology.  My aim has been to show how elements – the 
inheritance from the formerly socialist East, the gradual evolution of EU 
VET policy as it applied to the established member states, the pressures of 
economic transition, and the process of enlargement – combined to give 
rise to a distinctive policy towards VET in the East.  To supplement the 
narrative I have also used other methods; a documentary analysis with 
quantitative results in Chapter Eight, and extracts from interviews with 
representative participants in Chapter Ten.  These supplementary methods 
were intended, respectively, to ground at least one aspect of the study in 
hard evidence, and to incorporate some personal perspectives about 
particular issues which were not easily answered from documentary 
sources. 
In all, I think that this balance of methods has been satisfactory in 
establishing what the EU’s policy was and in accounting for why it took the 
shape that it did.  It is less satisfactory in answering the rather separate, 
and admittedly more difficult, question of what the effects of the EU’s policy 
were.  To address this would have needed some kind of counter-factual 
case (i.e. what VET policies in the East would have been without the 
influence of the EU), which would be difficult to establish.  However a case-
study approach, attempting to track the effects of some major EU VET 
projects and pressures brought to bear in accession negotiations in specific 
countries, might shed some light on the extent to which the EU’s influence 
brought about specific changes. 
Turning to the individual methods used, I had hoped originally to gain 
access to the terms of reference of a large number of EU VET projects.  I 
had originally envisaged conducting some in-depth analysis – on the lines 
of that performed in Chapter Eight on the regular monitoring reports – in 
order to identify common items within projects.  Although I have a number 
of examples of these terms of reference from various sources, these are 
not published, and my enquiries at the ETF indicated that, though there 
was no objection to my examining them, they were scattered across the 
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various country files and it would clearly be a major job to assemble them.*  
However fortunately there had already been some meta-analyses of the 
common themes in projects (Baumgartl, Strietska-Ilina and Schaumberger, 
2004; Masson, 2003; Parkes et al., 1998; Viertel, 1994), on which I was 
able to draw.  I had also hoped that there might be some kind of inventory 
of the various consultants who had worked on projects which would enable 
one to establish which countries were dominant, but it seems that this too 
could only be established painstakingly, if at all, by going through the 
records of each project. 
Though I have instanced a number of evaluations of projects in Chapter 
Nine, I was disappointed that a larger set of studies was not easy to 
access.  It may be that they are held at the ETF or within the European 
Commission, and some are certainly accessible through ad hoc web 
searches, but the collection stored on the DG Enlargement website (DG 
Enlargement, 2012), is very limited and is mainly restricted to broad-brush 
evaluations of the whole Phare programme in particular countries or by 
major theme (not including vocational education and training).   
However I was able to undertake a quantitative analysis on the regular 
monitoring reports (Chapter Eight).  With the benefit of hindsight I need not, 
perhaps, have gone through every report on each country each year.  I 
suspect that taking four or five countries, or perhaps every second year, 
would have halved the work-load without affecting the results greatly.  But it 
was not until I was well into the exercise that I began to sense that the 
reports were very similar, and indeed it was that similarity which was the 
major finding, indicating that the EU stance was not much dependent on 
the different conditions in each country.  Nvivo was an invaluable tool in this 
task, enabling me both to give a numerical account of the frequency of 
references to particular themes, and readily to instance examples of these 
references.  Its ‘Query’ function allowed cross-tabulation and the narrowing 
down of particular types of reference.   
                                                
* A collection of the ‘programming documents’ for past Phare projects are available 
at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/instruments/former-
assistance/phare/index_en.htm, but these only describe VET projects in broad 
terms. 
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Turning to the interviews themselves, I believe that their strengths include a 
rapport as a colleague or informed fellow-professional which enabled me to 
follow up points of interest with some focus.  I was also pleased to have 
been able to include a good range of nationalities, though deciphering 
distinct accents and idiosyncratic use of English did pose some challenges 
during transcription.  I allowed a few interviews to run on too long, and in 
some places was irritated, when transcribing, to hear the sound of my own 
voice rather more than it should have featured.   
Undoubtedly the study would have benefited from one or more interviews 
with key staff in DG Enlargement.  I did not have contacts there, and I felt it 
would be something of a ‘shot in the dark’ to try to identify people who had 
been in post 15-20 years ago, but no doubt with perseverance I could have 
uncovered a candidate or two.  As it happened, but certainly through luck 
rather than good judgement, one of my ETF interviewees (ETF Dk, page 
215) had worked in DG Enlargement at the critical time and was able to 
shed some interesting light on their approach.  It is also the case that my 
other interlocutors from the ETF had had considerable contact with DG 
Enlargement over the years, and indeed had played a part in influencing 
the main thrusts of policy in respect of its stance towards VET. 
Throughout the study I was very much indebted to Endnote as my constant 
companion, not only to store and format my references, but also enabling 
me to search for themes.  As well as a ‘library’ of documents, I built up a 
further Endnote library of some 700 quotations as I worked my way through 
the various documents.  Some appear in this study, but collectively they 
have had an unintended use of enabling me quickly to see a spread of 
comments on a particular theme, or readily to review those items from a 
particular book or document which had struck me as significant while I was 
reading it.  I certainly would not have been able to distil my reading through 
the ‘intermediate’ technology of extracts on index-cards that I would have 
otherwise have been inclined to use. 
 
Suggestions for further research in the f ield 
As I have indicated, interesting further research might profitably be 
undertaken on the longer-term effects of certain prominent Phare 
development projects – such as the Slovenian and Bulgarian examples 
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cited in Chapter Nine (page 184).  And it would be illuminating to undertake 
work on the provenance and role of foreign consultants, particularly to 
investigate which eastern countries might genuinely be said to have been 
influenced by which western models; the taxonomy quoted by Parkes et al. 
(Chapter Nine, page 182) may have been superseded by subsequent 
events, and no doubt could be added to.  It would be interesting, too, to 
establish whether links between ‘related’ countries have been maintained. 
It would also be interesting to establish the career trajectories of key 
national staff who had been involved in Phare projects.  There is anecdotal 
evidence (cf. in Lithuania, page 185)  that personal careers may play an 
important role in the transmission of even apparently unsuccessful 
innovations into a ‘second round’ effect.  This effect may also arise from the 
subsequent careers of project staff who acted as ‘local experts’ (cf. the 
evidence of TL UK – page 193).  If this is the case there might well be profit 
in agencies such as the ETF and EU Delegations keeping in touch with 
such individuals after projects have finished. 
At a broader level, comparative analyses of VET in a number of the eastern 
countries would be of great interest.  These countries have shared much in 
common, notably a fairly unified communist VET tradition, similar transition 
pressures and, as we have shown, remarkably similar treatment during the 
process of accession to the EU and no doubt since they became members.  
However we saw earlier in this chapter (page 236) that participation in VET, 
both at secondary level and amongst the population of working age, has 
diverged considerably between the countries.  Although there are accounts 
of the different systems in the eastern countries, notably Kogan (2008), I 
am not aware of a penetrating analysis as to why one country might differ 
from another.  Given their similar starting points, any effects of varying 
historical trajectories, or very different external factors, would seem likely to 
be very limited, and so domestic pressures, political climate, the re-
emergence of regional influences (page 237 above), or simply the choice of 
domestic policymakers would be likely factors to account for the later 
divergences. 
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Implications for policy 
It was not the intent of this study to undertake a critique of policy, rather 
merely to identify and account for it.  Nevertheless certain pointers for 
attempts to influence and support VET in a climate of EU accession, or 
perhaps even looser international association, can be gleaned from what 
we have examined. 
First, we have endorsed Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier’s thesis that 
conditionality is more powerful than support as a means of inducing change 
(page 228 in this chapter).  Without suggesting that conditionality should be 
the only means of encouraging change, it would be wise to use the two 
methods together and, in co-ordination with each other in a mixture of hard-
headed negotiation on the one hand and support on the other, (Kotter and 
Schlesinger, 1979).  This ‘force and support’ strategy was occasionally 
manifested in our story (for example when accession negotiators stressed 
the importance of adult training for active labour market measures, while 
Phare projects gave advice on how to institutionalize the new sector), but it 
does not appear that such a strategy was always carefully orchestrated.  
For example, the lack of references to the virtues of the ‘curriculum 
package’ in the accession negotations must have seemed odd to countries 
when they found this approach being strongly promoted in EU-supported 
Phare projects.   
Evidence from the interviews (eg. the Hungarian consultant, page 205) 
indicated that the development of Phare terms of reference could be a 
rather hurried business set against a backdrop where domestic 
policymakers did not have the capacity to enter into meaningful 
negotiations about the support they needed (Danish ETF official, page 
194).  The result was often a rather standardized specification for a project 
(UK Consultant, page 206).  Given the importance of securing the backing 
of domestic policymakers (page 186), it would seem wise to spend rather 
more time and effort than seems to have been the case during the period 
covered by this study, in negotiating the content of projects and ensuring 
that domestic policymakers are prepared to take an active interest in, and 
be associated with, their successful execution.  If, as seems not 
uncommon, such commitment is not forthcoming then it would seem 
prudent not to progress with the project, as success is unlikely.  
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Abandoning scheduled projects for this reason should be seen as money 
saved, rather than an opportunity missed. 
More time and deeper negotiation in the preparation phase might also help 
with the identification of potential internal champions for VET reform, who 
are not only an important ingredient for the success of projects, but who 
also can become influential catalysts for change in the future.  Identifying 
such people and taking steps to groom them for future roles (through, for 
example, progressive insertion in a series of projects, personal study visits, 
invitations to conferences etc.) is likely to be effective in promoting a reform 
agenda. 
Finally, we have noted how the ‘international’ consultants on Phare projects 
have, inevitably, developed and promoted their own ideas of VET reform.  
The ‘curriculum package’ seems largely to have been generated by these 
consultants rather than arising from deliberate policy of the ETF or DG 
Enlargement.  As Lipsky (1979) points out, those engaged in 
implementation will inevitably have agendas of their own, which need to be 
taken into account.  One reaction might be to seek to control and repress 
such ‘hi-jacking’, but it would seem more constructive to seek to understand 
and work with it.  For example one could promote interchange between 
consultants, through occasional conferences and consultations, and 
encourage more interplay between the ETF and project personnel.  The 
treatment of the cadre of consultants as a serious player in its own right, 
rather than as series of contractors who are only concerned with fulfilling 
project specifications, would recognize the reality of the matter and enable 
the EU agencies to shape the thinking of this significant resource. 
In these ways one might arrive at a rather less mechanical and more co-
ordinated programme of influence over VET, whereby government-level 
negotiations, reform-minded domestic policymakers and well-briefed 
external consultants were all acting to reinforce each others’ efforts. 
 
Contribution of the thesis 
I believe that this thesis has made an original contribution to the literature 
on the EU’s policy on vocational education in a number of ways. 
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In the first place it has, for the first time, given a unified account of the 
origins and development of the EU’s policy on vocational education as it 
applied to the enlargement of the Community to eastern Europe.  While 
there have been partial accounts, notably Masson’s (2003), none has 
presented a picture of the trajectory since before the fall of communism 
until the point of accession to the EU, and attempted to marry the parallel 
tracks of the impact of development aid and the pressures of the accession 
negotiations.  This perspective has allowed us to track the shifting 
directions of the EU’s policy and has allowed insights into what was driving 
the policy at different points of time. 
By tracking the policy trajectory, the thesis has given strong indications that 
it was developments internal to the EU – rather than the external context of 
the transition economies – that best explains the shifts in policy that took 
place.  In turn, this internal dynamic provides evidence for a neo-
functionalist interpretation of the forces that shape European integration, at 
least in analyzing the reasons why particular policies took the shape that 
they did.  The  EU’s emphasis on developing institutions involving social 
partnership and the promotion of a technocratic approach to educational 
planning would seem to weigh significantly against interpretations that the 
EU, as a supra-national institution, has been increasingly wedded to ‘neo-
liberal’ views of the place of VET in a globalized economy. 
The findings about the nature and origins of the ‘curriculum package’, which 
was applied to eastern Europe through the Phare programme in the 1990s, 
indicate that events in VET in the East pre-dated the application of these 
precepts in the wider EU context in the early 2000s.  The current interest in 
outcome-based vocational education pedagogy and curriculum design in 
the East may not simply be a result of the encouragement of this kind of 
thinking through instruments such as the European Qualifications 
Framework, but be as much due to the revival of ideas which active eastern 
practitioners were introduced to at a formative point in their transition from 
communist ways. 
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GLOSSARY 
Acquis 
communautaire 
The total legacy of EU law applying to member states, as 
it stood at any given point in time.  Comprised of EU 
Treaties and Directives together with Court 
interpretations of them.  The 'soft' acquis refers to items 
of EU practice which are the subject of collective 
agreement rather than strict law. 
Active labour 
market measures 
(ALMMs) 
Programmes, usually co-ordinated by National 
Employment Services, designed to encourage and 
enable unemployed people to return to work quickly.  
Contrasted with 'passive' measures such as paying 
unemployment compensation or encouraging withdrawal 
from the labour force. 
CEDEFOP The European Centre for the Development of Vocational 
Training.  A long standing EU-funded agency concerned 
with promoting co-operation in VET, mainly through 
research, networking and information activities.  Based in 
Thessalonika since 1995, and before that in West Berlin. 
CEE(C)s/New 
Member States 
A variety of terms are used to denote the 10 ex-
communist countries joining the EU in 2004-7.  There is 
no wholly accepted term. Though Cyprus and Malta 
joined at the same time as the ex-communist countries, 
they are not often referred to in the same groupings. 
Copenhagen 
Process 
A series of collective policy statements about  VET 
priorities made by education ministers of European 
states, starting in Copenhagen in 2002.  Policies and 
progress are reviewed every two years.  As well as 
national actions, the Copenhagen process has led to the 
development of EU-wide 'instruments', notably the 
European Qualification Framework, ECVET for credit 
transfer between VET systems, and the European 
Quality Assurance Reference Framework for Vocational 
Education and Training (EQAVET) 
CVET Continuing Vocational Education and Training.  The term 
connotes the sector of VET which concerns training for 
adults.  This might apply to those who have already 
undertaken training for a trade/profession during a period 
of IVET, and who either wish to upgrade this, or to switch 
to a different occupation (re-training).  It may also apply 
to those adults who have, for whatever reason, not 
undertaken IVET and wish to train for the first time.  
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ETF The European Training Foundation.  Concerned with 
promoting European approaches to vocational education, 
training and employment measures in countries which 
are candidates for accession or which are otherwise 
aided by EU funds.  Monitors country VET issues, 
advises on projects to support VET and convenes 
conferences and groups to explore relevant topics, but no 
longer undertakes major aid projects itself. 
European 
Qualifications 
Framework (EQF) 
An instrument devised under the Copenhagen Process 
for comparing qualifications offered in one country's VET 
system with those in another system.  It operates through 
a series of generic descriptors of increasing  educational 
and occupational demand over eight levels.  Is expected 
to be operated through countries 'referencing' their 
national qualifications frameworks (which in some cases 
are being for the first time devised for this purpose) to it - 
hence its description as a 'meta-framework'. 
European Social 
Model 
A loosely defined concept whereby market forces are 
tempered through regulation to ensure a degree of 
employment protection and rights, health and 
unemployment insurance, equality of opportunity in the 
labour market, and decision-taking through collective 
agreements amongst the 'social partners'.  The intention 
is to balance economic growth with ‘social justice’.  It was 
manifested in the Maastricht ‘Social Chapter/Charter’ 
which gave explicit provision for the EU to legislate in this 
area. 
IVET Initial Vocational Education and Training.  The term 
connotes that part of VET which is concerned with the 
first establishment of skills relevant to a working career, 
usually in some particular trade or profession, or plainly 
preparatory to such training.  It sometimes includes 
relevant parts of higher education, though is not used in 
that sense in this study.  Generally IVET students are 
aged between 14 and 25. 
Learning 
Outcomes/ 
Competences 
Expressions of what an individual should know or be able 
to do after a period of instruction in VET.  Often 
contrasted with a 'traditional' VET approach whereby 
syllabuses of what should be taught are devised.  
Learning outcomes in VET are usually agreed with the 
relevant industrial sector and may be used either as the 
basis for devising a scheme of instruction or for 
assessing individuals directly, or both. 
Lisbon 
Agenda/Process/ 
Strategy 
A series of targets relevant to EU-wide competitiveness 
agreed in the Lisbon summit of 2000, and followed up in 
subsequent years through the 'open method of co-
ordination'.  Following a number of adaptations and re-
launches the current version (dating from 2012) is 
'Europe 2020'. 
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Modularization The construction of a programme of instruction or 
scheme of assessment from a number of self-contained 
sections, allowing flexibility and choice in the selection of 
what is taught or the description of what has been 
achieved.  The modules may be termed 'units', though 
this term is sometimes reserved for staged  
assessments, rather than for periods of instruction.  
Modules/units can be aggregated towards a larger 
course or qualification through 'credit accumulation' 
according to protocols known as 'rules of combination'. 
NVQs National Vocational Qualifications.  A UK initiative to 
modernize vocational qualifications in the 1980s, building 
on earlier reforms in Scotland.  It involved learning 
outcomes, through occupational standards, 
modularization, and a qualifications framework of 
different levels.  Though they still exist, NVQs never 
fulfilled the original aim of substituting for other forms of 
vocational qualification. 
Occupational 
Standards 
A particular form of learning outcome, devised through 
analyzing the detailed demands of particular occupations 
(often through a process known as 'functional analysis').  
Usually formally agreed by sectoral bodies.  Used to 
design VET programmes, and sometimes for the direct 
assessment of individuals. 
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ANNEX A: FULL CODING RESULTS FOR EU REPORTS 
Theme Sub-category level 1 Sub-category level 2 No of References* 
Decentralization  
 
139 
  Delegation to social 
partners 
 
70 
 
Looser regulation  5 
  Regional-local authorities  44 
  School independence  12 
  
 
 
 Directives   105 
 
Chapters 
 
11 
  Mutual recognition 
 
91 
  
   Europeanization 
 
 
466 
  Copying West European 
patterns 
 
47 
  
Apprenticeship 19 
  
New Teaching Methods 12 
  European Social Model 
 
126 
  Market models 
 
30 
  Mobility measures 
 
1 
  Participation in EU 
initiatives 
 
255 
  
ESF 84 
  
Lisbon and associated 10 
  
Projects 57 
  Reversion to pre-
communist forms 
 
5 
  
   Lifelong 
Learning 
  
 
192 
  Adult Training Sector 
 
79 
  
Regular school 
involvement 
9 
  Employability-
Competence 
 
1 
  Employer Training 
 
34 
  Government as promoter 
 
6 
  Individual Responsibility 
 
6 
  Lisbon 
 
4 
Modernization   
 
424 
  Bureaucracy 
 
17 
  Curriculum reform 
 
96 
  
Broader profiles 16 
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Theme Sub-category level 1 Sub-category level 2 No of References* 
  
Customization of 
curricula 
4 
  
Employer and 
stakeholder involvement 
45 
  
Increased general 
education 
6 
  
Modularization 17 
  Employability skills 
 
19 
  
Enterprise Education 8 
  Equipment 
 
23 
  
ICT 12 
  
  
   Responsive to individuals 
 
38 
  
Counselling 26 
  School Network 
 
43 
  
Rationalization of 
profiles 
4 
  
Vocational HE 14 
  Skills mismatch-LMI 
 
87 
  
Updating 25 
  Teacher Training (VET) 
 
33 
  
   Transparency   
 
488 
  Apolitical governance 
 
33 
  Data, Research & 
Classifications 
 
34 
  Formal qualifications 
 
85 
  
Qualifications 
Frameworks 
12 
  
Recognition of 
non/informal learning 
19 
  Legislation 
 
57 
  Levels 
 
9 
  Open planning 
 
177 
  
JAP or NAPE 
(Employment Strategy) 
107 
  Outcome based 
 
9 
  Quality Assurance 
 
39 
  
Assessment 17 
  
School inspection 1 
  Standards of training 
 
43 
  
Occupational Standards 19 
    Active Labour 
Market Policies 
  
103 
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Theme Sub-category level 1 Sub-category level 2 No of References* 
Machinery of 
Government 
 
 
33 
  
  
  
Social Inclusion 
  
121 
  Gender issues 
 
5 
  Minorities-Disadvantage 
 
99 
  Regional disparities  17 
  
   Whole system 
issues 
  
175 
  Drop out 
 
25 
  Financing 
 
65 
  Increased HE 
 
18 
  Participation in Sec Ed 
 
22 
  Progression to HE  9 
  Status of VET  21 
  Volume of VET 
 
15 
    Policy status 
  
906 
  Approval 
 
243 
  Capacity & co-ordination  178 
 
  Non implementation 46 
  Criticism 
 
237 
  Planned development 
 
55 
  Recommendation 
 
193 
 
*Figures for higher level categories include those in relevant lower level categories 
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ANNEX B: SAMPLE INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
 
The following is an example of the sheet given to interviewees around a 
week before the interview and re-presented to them at the beginning of the 
interview itself.  The questions posed were similar in each case, though 
varied slightly to reflect the likely experience and perspective of the 
interviewee. 
 
With your permission, I shall record the interview.  I would like to be able to 
quote passages in my thesis, but would do so anonymously, using the title 
‘Team Leader for PHARE projects in Eastern Europe’. 
 
My focus is the events concerning VET leading up to the accession of 
Eastern European countries.  My main interests in the interview are: 
1. Projects generally have detailed terms of reference.  How 
appropriate are these in relation to the problems that face VET in the 
country(ies)? 
2. Describe the process for bidding for a project.  To what extent does 
the bidding process ensure that the best team and ideas are selected? 
3. In practice, what room for manoeuvre are projects given in adapting 
their activities to the problems that need to be addressed?  Are they given 
too much/not enough freedom? 
4. How critical for success are: 
 (a) the agencies of the EU which fund and monitor the project; 
 (b) the ETF; 
 (c) the local officials/policymakers with whom one needs to 
interact; 
 (d) foreign experts deployed in projects; 
 (e) local experts deployed in projects. 
5. Projects seem to include various elements, typically resources for 
buildings/equipment, training of staff, adaptation of 
curricula/qualifications/profiles, advice on policy, study visits etc. Would you 
single out any as being more effective than others? 
6. How important do you think is the national background of the foreign 
experts (as opposed to their personal qualities)? 
7. To what extent do you think that local policymakers, stakeholders 
and heads of schools/colleges feel they can influence their own 
participation.  Is their cooperation a matter of helping to further their own 
objectives or a matter of ‘toeing the line’? 
 
